Michigan Legislature
Volume 23 Number 18 October 28, 2002
Afghanistan: current issues and U.S. policy concerns.
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002, 35 p.
DS 361 .K37 2002
Animal agriculture: issues for the 107th Congress.
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002, 16 p.
SF 61 .B49 2002
Budget processes in the states.
Washington DC, National Association of State Budget Officers, 2002, 93 p.
HJ 2053 .A1 N37 2002
Capital punishment: summary of Supreme Court decisions during the 1999-00 term.
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2000, 6 p.
KF 9227 .C2 W355 2000
Charter schools in Michigan: the report of the Commission on Charter Schools to the Michigan Legislature.
Lansing, Michigan. Commission on Charter Schools, 2002, 27 p.
LB 2806.36 .M5 2002
Demographic change in medium-sized cities: evidence from the 2000 Census.
Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy in collaboration with the National League of Cities, 2002, 17 leaves.
HT 384 .U5 V39 2002
Digital television: an overview.
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002, 24 p.
TK 6678 .K7 2002
Education of limited English proficient and recent immigrant students: provisions in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001, 8 p.
LB 3731 .K8 2002
Expanded school sinking fund taxes.
Lansing, Anderson Economic Group, 2002,
32 leaves.
HJ 4121 .M52 A534 2002
Foster care: recent legislation helps states focus on finding permanent homes for children, but long-standing barriers remain.
Washington, DC, U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002, 59 leaves.
HV 875.55 .U5 2002
FPE/AFT compensation survey, 2000: a survey of professional, scientific and related occupations in state government.
Washington DC, Federation of Public Employees, AFT, AFL-CIO, 2001, 101 p.
JK 2474 .F64 2001
Gas prices: how are they really set?
Washington, DC, U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002, 396 p.
HD 9579 .G5 U68 2002
Impact of charter school attendance on student achievement in Michigan.
Kalamazoo, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2002, 27 p.
LB 2806.36 .E25 2002
Informing the future: critical issues in health.
Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 2000, 122 p.
RA 394.9 .I55 2000
Kids count data book.
Washington, DC, Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2002, 200 p.
HQ 792 .U5 K53 2002
The machinery of democracy: voting systems and ballot miscounts in Illinois.
Urbana, IL, University of Illinois, 2002, 16 p.
JF 1161 .Q5 2002
Meeting the need for scientists, engineers, and an educated citizenry in a technological society.
Princeton, NJ, Educational Testing Service, Policy Information Center, 2002, 39 p.
Q 149 .U5 B346 2002
Mergers and consolidation between banking and financial services firms: trends and prospects.
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001, 9 p.
HG 4028 .M4 J32 2001
Military pay and benefits: key questions and answers.
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002, 15 p.
UC 74 .G65 2002
Prescription drugs: state monitoring programs provide useful tool to reduce diversion.
Washington, DC, United States General Accounting Office, 2002, 24 p.
HV 4999.2 .U5 2002
Report and recommendations to improve America's election system.
Washington, DC, NACO, 2001, 13 p.
JK 1976 .R46 2001
Social Security reform: how much of a role could private retirement accounts play?
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002, 57 p.
HD 7125 .K644 2002
Unequal treatment: confronting racial and ethnic disparities in health care: summary.
Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 2002, 28 p.
RA 563 .M56 U53 2002
Legislative Term Limits
These papers were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Boston, MA from August 29 to September 1, 2002
Papers on Michigan
Bureaucrats and Legislators in Michigan: A Complex Relationship Complicated by Term Limits. Kelly LeRoux, John M. Strate, Richard C. Elling, Marjorie Sarbaugh-Thompson, Lyke Thompson.
The relationship between legislators and bureaucrats is a complex one that includes collaboration, cooptation, delegation and monitoring. Legislative term limits have the potential to alter this relationship in a number of ways. This paper explores the impact of term limits on the relationship between state legislators and bureaucrats, using data from personal interviews with both pre and post-term limited members of Michigan's House of Representatives. Three measures are used: The extent to which legislators rely on bureaucrats for information and guidance, the level of priority legislators assign to monitoring state agencies, and how well members evaluated themselves as a chamber in monitoring the implementation of programs. Overall, we find that term limits has some important, but limited effects on the relationships between legislators and bureaucrats.
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/024/024008LeRouxKell.htm
The Impact of State Legislative Term Limits on Races for Local Office.
Rebecca A. Tothero.
