State and Federal Court Challenges to the
Constitutionality of DNA Databases
LISTING OF CASES BY ARGUMENT
Cruel and Unusual Punishment:
Boling vs. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, (Jan. 17, 1997)
Kruger vs. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996)
Vanderlinden vs. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210 (D.Kan. 1995)
Gaines vs. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)
Sanders vs. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
Johnson vs. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000)
Ryncarz vs. Eikenberry, 824 F.Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993)
Equal Protection-requirement of equal protection violated:
Wisconsin vs. Trepanier, 555 N.W.2d 394 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
Equal Protection-requirement of equal protection not violated:
Roe vs. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2nd Cir. 1999)
Boling vs. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, (Jan. 17, 1997)
Vanderlinden vs. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210 (D.Kan. 1995)
Murphy vs. Department of Correction, 711 N.E. 2d 149 (1999)
Gaines vs. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)
Washington vs. Olivas, 956 P.2d 1076 (1993)
Unreasonable Search and Seizure-traditional Fourth Amendment analysis:
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Numbers JV-512600 and JV-512797, 930 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1996), review denied, (Jan. 14, 1997)
People vs. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994)
Gaines v. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)
State ex re. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County vs. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432 (1994), review denied, 944 P.2d 947 (1997)
Johnson vs. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000)
Doles vs. Wyoming, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999)
Unreasonable Search and Seizure reduced privacy interests of prisoners:
Jones vs. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), as amended (Apr. 27, 1992)
Sanders vs. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
Kruger vs. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996)
Rise vs. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995)
Ryncarz vs. Eikenberry, 824 F.Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993)
Boling vs. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, (Jan. 17, 1997)
Schlicher vs. (NFN) Peters, I & I, 103 F.3d 940(10th Cir. 1996)
Vanderlinden vs. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210 (D.Kan. 1995)
Shaffer vs. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 520 (U.S. 1998)
People vs. Calahan, 649 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995)
Landry vs. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 20, 1999)
Cooper vs. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Apr. 1, 1997), transfer denied (May 27, 1997)
Doles vs. Wyoming, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999)
Unreasonable Search and Seizure special needs of government:
Roe vs. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2nd Cir. 1999)
Shelton vs. Gudmanon, 934F.Supp. 1048 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
Dial vs. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999)
Washington vs. Olivas, 956 P.2d 1076 (1993)
Doles vs. Wyoming, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999)
Ex Post Facto Law requiring provision of DNA sample:
Jones vs. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), as amended (Apr. 27, 1992)
Sanders vs. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
Gilbert vs. Peters, 55 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 1995)
Kruger vs. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996)
Rise vs. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995)
Shaffer vs. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998, cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 520 (U.S. 1998)
Vanderlinden vs. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210 (D.Kan. 1995)
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Numbers JV-512600 and JV-512797, 930 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1996), review denied, (Jan. 14, 1997)
Cooper vs. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Apr. 1, 1997), transfer denied (May 27, 1997)
Dial vs. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999)
Free Exercise of Religion:
Ryncarz vs. Eikenberry, 824 F.Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993)
Shaffer vs. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 520 (U.S. 1998)
Procedural Due Process under statute:
Rise vs. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995)
Boling vs. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, (Jan. 17, 1997)
Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210 (D.Kan. 1995)
Johnson vs. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000)
Procedural Due Process under regulation implementing statute:
Ewell vs. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1993)
Substantive Due Process:
Sanders vs. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
Kruger vs. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996)
Cooper vs. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Apr. 1, 1997), transfer denied (May 27, 1997)
Gaines vs. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)
Johnson vs. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000)
Right to Privacy:
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Numbers JV-512600 and JV-512797, 930 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1996), review denied, (Jan. 14, 1997)
People vs. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994)
Cooper vs. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Apr. 1, 1997), transfer denied (May 27, 1997)
Self-Incrimination:
Boling vs. Romer, 101 F.#d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, (Jan. 17, 1997)
Shaffer vs. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 520 (U.S. 1998)
Cooper vs. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Apr. 1, 1997), transfer denied (May 27, 1997)
Johnson vs. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000)
Vagueness:
Washington vs. Olivas, 956 P.2d 1076 (1993)
DESCRIPTION OF LIMITED CASES
Federal Cases
Roe vs. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2nd Cir. 1999): Plaintiff argued that the Connecticut statute requiring convicted sex offenders incarcerated on the statute's effective date to submit a blood sample violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 1) impermissibly distinguished between individuals convicted of sexual offenses and those convicted of other violent offenses, 2) targeted incarcerated sexual offenders but not prior sexual offenders who were not incarcerated at the time, and 3) targeted convicted sex offenders whether or not their current incarceration was for a sex offense. The appellate court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because there was no evidence that there was a compelling need to test other violent felons, and the statute's claimed underinclusiveness did not provide a basis for invalidating it.
