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Environment, Energy and Transportation Program

The State Role in Spent Fuel Transportation Safety: Year 2000 Update

January 2000

Transportation Series No. 14

By James B. Reed

Contents

Introduction
Public Perception
History of Spent Fuel Transportation
Federal Regulatory Overview
State Regulation of Spent Fuel Transportation
Federal Preemption
State Practices
Emergency Response Revenue Sources
Highway Routing
Rail Routing
Modal Mix
Sabotage
Liability
WGA Transportation Safety Program for WIPP
Recommendations
Conclusion
Appendix A: DOE Details Impacts of Spent Fuel Transportation to Yucca Mountian
Appendix B: State permit Fees for the Transportation of Spent Fuel, High-Level Waste and Highway Route-Controlled Quantities of Radioactive Materials
References

Figure 1
Figure 2 (PDF version)
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5 (PDF version)
Figure 6 (PDF version)
Figure 7 (PDF version)

Introduction

State legislatures have a vital role in ensuring the safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials through their states. The states work with local governments and federal agencies to prevent accidents and provide emergency response when accidents do occur. The state role became more prominent during the last two decades as Congress pushed implementation of federal policy to the state level and as states assumed authority for areas where federal activity was inadequate. In the last two years, state legislators considered numerous bills in this area, largely reacting to the policies of the federal government as spent fuel shipments from foreign research reactors move across the country and as planning proceeds for shipping spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada, geologic repository. (Other nuclear cargoes are also shipped through the states, however, the focus of this report is on spent fuel transportation.)

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, as amended, (42 USC 10101 et seq.) establishes U.S. policy for the development of facilities for the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. (Spent nuclear fuel is irradiated fuel discharged from a nuclear reactor. It is defined as a subset of high-level radioactive waste, which is a subset of hazardous materials.) As required by the NWPA, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) entered into contracts with utilities that own spent nuclear fuel. The contracts provided that, "Following commencement of operation of a repository, the Secretary [of Energy] shall take title to the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as expeditiously as practicable upon the request of the generator or owner of such waste or spent fuel and in return for payment of fees established by this section, the Secretary, beginning not later than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as provided" by the act. (42 USC 10222)

As the January 1998 date approached, DOE stated that, since no federal facilities would be available to store or dispose of spent fuel by that date, it was under no obligation to begin accepting waste. A number of electric utilities, state public utilities commissions and attorneys general in 35 states sued to force DOE to accept spent fuel as required by the NWPA. After several rounds of litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court let stand a District of Columbia Circuit Court ruling that DOE need not begin collecting nuclear waste until it has a disposal facility. However, the appeals court said DOE could be sued for monetary damages by those entities that had relied on the 1998 deadline. Several utility companies are seeking such damages. To ease utility liability worries, DOE has proposed to Congress that it would take ownership and management responsibility of spent fuel at reactor sites and pay for temporary storage when necessary.

In the meantime, commercial spent fuel is accumulating at 72 nuclear power plants in 33 states that are awaiting the opening of a permanent repository. Legislation to authorize storage at the Nevada Test Site failed to pass Congress in the past two legislative sessions, and is pending again in the 106th Congress. Congress also is considering S 1287, providing for waste acceptance by December 2006 at the repository (contingent on Nuclear Regulatory Commission construction authorization), and improving planning and shipping requirements, among other provisions. To address shortages of on-site spent fuel storage some utilities have constructed dry cask storage facilities or shipped nuclear fuel between reactor sites.

DOE is studying a site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to determine its suitability as a permanent repository. In August 1999, DOE issued a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) that provides information about potential environmental impacts of constructing and operating a geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain. The DEIS found "nothing that would be a basis for not proceeding" with the Yucca Mountain repository. (See appendix A for a summary of the DEIS findings relative to transportation.) An earlier "Viability Assessment" in December 1998 also found nothing in the scientific and technical analyses being conducted to support the final EIS and a 2001 recommendation to the president that the Yucca Mountain site be developed as a repository to indicate that plans for a repository should be halted. Upon presidential recommendation to Congress that the project proceed, a license application for construction and operation of the repository would be submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by DOE. Nevada can veto the president's decision, which Congress can override. A permanent disposal facility would be ready in 2010, according to official DOE estimates.

The earliest date for significant transportation of spent fuel to a repository is eight to 10 years away. Recognizing the substantial lead times needed to prepare for a potential of 100,000 shipments during a 25-year period, states are examining what safety legislation may be necessary to accommodate significant increases in spent fuel traffic on highways and railroads. (Other fuel shipments are ongoing, including those from foreign reactors and routine shipments between reactors.) This state-level examination focuses on emergency response, routing, enforcement and other safety questions. DOE is obligated by the NWPA, Section 180(c), to provide funds to states where spent fuel and high-level waste shipments covered under the NWPA will occur. Of particular interest to states is DOE's plan to use private industry for its entire waste acceptance and transport services operation.

Moving radioactive waste and spent fuel from generation points to new storage or disposal facilities takes place under public scrutiny. Indeed, public expression of fear and concern often is substantial when the materials to be transported are radioactive, according to a University of New Mexico (UNM) survey. Even though the safety record of radioactive shipments in the United States is exemplary, the public perception of radioactive shipments is that they are more dangerous than other hazardous cargoes. A major risk study-entitled the Modal Study-conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1987 and partially updated in 1995 concluded that extremely few accidents would pose a significant radiation hazard to the public. (NRC-sponsored meetings are under way to update the findings of the Modal Study.) It concurred with a previous Nuclear Regulatory Commission finding that the expected radiological consequences from the shipment of 3,000 metric tons of spent fuel is less than one latent cancer fatality every 2,300 years. With increased numbers of future shipments expected once a disposal facility opens, some number of accidents are anticipated, causing further public concern, even though casks are designed to withstand severe accidents. Many state legislators feel that the need for heightened safety vigilance is imperative since the NWPA program represents an increase in both scale and operational complexity, thereby increasing the opportunity for mishaps and human error.

An important finding of the UNM survey on the transportation of radioactive materials was that 45 percent of the respondents perceive state or local government officials as the best representatives of community views regarding the transport of radioactive materials. Thus, state legislators are key brokers of information on this topic and need factual information to be able to respond to constituent concerns.

This report provides information to legislators and interested citizens as they evaluate the safety of spent fuel transportation. The report gives a brief history of spent fuel transportation, an overview of the federal regulatory structure, and a description of the steps states have taken to ensure the safety of spent fuel shipments, including permits, inspection and enforcement, notification, emergency response, and routing. Included are recommendations of additional steps states might find useful in furthering public safety as shipments increase during the next several years.

