NCSL Brief: Safeguarding the Nation's Energy

(This is one of a series of briefs written by NCSL, "Protecting Democracy: States Respond to Terrorism.")

Safeguarding the Nation's Energy

By Matthew Brown

The nation's energy system of power plants, power lines, gas pipelines and power facilities is uncomfortably exposed to terrorist threats. The scope of the threat is great, but lawmakers can take steps to reduce the risks.

The bulk of the nation's energy infrastructure has some level of risk. The question that legislators and industry need to address is: What risks are unacceptable? The country relies on thousands of miles of pipelines and power lines and a multitude of facilities, such as compressor stations on gas pipelines or substations for electricity transmission and distribution. Protecting each mile of these facilities would be impossible and impractical. Disruptions to small distribution pipelines or power lines might qualify as acceptable risks because the effects would be limited and repairs could be easily made. Attacks on some other facilities such as large power generators, major pipelines and transmission lines, or fuel storage facilities may qualify as unacceptable risks.

Information Systems. Information systems control much of the electric power and many of the pipelines. A National Security Agency mock attack on systems that control the power grid in the late 1990s found that a cyber attack could bring down the grid. As a result, the industry and federal government have been working to reduce the vulnerability of the grid to cyber attack. But Internet-based control systems are still vulnerable, and the nation continues to rely heavily on them. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, for instance, established an Internet-based system through which owners can sell access to the transmission grid to power generators.

Large Power Generation Stations. Power generating stations could also be a target for attack. The effects would multiply in situations where plants are located near cities. Two types of power plants deserve special attention: dams and nuclear facilities.

Policymakers and industry representatives have recognized that a security breach at a nuclear power plant poses dangers not only to the reliability of the energy system, but also to the safety of large regions. As a result, many nuclear plants are built to sustain a direct hit from a small airplane. They are not built to sustain the force of a large plane. Nor are they impervious to direct attacks from hostile groups. Although protected by well-trained, armed guards, Nuclear Regulatory Commission simulated attacks found some security shortcomings.

Unlike nuclear facilities, which are constructed and operated with the threat of an attack in mind, dams are built to withstand and direct forces that result from the movement of water-not from explosives. A breach to a dam not only would disrupt the electricity system for a region, but would pose dangers for downstream populations.

Power Transmission Lines. The vast majority of power lines fall into the category of an acceptable risk. Even if one power line went down, power could be shipped over other lines while that one was repaired. Utilities regularly deal with weather-related disruptions on their power system. What has become clear, however, is that certain congested power lines are critical--not only to the operation of the power grid, but also to its security. A prominent example is Path 15, which carries power between northern and southern California. The scarcity of energy in California's system during 2000 and parts of 2001 highlighted the inadequacy of this transmission line and also how critical it is to the system.

Gas Pipelines. California alone consumes close to 6 billion cubic feet of natural gas each day-much of it imported from out-of-state sources. The Northeast relies on natural gas for home heating and its electric generating plants. More than 90 percent of the new power plants proposed in this country rely on natural gas. Although much of the gas pipeline is underground, those elements above-ground are vulnerable.

Oil Refineries and Pipelines. Like power plant regulations, rules governing oil processing and pipeline infrastructure focus on mitigating environmental problems, not defending against terrorist attack. Oil refineries in the United States are probably not well prepared to defend against such an attack. And many of these facilities are concentrated in just a few states. Texas, Alaska, California and Louisiana house not only the refineries, but also pipelines and storage.

Policy Issues. There is a range of security threats to the nation's energy infrastructure. Certain parts of the infrastructure are both more vulnerable to attack and more important to defend. State policymakers may want to:

· Develop or update a plan that defines ways to respond to an energy emergency. Many states have plans, but some are in need of updating.

· Ensure that there is a plan for communication among law enforcement and industry.

· Recognize that enhanced security costs money. Some--particularly regulated-industries--may ask for assistance in terms of either tax relief or rate hikes.

· Build a system that incorporates a reasonable level of redundancy. For instance, if a pipeline is breached, the product can be moved through another line while the breach is fixed.

· Move to a less vulnerable infrastructure. Some states now have policies that encourage small scale generation that does not rely heavily on transmission of either gas through pipelines or electricity through transmission lines from large central station facilities. However, such systems--known as distributed resources--often have a higher up-front cost than would the existing system.

Contact for More Information

Matthew Brown
NCSL--Denver
(303) 856-1359
matthew.brown@ncsl.org

Other NCSL Resources:

Other NCSL Briefs "States Respond to Terrorism"

NCSL's Protecting Democracy Page

NCSL's 2002 Legislative Session Home Page

NCSL's Energy and Electric Utilities Page