Boling vs. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied (Jan. 17, 1997): Plaintiff argued the statute denied equal protection of the law and procedural due process to sex offenders, and that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by exposing him to possible physical abuse when they indicated, in front of other inmates, that he had to submit to DNA tests, thus disclosing he was a sex offender. Reasoning that a rational relationship existed between the government's decision to classify inmates as convicted sex offenders and the government's state objective to investigate and prosecute unsolved and future crimes, the appellate court held that the statute did not violate equal protection requirements. The appellate court held that the argument was insufficient to state a valid claim for cruel and unusual punishment.
Rise vs. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995): Plaintiffs filed a ยง1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause. The court held that the statute is rationally related to a public interest, no individualized hearings are necessary before sampling, the Ex Post Fact Clause was not violated, and absent a causal connection between the behavior of state officials and the order to submit to a test, a person wrongly sampled has no cause of action.
Vanderlinden vs. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210 (D.Kan. 1995): Plaintiffs challenged the DNA statute on various grounds including: 1) violation of the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search and seizure, 2) impermissible infringement on privacy interests, 3) violation of procedural due process, 4) cruel and unusual punishment, 5) Ex Post Facto violations, 6) bill of attainder, and 7) equal protection violations. The court held that, although the blood test was a search, individualized suspicion is not required for testing and the method of searching was reasonable. Privacy interests in a person's blood are limited and thus no infringement occurred. The court also dismissed the due process, cruel and unusual punishment, bill of attainder, and Ex Post Facto claims. Since all prisoners of a similar class are tested, the equal protection argument failed as well.
Sanders vs. Coman, 864 F.Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994): Prisoners brought a class action against state prison officials arguing that the prison employees' use of force against the inmates who refused to provide the required blood sample violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The appellate court determined, in order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the challenged force was required to be applied for the purpose of causing harm. The court held that the force used was reasonable under the circumstances and there were no facts that force used was intended to cause harm to the inmates.
Gilbert vs. Peters, Nos. 93 C 20012 and 92 C 20354, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9215, (N.D.Ill. June 28, 1994), 55 F.3rd 237 (7th Cir. 1995): Plaintiffs, two imprisoned sex offenders, challenged the statute requiring incarcerated sexual offenders to submit blood specimens to the Illinois Department of State Police prior to final discharge, parole or release. Plaintiffs argue that the statute violates the Fourth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court determined that the warrant and probable cause requirements were not applicable and the intrusiveness of the blood test was minimal. Therefore the Fourth Amendment was not violated. In addition, the statute was not penal, so the Ex Post Facto Clause was not triggered. The appellate court determined that the statute is not penal in nature; rather, the DNA database serves law enforcement purposes. Therefore, the statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Ewell vs. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1993): Plaintiffs alleged that by allowing a reduction in good time if a prisoner refused to submit to sampling, the state violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court refused this argument and held that the sampling statute and the reduction in good time are constitutional.
Ryncarz vs. Eikenberry, 824 F.Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993): Plaintiff argued that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when prison employees failed to take precautions in conducting the blood draw. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; at most, the plaintiff stated a claim for medical malpractice.
Kruger vs. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D.Minn. 1985) aff'd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996): Plaintiff, serving time for kidnapping, filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the retroactive application of the law violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and the due process clause. The district court denied the petition, holding that the blood-taking procedure did not amount to wanton infliction of pain, was a reasonable search and seizure because the test served a legitimate governmental interest that outweighed the minimal invasion, and that the Minnesota law was not penal in nature. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment but on different grounds, determining that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition.
State Cases
Patterson vs. Indiana, 742 N.E. 2d 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g granted 2001 Ind. App. LEXIS 267 (Ind. Ct. App. February 16, 2001): Plaintiff argued that a second series of DNA tests done on lawfully obtained blood samples from an unrelated criminal investigation were warrantless searches prohibited by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. During trial, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to suppress. Recognizing that the analysis of DNA is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the appellate court determined that the Fourth Amendment protections were not triggered because: 1) plaintiff's privacy was outweighed by the state's interest in protecting citizens through criminal investigations; 2) plaintiff did not exhibit an actual expectation of privacy in the blood sample from a previous criminal investigation; and 3) plaintiff's continued expectation of privacy in blood samples lawfully collected by the police is not reasonable.
Gaines vs. Nevada, 995 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000): Plaintiff, incarcerated for burglary, argued that the Nevada statute requiring genetic marker testing for certain enumerated offenders was intended for sex offenders, was overbroad and violated the Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process, Eighth Amendment. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent unambiguously required DNA testing for several types of non-sexual offenders. In addition, the plain language of the statute limits the purpose of testing to identification; therefore, the statue was not overbroad. As for the Fourth Amendment argument, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that the state's interest in solving crimes outweighed the convict's diminished expectation of privacy and the minimally intrusive nature of the blood draw. The Nevada Supreme Court applied the rational basis standard under the Equal Protection Clause and determined that the statute did not offend notions of equal protection because of the existence of a rational basis for requiring genetic marker testing, specifically the apprehension of repeat and violent offenders. As for the Due Process Clause, the court held that the blood test was routine and did not concern a fundamental right; therefore, the Due Process Clause was not triggered. Finally, the court held that the Eighth Amendment was not triggered because the blood test was not barbarous and did not involve wanton physical punishment since the test was properly performed by a medical provider.