History of Spent Fuel Transportation

Approximately 3 million shipments of radioactive materials occur annually in the United States, mostly on the highways. The majority of these shipments are radio-pharmaceuticals being transported to and from hospitals. DOE shipped almost 13,000 radioactive cargoes in 1995-1996, 27 of which were irradiated fuel. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), fewer than 100 spent fuel shipments take place each year. From 1971 through 1991, six accidents and 47 incidents occurred involving nuclear fuel shipments. (An accident involves a motor vehicle mishap such as a crash; a reported incident includes an actual or suspected release or surface contamination that exceeds regulatory requirements from either the package or the transport vehicle.) No radioactive materials were released during these occurrences due to the robust nature of the casks.

Nuclear power plants, government research facilities, universities and industrial facilities have transported about 3,000 shipments of spent nuclear fuel to date without a single death or injury due to the radioactive nature of the cargo. The potential for radiological injury is greatly minimized during transportation because spent fuel and high-level wastes are shipped solid and dry in large metal, lead-lined containers called casks. Casks are robust containers that are designed to shield radiation and withstand severe accidents without releasing radioactive contents. They must meet strict federal regulatory standards. Workers involved in transporting loaded casks exercise caution when in close proximity to casks because some radiation exposure occurs-about the equivalent of a chest x-ray if a person stood six feet from a cask for one hour.

Federal Regulatory Overview

Both the federal government and the states have roles in ensuring spent fuel transportation safety. At the federal level, spent nuclear fuel transportation is regulated jointly by the NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation. The NRC regulates the packaging, preparation and transfer of commercial nuclear material under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2011 et seq.) and its implementing regulations found at 10 CFR Parts 20, and 71-73. The NRC issues certificates for radioactive materials packaging, including spent fuel casks, that verify compliance with safety standards. The certification essentially means that the cask will withstand severe transportation accidents with minimal chance of release of its contents. The NRC is the largest enforcer of DOT radioactive materials regulations, and has the lead role in investigating accidents involving NRC-certified packages. NRC also requires advance notification to state governors of spent fuel shipments, and enforces requirements for safeguarding shipments. NRC physical protection requirements for those shipping spent fuel include the following:

• Advance NRC approval of routes,
• Procedures to deal with theft or sabotage of shipments,
• Visual surveillance of the cargo during stops,
• Communications monitoring of the shipment,
• A written shipment log,
• Avoidance of intermediate stops to the extent possible,
• Two or more armed escorts through high population centers and one (unarmed) through other areas,
• Calls to communications center by escorts at least every two hours,
• Prior arrangements with local officials along routes to assist in emergency response activities, and
• Methods to immobilize trucks in case of emergency (10 CFR 73.37).

Scientists use a combination of investigation methods, including calculations, computer modeling and scale model tests to ensure that casks can meet testing requirements (see sidebar). Numerous organizations that are affected by the DOE civilian radioactive waste management program-including the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)- have called for full-scale cask testing to enhance public confidence in the integrity of transportation casks, a view endorsed by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. A bill passed by the California Legislature in 1998 would have required full-scale cask testing, among numerous other provisions, but the governor vetoed it. In addition, some organizations have called on the NRC to require crush testing for casks.

The DOT, under the federal law entitled Transportation of Hazardous Material (49 USC 5101-5127), is responsible for ensuring the safety of hazardous materials transportation (of which spent fuel and all radioactive materials are a subset) through numerous requirements. Figure 1 summarizes the federal hazardous materials regulations. Place-of-origin inspections of all highway route-controlled quantities (HRCQ) of radioactive materials by state or federal officers are required. (49 USC 5105(e)) HRCQ is defined by the type of radionuclide, the amount of radioactivity and the form of the material. HRCQ shipments contain a relatively large amount of radioactive activity and are subject to specific training and routing controls in highway shipment. Spent fuel is classified as HRCQ. Criteria for handling hazardous materials and required training of employers and employees is specified. A grant program through the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) assists states, local governments and Indian tribes by providing funds for planning and training for hazardous materials incidents.

Figure 1. Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR)

Further, carriers of certain hazardous materials must register with RSPA. Shipping papers and incident notification are required. Routing standards are specified for states that wish to designate routes. Inconsistent state, local and Indian tribal laws and regulations are preempted by federal law through DOT regulations in certain areas, including the designation, description and classification of hazardous materials; packing, handling, marking, labeling and placarding; shipping papers; incident reporting; and packaging and container requirements. Other federal laws govern rail safety, motor carrier inspections, motor carrier safety requirements, and commercial driver's license standards. The DOT and NRC have a memorandum of understanding to clarify roles and responsibilities and avoid regulatory duplication. Two arms of DOT are responsible for specific transportation modes. The U.S. Coast Guard has oversight of vessel transportation of radioactive materials, while the Federal Railroad Administration enforces track safety standards, conducts rail car inspections, and verifies operational safety of plans and equipment for radioactive materials shipments.

The role of the Department of Energy is primarily management of spent fuel transportation operations. The DOE must comply with all DOT and NRC transportation regulations and has stated that it will comply with all applicable state requirements that are not preempted by federal law. Internal DOE regulation-orders-prescribe safety procedures. Under the NWPA, DOE will take title to spent fuel at the reactor, provide casks for transport, arrange for shipments to occur, manage its transportation contractors, assist state and local governments in responding to transportation emergencies, and provide technical and financial assistance to states and Indian tribes for emergency response training. DOE deploys radiological assistance program (RAP) teams during radiological incidents. DOE works with affected organizations through cooperative agreements that allow for communication and coordination of DOE activities with local, state and tribal governments.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has a role in assisting states in planning and training for emergency response and coordinating federal agencies during an incident, if federal assistance is requested. FEMA periodically issues Guidance for Developing State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness for Transportation Accidents and provides financial and technical assistance to state, tribal and local governments.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets radiation standards for protecting the public and the environment at Yucca Mountain, although an effort is under way to by the nuclear power industry and others to shift the standard setting authority to the NRC. An EPA official chairs the National Response Team, which oversees national emergency response and preparedness planning. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), an arm of the Department of Labor, regulates vehicle operator safety, the safety of emergency response employees, and the protection of workers who handle radioactive materials at shipping or transfer facilities, although that jurisdiction overlaps with DOT jurisdiction.

The nonregulatory Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) evaluates the scientific and technical validity of DOE's waste management activities, including transportation, and makes recommendations to Congress and the secretary of energy.