This paper seeks to explore the indirect effect of state legislative term limits on races for local office. Specifically, the research question of interest is: Are members of the State House of Representatives more likely to run for local office after the passage of term limits? Researchers have demonstrated that most term-limited legislators are still interested in remaining in public life. However, ambitious legislators in a state with limited opportunities for upward mobility such as Michigan may choose to return to local office rather than the traditional progression up the "political ladder." In order to address the question of interest, data were collected on the activities of legislators immediately after their last year in office in the Michigan House of Representatives between the years of 1982-2000. In all, 212 legislators were included in the analysis. The activities of a pre-term limit set of legislators (1982-1992) were compared to that of a post-term limit group of legislators (1993-2000). Overall, a multivariate probit model demonstrates that term limits do have a significant impact on a legislator's decision to run for local office. Overall, legislators are 14.3% more likely to run for local government in the post term limit period. Other variables such as the presence of a Senate election year, the Senate incumbent's percent of the previous vote, and county population were also found to be significant at least the .10 level with varying degrees of influence.
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/029/029006TotheroReb.htm
Lobbyists and Legislators in Michigan: Term-limit Effects on the Relationship.
Pamela Walsh, Charles D. Elder, Lyke Thompson, Marjorie Sarbaugh-Thompson.
Interaction between legislators and interest groups is a complicated two-way relationship that is likely to become even more complex in states that have adopted term limits. Based on a longitudinal study of member of the Michigan House of Representatives, the authors explore several facets of legislators' perceptions of their relationship with lobbyists before and after term limits. Despite the claims of some term limits advocates that this reform would purge the state of cozy relationships between elected officials and special interests, the authors find that there is no difference between the extent to which legislators rely on interest groups and lobbyists for information and guidance on issues. Further they find that legislators may be more instead of less accessible to lobbyists after term limits.
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/029/029003Sarbaugh-T.htm
Papers on Other States
Assessing the Impact of State Legislative Term Limits.
Michael W. Tofias, Michael J. Ensley.
One aspect of the debate surrounding term limits that has received scant attention is what impact term limits will have other levels of government. Recently, several states have instituted term limits for state legislators. In this paper we seek to investigate what impact state legislative term limits have on House elections. We find that congressional seats in states with term limits are more likely to be challenged by state legislators. However, we find evidence that state representatives from states with term limits do not perform as well as other quality candidates in House elections.
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/029/029002TofiasMich.htm
The Role of Term Limits in State Legislative Policy Decisions.
Priscilla L. Southwell.
This research examines the role call voting record of state legislators in Oregon in order to assess if there are any substantive differences between "last term" legislators who are nearing retirement due to term limits and those who are at an earlier stage of their legislative career. We can also further distinguish between these last term legislators who were elected before and after term limits were put into effect (old-timers vs. newcomers). The research findings suggest that campaign contributions are lower, and rates of party voting are higher among last term legislators. An analysis of key roll call votes suggests that these old-time, last term legislators stand apart from their other colleagues on certain issues, such as taxes and land use policy. Therefore, term limits appear to have an effect on the policy preferences of legislators, but this effect does not seem to arise from a simple "lame duck" or last term phenomenon
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/022/022018SouthwellP.htm
Term Limits and Electoral Competition: Analysis of California Legislative Races.
William M. Salka.
While considerable scholarly research has examined the effects of term limits on turnover rates and representation in state legislatures, little work has been done regarding the impacts on electoral competition. This study tests the hypothesis that term limits actually decrease electoral competition for elections in which incumbents are permitted to run, while increasing competition for seats that are open because of term limits. The hypothesis is based on the argument that serious candidates will not challenge incumbents who are permitted to run for reelection, preferring to wait for the open seat election once the maximum number of terms has been served. This means that electoral competition will be greater for the open seat elections, but declines when the incumbent is permitted to run. Thus, it is expected that competition will decrease overall. Evidence drawn from California legislative elections from 1986 to 2002 suggest that Senate elections became less competitive after term limits took effect. In the Assembly, term limits do not appear to have influenced competition in general elections, however, primary elections have become more competitive. http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/022/022018SalkaWilli.htm
Throwing in the Cards: Term Limits, Strategic Retirement, and the Incumbency Advantage.
Erik J. Engstrom, Nathan W. Monroe.
The conventional wisdom in the legislative elections literature is that incumbent politicians use the resources of office to create an electoral advantage over non-incumbents. Recent research by Cox and Katz (2002), however, argues that the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections is largely a statistical artifact of the strategic entry and exit decisions of incumbents. We address this debate by moving to the state level. Specifically, we take advantage of the natural experiment provided by state legislative term limits to assess the effect of candidate entry decisions on measurement of the incumbency advantage. Because term limits force incumbents to retire, they remove the problem of endogenous entry and allow us to observe the non-strategic value of incumbency. Using election data from the most professional legislature in the U.S. to implement term limits - the California state legislature - we find that the incumbency advantage is substantially smaller than traditional estimates.
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/022/022018EngstromEr.htm
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