Johnson vs. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000): Plaintiff argued that the Virginia statute requiring all convicted felons to submit blood samples for DNA testing violated the Eighth Amendment and the parallel provision of the Virginia Constitution. Determining that the statute was not penal in nature, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's claim had no merit.
Smith vs. Indiana, 734 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000): Plaintiff argued that the use of a DNA profile, originally created for use in a prior unrelated case, constitutes an unreasonable warrantless seizure violating the U.S. and Indiana constitutions. At trial, plaintiff moved to suppress the DNA evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. Under the Fourth Amendment, the appellate court determined that the police conduct in comparing the court-ordered DNA sample with the DNA obtained from the instant case is not a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. The appellate court analogized the retention of DNA samples to the retention of fingerprint samples, authorizing law enforcement agencies to retain validly obtained DNA samples for use in subsequent unrelated criminal investigations. In addition, under the Indiana Constitution, Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the use of the DNA profile because he failed to show any possessory interest or any other interest in the crime lab's DNA profile record.
Landry vs. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 20, 1999): Plaintiffs wanted their case in lower court and obtained a preliminary injunction against the collection of samples on the basis that it violated the state and federal constitutions. The Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned the injunction and held that the statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provisions and that the director of the state crime laboratory did not have to promulgate specific regulations regarding the use of force when sampling non-cooperative people before the statute became effective.
Murphy vs. Department of Corrections, 711 N.E.2d 149 (Mass. 1999): Plaintiff, incarcerated at the time of filing the complaint, sought a declaratory judgment that he is not required to submit a DNA sample for inclusion in the state DNA database. The state statute requires a DNA sample from individuals convicted of the listed offenses who were incarcerated on the effective date of the statute. Plaintiff was convicted and already served time for an offense listed in the statute. At the time of his complaint, plaintiff was incarcerated for an offense not listed in the statute as requiring a DNA sample. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning that a literal reading of the statute produced an irrational result. However, the appellate court overturned the trial court, arguing that the statute was unambiguous, the statute made no distinction based on the offense for which the individual was incarcerated at the time.
Dial vs. Vaugh, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. 1999): Plaintiff brought suit alleging that, because he was incarcerated at the time the statute was passed, application of the statute to him would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court held that these allegations do not result in an injunction against the state.
Doles vs. Wyoming, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1997): Plaintiff, convicted of conspiracy to committee larceny, argued that the statute establishing a DNA database constitutes an unreasonable search, violating the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the state's argument that gathering evidence from "free persons" in order to determine the identity of those responsible for committing unsolved crimes must be distinguished from obtaining the DNA of "convicted felons" whose identity is a matter of legitimate state interest and who, because of their conviction, have a reduced expectation of privacy in their identifying information. Although the court determined that collecting DNA samples is a search and seizure, the court held that the mandated DNA collection from convicted felons through routine and unobtrusive methods was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff's argument that the Wyoming Constitution provided greater protection than the federal constitution did not meet the required standard for analysis, and therefore the Wyoming Supreme Court did not address that argument.
Washington vs. Trepanier, 555 N.W.2d 394 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996): Plaintiff, convicted for burglary, argued that the requirement that he pay a $250 DNA surcharge, whether he submitted a DNA sample or not, when those convicted of other offenses were not required to pay the surcharge violated equal protection requirements. Determining that the statute need only a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest, the appellate court held that the high recidivism rates for burglars was not rationally related to the requirement that they must pay the DNA surcharge when not providing a DNA sample, since burglars are not substantially different from other people covered by the statute.
Oregon ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County vs. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432 (Or. Ct. App. 1994): Child argued that the Oregon statute requiring to him to submit a DNA sample violated the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although the appellate court determined that the state failed to identify a penological objective related to the management or mission of a prison, the statute fell into a narrow class of searches and seizures performed for law enforcement objectives. Drawing the corollary between DNA sampling and fingerprinting, the appellate court held that the DNA sampling was not an unreasonable search under the Oregon Constitution. Under the U.S. Constitution, the appellate court determined that the minimally intrusive quality of the blood extraction, combined with the important governmental interest in prosecuting sex offenses being furthered by the creation of the DNA database, did not violate the child's Fourth Amendment rights. The dissent argues that, under the Oregon Constitution, the DNA sampling is not similar to routine fingerprinting and that criminal offenders do not have reduced constitutional rights.
Washington vs. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993): Plaintiff argued that the statute requiring "sex offenders" and "violent offenders" to submit a DNA sample violated the state and federal equal protection clauses. The court determined that the purpose of the statute was to investigate and prosecute sex offenses and violent offenses, and that there was a rational relationship between the government interest in law enforcement and the application of the statute to the specified class of people.
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