Figure 2 (PDF Version)

State Regulation of Spent Fuel Transportation

Although the federal government is responsible for most regulations concerning spent fuel transportation, state, local and Indian tribal governments have some authority over shipments that originate in, pass through or terminate in their jurisdictions. The federal role is comprehensive but not exclusive. Non-federal governments seek to further protect public health and welfare by enacting laws and regulations that are intended to minimize the occurrence of and potential adverse effects of a transportation accident. A level of tension exists between states that enact safety requirements based on localized concerns and conditions and the federal government that generally seeks uniformity of regulations to support the free flow of interstate commerce. An ongoing process exists to reconcile the legitimate right of states to protect the health and safety of their citizens through the states' constitutional police powers with the federal responsibility to assure safety and the free flow of interstate commerce. Inconsistent state, local and tribal requirements are preempted, but some latitude exists for enactment of state regulations that mirror federal requirements (such as adoption of federal hazardous materials transportation regulations) or address areas untouched by federal law (such as requiring hazardous materials carriers to keep their headlights on during the day.) Indeed, the federal hazardous material transportation law embodies the notion of a federal-state partnership in assuring hazardous materials transportation safety.

The state role in regulating highway transport of spent fuel has been especially prominent, with lesser authority existing relative to air, water and rail transport. Specifically, states have authority in determining driver qualifications, ensuring safe operation of motor vehicles, and conducting inspection and enforcement activities. All states have adopted, in large part, the federal motor carrier safety regulations and the federal hazardous materials regulations and are authorized and encouraged to enforce them. Nine states enact the federal regulations through a legislative process, while the rest use an automatic or administrative adoption procedure.

In addition, states have enacted a variety of statutes aimed at further protecting public health and safety, sometimes after a highly publicized transportation accident occurs that exposes flaws in the system. Some 500 state laws and regulations are in force that have some effect on spent fuel transportation. The laws address registration and permit programs, routing requirements, notification, financial liability, emergency response planning and training, inspection and enforcement, and various shipment restrictions.

Federal Preemption

Numerous state hazardous and radioactive materials transportation requirements have been challenged in court by individuals and companies seeking clarification of state and federal jurisdiction. A state or local transportation requirement may be challenged on two primary grounds-preemption by federal transportation law or violation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. In resolving questions of federal preemption, the courts have declared valid state and local regulations that promote the federal government's goal of safe transportation, cause only minor transportation delays, and produce little or no burden on interstate commerce.

In addressing these questions previously, the federal courts applied two tests as originally promulgated by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act: 1) the dual compliance test (whether compliance with both state/tribal/local and federal regulations is possible) and 2) the obstacle test (the extent to which the state, tribal or local requirement creates an obstacle to execution of the federal law and accompanying regulations).

These tests and a new test were codified by amendments to the federal hazardous materials transportation law in 1990. Federal law (49 USC Sec. 5125) and the hazardous materials regulations (49 CFR Part 107, subpart c) provide that, unless authorized by another federal law, any requirement of a state, local or tribal government is preempted if:

• Compliance with both the state, local or tribal requirement and any federal hazardous materials requirement is not possible; or
• The state, local or tribal requirement as applied or enforced is an obstacle to accomplishing and carrying out federal hazardous materials law; or
• The state, local or tribal requirement concerns a "covered subject" and is not substantively the same as any provision or regulation of federal hazardous materials law concerning that subject. ("Substantively the same" means that the non-federal requirement conforms in every significant respect to the federal requirement. Editorial and other similar changes are permitted.)

Covered subjects are:

• Designation, description and classification of hazardous materials;
• Packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking and placarding of hazardous materials;
• Preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents pertaining to hazardous materials and requirements related to the number, content and placement of such documents;
• Written notification, recording and reporting of the unintentional release in transportation of hazardous materials; and
• Designing, manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintaining, reconditioning, repairing or testing of a package or container that is represented, marked, certified or sold as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials.

DOT, through RSPA or the Federal Highway Administration, may issue a preemption determination based on the above tests or on a waiver of preemption. (Previously, these determinations were called inconsistency rulings and were issued solely by RSPA.) Preemption is waived in cases where the jurisdiction shows that its requirement affords an equal or greater level of protection to the public as that afforded by the federal requirement and does not unreasonably burden commerce. In addition, as noted in DOT Inconsistency Ruling Number 2 (1978) involving Rhode Island's restrictions on the transportation of bulk flammable gas by highway, "To the extent that nationwide regulations do not adequately address a particular local safety hazard, state and local governments can narrowly regulate for the purpose of eliminating or reducing the hazard." Figure 3 shows federal court decisions on various state and local rules governing hazardous materials transportation.

In another form of federal preemption, all radioactive materials shipments connected with defense or national security matters are under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government. State and local jurisdictions have no authority to regulate such shipments, which are not disclosed as to time and place and which occur in specially protected, escorted trucks.

Additional examples of permissible state-specific safety measures are shown in figure 4.

Figure 3. State and Local Regulations Ruled Upon by Federal Courts

Figure 4. Permissible State-Specific Safety Measures

State Practices

During the last two decades, radioactive waste transportation has become an important topic for state legislators, corresponding with growing public awareness of storage and disposal facility siting activities for all types of radioactive waste. Some states address radioactive materials or hazardous materials in general, while others target a specific type of radioactive material such as spent fuel from nuclear power plants. Key concerns of state legislators are accident prevention, emergency response training, and communication and coordination. To track these concerns, many legislatures receive an annual report from the state regulatory agencies that are responsible for hazardous and radioactive materials transportation safety.

Described below are state radioactive materials transportation programs that are among the most effective for ensuring safety. These include permitting of placarded shipments; vehicle, driver and cargo inspections; notification requirements; routing designations; and emergency response preparedness, including training.

An important state regulatory tool for ensuring safety is requiring transporters of certain materials to obtain a transportation permit. Permits generally involve an evaluation of a motor carrier's ability to operate safely, and include an examination of its past safety compliance record, financial responsibility, inspection record and other compliance factors. Permits are issued both annually and on a per-trip basis. Eighteen states-California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and Wyoming-require permits for shipments of HRCQ, spent fuel and/or high-level radioactive waste (see figure 5). Permit applicants usually must supply name and address, emergency telephone number, description of material to be transported, number of shipments, estimated radioactivity of shipments, route to be used, description of any past violations of law related to radioactive transportation, proof of insurance, proof of a satisfactory safety rating from DOT, payment of fee, agreement to allow vehicle inspection, certification as to compliance with applicable federal and state laws, indemnification of the state, and immediate report of any release or accident. Most states also issue permits for overweight and oversize highway cargoes to control time and place of movement and otherwise enhance safety.

Figure 5 (PDF version)

An effort is under way to standardize the forms and procedures for all hazardous materials permitting and registration of motor carriers, pursuant to 49 USC 5119. The DOT has been reviewing the recommendations of the Alliance for Uniform HazMat Transportation Procedures after two Federal Register notices seeking public review and comment were placed in 1996 and 1998. The Alliance has recommended a base state system where a carrier receives credentials in its home state that are valid in all participating jurisdictions. States using the uniform program have found that it improves safety through better regulatory compliance on the part of motor carriers. Motor carriers must certify that they are aware of and will comply with all applicable federal and state regulatory requirements.

Congress created the Alliance as a part of Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990. The Alliance consisted of 28 state and local officials involved with permit and registration programs in 27 jurisdictions. The congressional charge to the group was to establish uniform forms and procedures for states that register and permit carriers that transport, cause to be transported, or ship hazardous materials by motor carrier. Initial recommendations were conveyed to the secretary of transportation in November 1993. Pilot programs in Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio and West Virginia from 1994 through 1995 tested the Alliance recommendations. The Final Report of the Uniform Program Pilot Project, issued on March 15, 1996, asks Congress to create a compact-like process to encourage new states to adopt the uniform program. Programs that are inconsistent with the uniform program after a certain date would be preempted. When fully implemented, the end result will be a consistent national permit and registration process to ease motor carrier compliance with state programs and decrease the administrative workload in individual states by spreading the regulatory burden among the states.

Inspection of vehicles, drivers and cargo is one of the most effective ways to ensure radioactive materials transportation safety. Using federal money, states conduct the majority of inspection and enforcement functions that help ensure the safety of motor carriers on the nation's highways. States that adopt the federal motor carrier safety regulations and the federal hazardous materials regulations are able to engage in inspection and enforcement activities. All states have done so to the extent necessary to qualify for grants under the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP), housed in the new National Motor Carrier Safety Administration under the U.S. Department of Transportation. MCSAP is a matching grant program designed to promote commercial vehicle safety by increasing the level of national uniform inspection and enforcement activities. Roadside inspections are conducted in 48 states. Several states-including California, Illinois, New York and Ohio-have extensive enforcement programs that include inspection for compliance with hazardous material regulations, education programs to increase compliance, and stiff civil or criminal penalties for violations. Other enforcement tools include authority to search the contents of vehicles without a warrant, inspection of carrier facilities, and inspections at the point of shipment origin.

MCSAP helps pay for state activities in this area. It funds state motor carrier safety programs on an 80 percent/20 percent basis if the state adopts and enforces the appropriate safety regulations, submits an enforcement and safety program plan, designates a lead agency, agrees to devote adequate resources to administration and enforcement of regulations, has established statutory authority to regulate private and for-hire motor carriers, and provides for right of entry into vehicles and facilities. States use MCSAP money to train personnel to inspect vehicles and driver records, conduct reviews of carrier operations, and promote public awareness of commercial vehicle laws and safety. States also may use funds to support truck weight enforcement, uniform truck and bus accident reporting, commercial driver's license enforcement, hazardous materials requirements training, and enforcement of state laws in conjunction with MCSAP roadside inspections. In FY 1996, more than 2 million inspections took place. Many states also assist the federal agency by conducting compliance reviews of motor carriers that result in safety fitness ratings.

The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), enacted in June 1998, changes the program to one based on performance in enhancing truck safety. MCSAP states must invest in activities to reduce crashes, set performance goals and maintain program effectiveness, improve data collection and analysis, adequately train enforcement personnel and pursue new technologies. TEA-21 also greatly increased funding authorization to states for MCSAP, starting at $90 million for FY 1999 and increasing to $110 million in FY 2003. To place a greater federal emphasis on truck safety, Congress, in late 1999, created the National Motor Carrier Safety Administration and doubled the size of motor carrier safety enforcement programs, adding $550 million to the $579 million already authorized by TEA-21.

The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) is a North American organization of state, federal and Canadian provincial safety enforcement officials that seeks uniformity, compatibility and reciprocity of inspections and motor carrier safety activities. CVSA has worked with DOE to develop uniform inspection standards for drivers and vehicles that are transporting spent fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and transuranic waste. The so-called Enhanced North American Standard Inspection for Transportation of Radioactive Materials has been thoroughly tested during the past four years. Under the enhanced inspection, the vehicle can have no defects before a special radioactive inspection decal-valid for only one trip-is affixed.

CVSA's evaluations have found that the use of the enhanced (more stringent) procedures contributed to the overall success of radioactive shipment campaigns through use of better equipment and more experienced drivers. CVSA membership recommends using the enhanced North American standard for all highway route-controlled quantities of radioactive materials and transuranic waste.

The Federal Rail Safety Act authorizes DOT, through the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), to conduct rail inspections, regulate state activity in federal rail safety inspections, oversee track and locomotive safety standards, and establish railroad accident reporting. The FRA policy for inspection of high-level nuclear waste includes twice-yearly inspections of track, signals along routes, locomotives, cask cars and train crew compliance with carrier operating rules. Through the State Participation Program, state rail inspectors may coordinate with or supplement FRA inspectors, and may conduct independent inspections after certification by FRA. Before participation can begin, states must enter into a multi-year agreement with FRA for the exercise of the specified authority. Fourteen states-Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington and West Virginia-employ 23 certified hazardous materials rail inspectors. States may enforce regulations beyond federal rules as necessary to eliminate or reduce a local safety hazard if the state rules are compatible with federal requirements and do not interfere with interstate commerce. However, FRA has exclusive authority to assess monetary penalties and to recommend court action for recovery of such penalties.

State and local governments have enacted notification requirements to provide data for routing, safety planning and improving emergency response. Notification can include notice to appropriate authorities before a shipment occurs, periodic summaries, and reports on individual shipments filed after the trip. NRC rules (10 CFR parts 71 and 73) require prenotification of the governor's designee for spent fuel shipments; at least 17 states have enacted the same or similar requirements. With recent NRC rule changes, tribal governments also receive notification. Information required by NRC Part 73 regulations (that cover spent fuel shipments in excess of 100 grams) to be supplied to states before a shipment occurs includes: contact information, a description of the shipment, a listing of routes to be used, estimated time and date of departure, estimated time and date of entry into the state, and a statement that the shipping information must be withheld from the public for at least 10 days after the shipment. DOE follows NRC notification requirements and has sometimes undertaken voluntary courtesy notifications to states and tribes along planned routes for certain shipping campaigns, such as the transportation of transuranic waste to WIPP. DOE's tracking and communication system-called TRANSCOM-is available to states and tribes to monitor movement of selected shipments, and can be used to make the required notifications.

Prenotification allows state and local authorities to be on alert when shipments traverse their jurisdictions. Numerous local communities have notification requirements, although enforcement is inconsistent. Upon receiving the required notification, 19 states sometimes or always notify local governments of spent fuel shipments. Virginia and Indiana provide information to local elected officials, while the others notify law enforcement or emergency responders. Public authorities that operate transportation infrastructure such as bridges and tunnels often require prenotification of spent fuel shipments to arrange for escorts and to alert emergency response authorities. Several facilities ban spent fuel altogether due to the difficult logistics of response to an accident in a confined space like a tunnel.

Emergency preparedness for and response to a radioactive materials accident is the collective responsibility of shippers (the owners and/or generators of the materials); the carriers that are transporting the materials; the affected state, local, and tribal governments; and the federal government. The driver, if not injured, has initial responsibility for on-site response to minimize personal injury and property damage from a radioactive release, such as directing traffic around the accident, keeping people away from suspected radioactive contamination, and notifying the shipper and authorities that require incident reporting. Local governments-and, sometimes state agencies-have principal responsibility for first response to protect people, property and the environment within the state from harm from civilian radioactive transportation accidents. Their ability to take appropriate actions-like putting out fires and organizing evacuations-can be critical factors in alleviating severe consequences. Such local and state capability depends largely on adequate training. Upon request, various federal agencies will assist state and local governments in responding to certain nonmilitary radioactive accidents. The federal government exercises primary responsibility in response to a defense-related radiological accident.

State officials also can request assistance from utilities during a transportation emergency that involves radioactive materials. The NRC requires each nuclear utility to develop a plan for coping with the effects of a radiological emergency at a nuclear power generating station. Utilities in the vicinity may be asked to lend technical support in the event of a transportation accident.

Guidance for radiological emergency response planning is found in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Guidance for Developing State, Tribal, and Local Radiological Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Transportation Accidents. The document was prepared by FEMA with the assistance of other federal agencies, and in consultation with state and local officials and provides guidance for states, Indian tribes and local governments. All states have plans to react to emergency situations; several have specific plans to respond to transportation accidents involving radiological hazards. Numerous states participate in mutual aid agreements to share or exchange resources under emergency conditions.

All state legislatures have passed bills to address various emergency response needs. State concerns include adequate funding and staff, equipment, planning, training/exercises, communications and coordination. State programs generally are geared to address all types of hazardous materials incidents, including radioactive materials. However, variation exists among states as to the adequacy of their emergency response capability for radiological transportation incidents. Radioactive material shipments cannot be banned even if officials feel their emergency response is inadequate. DOT Inconsistency Ruling #18 involving the radioactive materials transportation rules of Prince George's County, Maryland, stated that the inadequacy of emergency response capabilities cannot provide a basis for prohibiting transportation.

Numerous federal, state and private agencies provide assistance and training to meet emergency response needs. DOE offers training courses designed to teach various levels of knowledge from simple awareness to commanding the scene of an incident. One such course, the Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training (MERRTT), features eight courses with 16 training modules that can be used according to a jurisdiction's specific needs.

Emergency Response Revenue Sources

Revenue to support emergency response activities comes from federal sources, and is generated through permit and fee systems at the state and local levels, and by general appropriations.

Twenty-five states assess fees for radioactive materials shipments usually associated with a permit or registration requirement. With user fees, the beneficiaries of a state's services help defray the costs of such services. The revenue generated meets some, but not all, the costs of emergency preparedness and response. Federal law requires that fees on hazardous materials transportation must be equitable and used for purposes related to hazardous materials transportation, including enforcement; carrier education; and planning, development and maintenance of emergency response capability. Thus, Illinois' $1,000 per cask fee for spent fuel transportation was not preempted when challenged in 1985 because it funds inspection, enforcement, state escorts and emergency response, and does not cause transportation delays. (During the 1998 legislative session, Illinois raised its per cask fee to $2,500 for truck shipments and $4,500 for rail shipments.)

Fees also must meet the fairness test under the dormant commerce clause found in Evansville (92 S. Ct. 1349) (1972). This test says a fee is fair if it is based on a fair approximation of use of the state facilities, is not excessive in relation to benefits conferred, and does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Flat tax fees assessed per vehicle or per trip per vehicle have been preempted because they fail the internal consistency test of the Commerce Clause as an undue burden on interstate commerce. Essentially, these fees are not equitable to nationwide carriers. (Appendix B contains a list of state fees on spent fuel, HRCQ and high-level radioactive waste transport.)

No matter the status of a state's program, all states depend upon federal money to supplement their efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency provides more than $150 million per year to states, tribes and local governments to enhance general emergency response capability. Programs that specifically target radioactive materials transportation are listed below.

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Section 180(c), DOE is required to implement a program of technical assistance and funding to states for training of public safety officials of appropriate units of local government and Indian tribes through whose jurisdiction DOE plans to transport spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste. The training will cover both safe routine transportation and emergency response procedures. The funding and assistance are intended to compensate states for the extra effort and expense they will incur due to the federal spent fuel shipments. Money for the Section 180(c) program comes from fees paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund by consumers of nuclear power. Key elements of the proposed policy include the following:

• DOE, through the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), will provide financial and technical assistance, subject to annual appropriations, to assist states and tribes to obtain access to the increment of training needed to prepare for NWPA shipments.
• Funds can be used for highway safety inspections of shipments, for rail measures that compliment Federal Railroad Administration inspection procedures, for access to satellite tracking equipment and related training, for awareness level training for emergency responders, and, possibly, enhanced training for responders.
• A one-time planning grant of $150,000 will be available to each eligible jurisdiction, plus an annual base grant of $75,000, plus a two-part variable amount based on specific needs.
• The grant application process will begin four years prior to actual shipments, based on identification of preliminary shipping routes.
• Ten percent of each year's total grant can be used for supplies and equipment.

Many states believe that shipments ultimately destined for an NWPA facility should be covered by Section 180(c), even though they may reside for a period of time at a private storage facility. Sites in Utah and Wyoming are under current consideration as private spent fuel storage facilities. To date, DOE has disallowed funding for shipments to private facilities.

States have expressed the necessity of obtaining Section 180(c) funds with adequate lead time before spent fuel shipments begin so that preparations can be made for the additional burden DOE spent fuel shipments will place on local and state emergency response resources. A more important issue is incorporating Section 180(c) funds and activities into budget, administrative and training cycles in a timely fashion. Additionally, probable routes should be identified so that training assistance can be targeted along transportation corridors. The Western Governors' Association Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Transportation Safety Program which allows for these state concerns (discussed below) may be a good model for the spent fuel shipping campaign to an NWPA facility.

Due to OCRWM's de-emphasis of transportation planning, the Section 180(c) policy and procedures will remain in draft form until program progress or legislation provides definitive guidance as to when shipment will commence.

A related development is DOE's proposed consolidated transportation grant. In consultation with states, Indian tribes and other affected parties, a DOE-wide effort is underway to examine the feasibility of consolidating the many transportation grants DOE provides to states and tribes to achieve greater consistency, accountability, efficiency and better internal DOE coordination of transportation operations that affect states and tribes. A decision on the consolidated grant approach is expected in late 2000 after consideration by the Transportation External Coordination Working Group.

According to a survey by the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), 3.2 million emergency responders need training, a greater number than previously estimated. Funding is available from DOT, as mandated by HMTUSA (49 USC 5116), for states to pay for emergency response planning and training. Administered by RSPA, the Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) grant program is intended to provide financial and technical assistance as well as national direction and guidance to enhance state, territorial, tribal, and local hazardous materials emergency planning and training. The HMEP grant program distributes fees collected from shippers and carriers of hazardous materials to emergency responders for hazardous materials training and to local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) for hazardous materials planning. Since 1993, this grant program has helped train some 694,000 hazardous materials responders.

Planning grants totaling $5 million are made to states and Indian tribes for developing, improving and implementing emergency plans under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (42 USC 11001); for determining the flow patterns of hazardous materials within a state and between states; and for determining the need for regional hazardous materials emergency response teams.

Training grants totaling $7.8 million are made to train public sector employees to respond to emergencies that involve hazardous materials; three-quarters of the money must go to or benefit local governments. States and Indian tribes must contribute a matching share of 20 percent to any planning and training grant awarded. The match may be met with in-kind contributions, rather than a cash match. Approximately $6 million in grant funds were awarded in federal FY 1999. The average grant to the states was $120,000. An additional $388,000 was awarded to Indian nations and U.S. territories. RSPA has proposed that the registration fee that supports the program be broadened to include more hazardous materials companies and that fees for large companies be raised in an effort to generate $14.3 million for the HMEP. The justification for the increase is, in part, recognition of the increase in the official estimate of daily hazardous materials shipments from 500,000 to 800,000, which places a greater burden on emergency response officials. The proposal is under review.

Highway Routing

Citizens are concerned about the highway routes used to transport spent fuel. Routes that minimize risk are of paramount importance (see figure 6 for a map of commercial and DOE sites in relation to the U.S. Interstate Highway System).

DOT has established specific highway routing requirements for certain radioactive materials, as found in 49 CFR 397.101. (The requirements are sometimes referred to by their DOT docket number, HM-164.) DOT routing guidelines require the carrier to ensure that any motor vehicle that contains a radioactive material requiring a placard is operated on routes that minimize radiological risk. The carrier is to consider accident rates, transit time, population density, time of day, and day of the week when determining the route. The use of preferred routes which include interstate highways, beltways and/or those highways designated by a state routing agency, are required for shipments of highway route-controlled quantity radioactive materials; that is, shipments that contain significant amounts of radioactivity. States with designated routes are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, Tennessee and Virginia. State routing designations must meet federal procedural and substantive requirements; otherwise, they are preempted.

To designate alternative routes, a state must conduct a routing analysis that includes the following factors:

• A determination of routes that minimize impacts,
• Identification of alternate highway routes available,
• Development of a list of route comparison factors,
• Selection of a route that best minimizes impacts based on an evaluation of route comparison features, and
• Documentation of the entire routing analysis that serves as a basis for the routing.

Risk assessment techniques can be used to evaluate alternative routes. The Federal Highway Administration is responsible for evaluating routing analysis and approving state routing designations. Additionally, carriers must file route plans, provide specialized driver training related to radioactive materials and emergency response capabilities, and comply with NRC security requirements, when appropriate.

Figure 6 (PDF version)

Only 10 states have designated routes because it is a lengthy, technical, complex and contentious public process. Nonetheless, it offers states an important risk management tool. For a smoother process, states that have gone through the designation process recommend identification of the proper state routing authority and early coordination among affected state agencies and other parties.

Computer models maintained by DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory can be used to assist in routing determinations. Routing decisions often present a paradox for public safety officials: routes that minimize radiological risk usually traverse sparsely populated areas where few would be injured during a transportation accident, but where emergency response capability is potentially inadequate. Well-equipped emergency response teams are found in populated areas where quick, experienced response is critical.

According to a recent study completed by the Routing Topic Group of the DOE Transportation External Coordination Working Group, states are concerned that current regulations require the carrier-rather than the shipper-to select routes. In the case of commercial spent fuel, this would be DOE. States believe DOE should play a central role by narrowing the number of acceptable routes, then states can concentrate scarce training resources along those routes. In addition, states have expressed concern over DOE plans to contract out transportation services, thereby, potentially, leaving routing decisions to a private contractor. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) program provides a positive model for the states. In selecting WIPP routes, a preliminary set of routes was proposed to the states and then modified based on state suggestions and formal alternate route designations. The routes DOE selected in consultation with the carrier, states, tribes and others were included as mandatory provisions in carrier contracts.

The TEC/WG routing report further stated,

Rail Routing

No routing regulations exist for railroads, in part because rail rights-of-way are privately owned, thereby restricting the regulatory activities of state governments (see figure 7 for a map of commercial and DOE sites in relation to the U.S. railroad system). Yet, significant amounts of spent fuel are likely to be shipped by rail, which may be a safer method. A study by the National Conference of State Legislatures' Task Force on High-Level Radioactive Waste/Hazardous Materials, Report on Modal Selection for Spent Fuel Transportation, suggests rail as the preferred mode for spent fuel transport. Reasons cited by task force members included the lower probability of an accident and radiation exposure in transit, the higher capacity for shipments, the availability of dedicated trains, and lowest overall cost. This preference was tempered by the concern that states lack a strong regulatory role in rail safety, that no routing provisions exist, and that rail accident response could be hampered because of lack of road access to some rail lines.

Figure 7 (PDF version)

To minimize risk, dedicated or special trains for spent fuel shipments are favored by the railroad industry, but are opposed by DOE as unnecessary and expensive. Dedicated trains carry only one cargo, travel at 35 MPH or less and have special handling procedures to maximize safety. The rail industry believes dedicated trains are necessary because advance planning can occur, yards and auxiliary tracks can be avoided, better surveillance and security are available enroute, the movement of approaching or passed trains can be controlled, the risk of derailment is reduced, and public confidence in the safety of nuclear movements can be instilled.

Modal Mix

States will need accurate information from DOE about the expected modal mix for spent fuel shipments to address routing and emergency response concerns. A 1998 study by RSPA on factors that should be considered in choosing routes and modes for high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel shipments found that the most significant safety factor in determining risk for any given shipment option was shipment duration. The total time it takes to move a shipment from origin to destination affects non-incident radiation exposure levels to people; the group most affected by this factor is transport personnel. While exposures are very small, the longer the material is in transit, the longer the exposure of the crew and general public.

A second factor that substantially affects mode choice, number of trips and total risk is the amount of material to be shipped. The larger capacity of rail and barge casks-along with the ability to carry multiple casks on a single train or barge-means that such shipping campaigns require fewer trips than moving the same amount of material by truck. Fewer trips reduce total risk.

The study also concluded, however, that there is a sizable variation in the values of primary safety factors across different mode and route combinations, indicating that mode and route choices made by shippers and carriers can affect shipment risks. This conclusion should bolster the long-stated contention of affected state, local and tribal governments that the U.S. Department of Energy should develop standards for choosing routes and modes, rather than leaving those choices to the companies that transport the material. The study states that, under current practices, safety usually is not given as a primary reason for choosing a particular mode. Other factors such as availability, service attributes and minimizing transit time are more important selection factors. Likewise, routing choices currently are made primarily for reasons of operational efficiency.

Sabotage of spent fuel and high-level waste transportation casks could potentially release more radioactive material than a typical accident. The Western Governors' Association (WGA) has raised new concerns about terrorism and sabotage against high-level waste and spent fuel shipments to a repository. In a policy resolution adopted in June 1998, WGA called for the NRC to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of attacks against transportation infrastructure, attacks that involve capture of a nuclear waste shipment and use of high-energy explosives against a shipping cask, and direct attacks on a nuclear waste shipping cask using antitank missiles. In June 1999, the state of Nevada formally petitioned NRC to conduct such an assessment

The WGA faults a 1984 terrorism assessment by NRC for being too limited in scope and failing to account for new weaponry and methods used by terrorist groups. A more comprehensive assessment is needed in the wake of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings. WGA calls on DOE to incorporate terrorism and sabotage risk management and countermeasures into all transportation planning for spent fuel and high-level waste.

In general, NRC's studies conclude that, although some highly radioactive particles might be released if an armor-piercing weapon penetrated a cask, such a release probably would not exceed a small fraction of the cask's contents. NRC has adopted physical protection regulations designed to reduce the risk of sabotage. NRC recently has instituted a review-in conjunction with other countries-of the consequences of terrorist attacks on transportation.

DOE considers the sabotage of a high-level waste shipment to be unlikely because of safeguard and security measures imposed on such shipments. Yet, a 1997 survey paid for by the state of Nevada (which is opposed to the placement of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain) found that 70 percent of respondents believed that terrorist groups could successfully attack shipments of high-level radioactive waste.

Liability

Liability for a nuclear waste transportation accident generally is determined under state law. The federal Price-Anderson Act, amended in 1988, provides an insurance indemnity system with a liability limit of $8.96 billion for accidents determined to be "extraordinary nuclear occurrences." Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, motor carriers of radioactive materials must have $5 million insurance for non-radiological damages.

In the event of a transportation accident in which there is a release of radioactive material, tort liability for radiological injuries to persons and property may be determined in a specific state under the principles of negligence or strict liability. State law governs questions of standards of liability, defenses to liability, calculation of damages, methods of proof and statutes of limitation.

WGA Transportation Safety Program for WIPP

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant officially opened in March 1999. It is the world's first deep geologic repository for disposal of transuranic waste (discarded radioactive articles such as laboratory clothing from nuclear weapons research and production) generated during nuclear defense activities of the last several decades. WIPP will take waste from several facilities in the states of Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee and Washington. A coordinated and comprehensive transportation safety program has been developed by the Western Governors' Association for transuranic waste shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. Developed with DOT and DOE funding, the WGA safety program calls for:

• Highly qualified and specially trained drivers;
• Rigorous independent inspections of vehicles (the CVSA enhanced standard);
• Careful monitoring of road and weather conditions and restriction of travel when warranted;
• Identification of safe parking places along routes;
• Provision of advance notice of shipments to states and enroute monitoring through the TRANSCOM system;
• Establishing effective medical emergency preparedness along the route;
• Setting up mutual aid agreements to ensure swift response, regardless of the jurisdiction;
• Developing effective emergency response plans along the entire route;
• Acquiring and maintaining adequate equipment; and
• Providing appropriate training and exercises to emergency responders to ensure a coordinated incident response.

A lead state developed each portion of the program. The states where WIPP shipments will occur are a part of this effort, and include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. The WGA 1995 WIPP Transportation Safety Implementation Guide was issued at the end of 1995.

DOE and WGA signed a memorandum of agreement in April 1996 that endorses the approach contained in the Implementation Guide and affirms a regional planning process and ongoing dialogue between DOE managers and the WGA technical advisory group. The guide is to be reviewed annually to ensure that it continues to meet the objective of safe and uneventful transport of radioactive waste. The WGA approach has been endorsed as an excellent framework for transportation planning by all the regional high-level radioactive waste transportation committees. The committees said it should be used as a base document for all DOE's various transportation programs.

Recommendations

Should state legislators decide to further evaluate their states' system for ensuring spent fuel and hazardous material transportation safety, the following suggestions are offered.

• Determine if your state has a disproportionately high occurrence of hazardous materials incidents or if the trend of these incidents is becoming over the years. (Contact the Research and Special Programs Administration.)
• Assess developments that may increase shipments of radioactive hazardous materials. This would include potential high-level waste and spent fuel shipments to Yucca Mountain, the ongoing foreign fuel shipments, other radioactive waste shipments such as those to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and low-level waste shipments.
• Conduct a hazardous materials commodity flow study to determine how much and what types of hazardous materials are moving through the state.
• Assess the adequacy of state emergency preparedness for a radioactive materials transportation accident and the resources needed for improvement.
• Work closely with the regulated industry and citizen's safety groups to reach agreement on reasonable approaches. For its part, industry seeks to protect public health and safety by avoiding accidents.
• Know what is likely to be preempted, but be aware of unique local conditions and areas that are not already covered by federal law in setting state policies.
• Fully fund enforcement activities that promote hazardous material transportation safety.

Conclusion

In dealing with spent fuel transportation, state legislators must address public concerns, which are based on both real and perceived risks. Even though the risks are low, nuclear fuel shipments instill a greater sense of public fear, because of additional perceived hazards associated with radiation. Transportation safety systems and regulations already in place probably are sufficient to address the risks associated with spent fuel transportation in the majority of states. Certain additional regulations and other safety measures may be necessary to address particular state, regional or local concerns.

One recommendation from a 1996 study by the University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy, Transporting Radioactive Materials: Risks, Issues and Public Perspectives, was that DOE provide a larger role for state and local officials to ensure that local conditions and interests are considered. In particular, the study found that providing a state role in deciding the timing of radioactive materials shipments can potentially boost public confidence in shipping programs.

A survey by the Southern States Energy Board of its radioactive materials transportation advisory committee found a consensus that radioactive materials shipments are safe when properly handled, but trained and well-informed emergency response teams are critical. A concern of these officials was that, without proper information, the mix of the media, special interest groups and an uninformed public may impede the safety of radioactive shipments. A strong effort also must be made to educate citizens about the necessity and appropriateness of spent fuel transportation and the safety precautions that are being taken.

Appendix A. DOE Details Impacts of Spent Fuel Transportation to Yucca Mountain

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) released its draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for a proposed spent fuel and high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in early August 1999. DOE is charged by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to evaluate whether to recommend to the president the construction and operation of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. The NWPA specifies that it is not necessary for the EIS to consider the need for a repository, alternatives to geologic disposal or alternative sites to Yucca Mountain. Spent fuel and high-level waste would be transported from various sites around the United States for disposal in the geologic repository.

DOE would transport these materials through approximately 45 states and 30 tribal jurisdictions on their way to Yucca Mountain. The DEIS evaluates the "proposed action"-going forward with the Yucca Mountain repository-and the "no action alternative"-leaving spent fuel and high-level waste at their present locations and reclaiming Yucca Mountain. Based on the DEIS, DOE's preferred alternative is to proceed with the proposed action. The report states, "The analysis in this EIS did not identify any potential environmental impacts that would be a basis for not proceeding with the Proposed Action." The total cost of undertaking the proposed action is $28.8 billion in 1998 dollars, while the estimated cost of two "no action" scenarios is estimated at $51.5 billion to $56.7 billion for the first 100 years and $480 million to $529 million per year thereafter.

The national transportation analysis for the draft environmental impact statement identifies the potential impacts on people and the environment during normal transportation activities and under potential accident conditions. In evaluating transportation impacts, DOE chose two scenarios-mostly legal weight truck (80,000 pounds) and mostly rail-to cover the possible range of transportation impacts to human health and the environment. DOE does not anticipate that either scenario represents the actual mix of truck or rail transportation modes it will use because it cannot accurately predict actual transportation operations that are at least 10 years in the future.

It is uncertain at this time when DOE will make any transportation-related decisions. However, DOE states in the DEIS that, "The EIS provides the information necessary to make decisions regarding the basic approaches (for example, mostly rail or mostly truck shipments), as well as the choice among alternative transportation corridors. However, follow-on implementing decisions, such as selection of a specific rail alignment within a corridor, or the specific location of an intermodal transfer station or the need to upgrade the associated heavy-haul routes, would require additional field surveys, state and local government consultations, environmental and engineering analyses and National Environmental Policy Act reviews."

All spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste destined for a repository will be in solid form for transportation and disposal. These materials would be transported to a repository in large, strong containers called casks on trains, barges, and trucks. Loaded rail casks can weigh as much as 136 metric tons (150 tons); loaded truck casks can weigh up to 23 metric tons (26 tons).

Truck shipments would travel from 77 sites to Yucca Mountain, primarily on the interstate highway system. The rail scenario assumes that rail shipments would come from those nuclear plants that have capability to load large capacity rail shipping casks. Nine nuclear plants would ship by truck. Both scenarios assume that naval spent fuel would be transported by rail from Idaho to Nevada. Since no rail access to Yucca Mountain currently exists, material traveling by rail would continue on a new branch rail line or transfer to heavy-haul trucks at a transfer station in Nevada and then proceed on existing highways. The routes assumed in the draft environmental impact statement may or may not be the actual routes for repository shipments. For truck shipments, the draft environmental impact statement analyzed the impacts of using DOT preferred routes. These are defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation as the interstate highways, including interstate beltways and bypasses. State and tribal routing agencies, however, may designate alternate truck routes within their respective jurisdictions, according to federal guidelines. Currently, there are no federal rail routing regulations, so the impact statement analysis assumed the use of rail routes based on historic rail industry practices.

The mostly truck scenario would involve 49,500 truck shipments and 300 rail shipments over 24 years of operation. Annually, this amounts to 2,100 shipments by truck and 13 by rail. The mostly rail scenario would involve 10,800 rail shipments and 2,600 legal-weight truck shipments. Annually, this amounts to 450 shipments by rail and 110 by truck. Because of the larger number of shipments, the truck scenario would have greater incident-free radiological impacts, defined as latent cancer fatalities (lcf). (A latent cancer fatality is a death from cancer that has become active after a latent period, that is, the period after exposure.) For the truck scenario, this would amount to 11 lcf for the involved worker or 18 lcf for the general public as opposed to 3 lcf each for the rail scenario. Traffic fatalities would amount to four under each scenario in 24 years of operation.

However, in a "maximum reasonably foreseeable accident," that is, an accident with the highest consequence for human health that can be reasonably foreseen, the rail scenario would have more impact, resulting in 31 lcf as opposed to 5 lcf under the truck scenario. Acts of sabotage are included in the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident scenario. Transportation impacts analyzed under a higher disposal capacity for the repository, called "Inventory Modules 1 & 2" in the DEIS, would result in proportionately larger impacts. Over a 38-year operating cycle for Inventory Modules 1 & 2, 13 traffic fatalities could be expected from repository workers commuting and transporting construction materials to the site.

If a repository were built at Yucca Mountain, shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste would arrive in Nevada by train and/or truck. Shipments that arrive by truck would continue directly to the repository. However, rail access to Yucca Mountain currently does not exist. Therefore, the department is considering options for transporting rail shipments. DOE would build either a rail corridor or a heavy haul truck route in the state of Nevada, choosing from five alternative routes each. Impacts in the state of Nevada for any of the proposed routes would be 1 lcf to the public in incident-free operation and one lcf due to cumulative radiological accident risk. Traffic fatalities were estimated to be from one to four, while 5 lcf to 31 lcf could be caused by an accident in an urban area over the 24-year period.

Source: NCSL summary taken from U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Draft Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. Washington, D.C.: U.S. DOE, July 1999.

Appendix B. State Permit Fees for the Transportation of Spent Fuel, High-Level Waste and Highway Route-Controlled Quantities of Radioactive Materials

References

Selected Web Pages

Nuclear Energy Institute

State of Nevada, Office of the Governor, Agency for Nuclear Projects, Nuclear Waste Project Office

Transportation External Coordination Working Group

University of New Mexico Radioactive Materials Transportation Virtual Library

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Nuclear Waste Management

U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration

Selected Contacts For More Information

THE TRANSPORTATION SERIES