Legislative Oversight of Federal Funds

Legislative Finance Paper

Updated 12 April 1999

Legislative Oversight of Federal Funds

This report examines the findings of a 50-state survey conducted by NCSL that reviews how legislatures control federal funds. The issue is an important one as federal policymakers in Washington, D.C., have reopened the issue of fiscal federalism. Some of the changes that are now being proposed in the federal and state partnership are significant and could substantially revise how programs such as social service and environmental programs are funded. If a new state-federal fiscal relationship develops, it is essential to know the extent to which legislatures control and oversee the spending of federal funds.

Legislatures exercise control over federal funds in various ways-through the appropriations process, limitations on the number of federally funded positions in state workforces, and interim control over unanticipated federal funds. Collected as part of this survey is information on how each of the legislatures control the federal funds that come to their states.

Legislative Authorization for Expenditures of Federal Funds

The first part of the survey examined legislative control of federal funds in the appropriations process. Although some states appropriate federal funds, this process may be somewhat different from how they appropriate state funds. This occurs for two reasons: 1) the use of federal funds is controlled by the conditions of a grant, and 2) the amount may be uncertain. Some states therefore use the term authorize as an alternative to the term appropriate in connection with federal funds. In this survey, NCSL staff has adopted the word authorize to mean both:

appropriation of federal funds, in states where the process is considered akin to appropriation of state funds, and
authorization of federal funds, for states where the process means legitimizing--and generally capping--the use of receipts from the federal government.

A distinction drawn in South Carolina is that an authorization of the use of federal funds saves the state from having to cover any deficiency in the funding, as opposed to an appropriation, which imposes a requirement that the state supplement lower-than-anticipated federal funds to meet the appropriated level.

Table 1 shows where legislatures authorize the use of federal funds and illustrates whether the authorization is specific or open-ended. Specific authorization means that the legislature authorizes the expenditure of a specific amount for a declared purpose and may impose an upper limit on state expenditure of federal funds for a fiscal period. Open-ended authorization means that the legislature does not impose a cap or limit on the amount of funds that can be spent for a stated purpose in a given fiscal period.

Thirty states indicated that they make only specific authorizations of federal funds. Another nine states reported that they make only open-ended authorizations of federal funds. Five states in the survey responded that they make both specific authorizations and open-ended authorizations. Those states are Alaska, California, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska. Six states do not appropriate any federal funds.

Legislative Caps on Federally-funded Employees

The survey also found that 22 states limit the number of federally-funded full-time-equivalent (FTE) positions in state agencies. Nebraska sets a salary limit for FTEs in an agency budget instead of a limit on the number of positions.

Twenty-eight states do not set specific limits on the number of federally funded positions in the state workforce. In many of these states the federal FTEs are treated the same way as any other state FTE, as in Kentucky and Virginia, where the limit that the state places on size of the workforce also includes any federally funded FTEs.

Regardless of whether there are any limits on the number of federally funded positions, legislatures typically have requirements that the positions will not be picked up by state general funds if federal funds are insufficient or eliminated. Tennessee states that there is no obligation to continue positions with state funding if federal money goes away. Restrictions or limits on the number of federally funded FTEs may be more specific in some states. In Mississippi and New Mexico, it is policy to place employees paid from federal sources in "time limited" or "term" status so that if federal funds are eliminated, so are the positions.

Legislative Control Over Receipt of Unanticipated Federal Funds

The survey also asked who controls the use of unanticipated federal funds received when the legislature is not in session. As shown in table 2, in 11 states the controlling authority over unanticipated federal funds is the legislature. The table also shows that the executive branch is the controlling authority over unanticipated federal funds in 25 states. In 14 other states, the legislature and the executive branch share controlling authority over unanticipated federal funds.

Some legislatures have delegated interim decision-making authority to standing committees, special interim committees, or joint legislative-executive agencies. In Oklahoma, for example, the hybrid body is called the Contingency Review Board. It consists of the two presiding officers of the Legislature plus the Governor, and can permit the expenditure of federal funds that exceed expenditure limitations included in appropriations acts. In North Dakota, an emergency commission that includes the Governor, Secretary of State, chair of the Legislative Council and chairs of the House and Senate appropriation committees proposes how to spend unanticipated federal funds. That allocation plan must be approved by the budget section of Legislative Council. In Indiana, the Governor is empowered by statute to receive federal funds that are appropriated automatically upon review and comment by the State Budget Committee. The Indiana State Budget Committee consists of the state budget director and four state legislators.

States were also surveyed on the general degree of legislative authority over receipt of unanticipated federal funds. The survey results group the states into the categories of none, advisory, conditional, joint and binding.

None refer to states where the executive has complete discretion over unanticipated federal funds received between regular legislative sessions.

Advisory means that a legislative board may provide advice during the interim, but lawmakers have no direct say in how the executive spends unanticipated federal funds received by the state.

Conditional indicates that lawmakers defer to the executive for some spending decisions between legislative sessions. Practice may vary depending on the source, purpose or type of unanticipated federal funds received.

Joint means that the executive and legislative branch sit together on a board and during the interim, share the decision on spending unanticipated federal funds.

Binding refers to states where the executive branch may receive but cannot spend unanticipated federal funds without prior authorization or subsequent legislative approval.

Thirteen legislatures have binding authority and do not allow the executive branch to spend unanticipated federal funds without prior authorization or subsequent legislative approval. Some of the legislatures are full-time bodies and control all unanticipated federal funds, as in Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania, but that is not the case for all full-time bodies.

In states where the legislature is part-time, the legislative approval process may require that an interim finance or appropriation committee act on behalf of the full legislature. In Vermont, the governor has the power to spend funds in excess of the amount originally anticipated, but any unanticipated funds or reallocation of existing funds have to be approved in the appropriations process or by the Joint Fiscal Committee in the interim. In South Carolina the approval for expenditure of unanticipated federal funds must come from the Joint Legislative Appropriations Review Committee, while in South Dakota that authority lies with the Interim Committee on Appropriations.

In 10 states, legislative authority over unanticipated federal funds is defined as conditional. For example, West Virginia requires the governor to submit a statement to the legislative auditor explaining why the unanticipated federal funds could not have been anticipated in the budget process and describing how the funds will be spent. The unanticipated federal funds may be spent during the interim unless they will be used for the creation of new program or for a significant alteration to an existing program. In Colorado, for example, if the state is offered federal funds for a program that requires a state match, no state monies can be spent until reviewed by the Joint Budget Committee during the interim and then approved by the General Assembly in regular session. Otherwise, the governor is allowed to spend federal funds that do not require a state match.

In 11 states, legislative authority over unanticipated federal funds during the interim is defined as advisory. For example, in Minnesota, the Legislative Advisory Commission may review and comment on planned uses for unanticipated federal receipts between legislative sessions, but the executive is not obliged to follow its recommendations. This advisory process is similar to that of the other states in this category. Some restrictions do exist in states such as Illinois and West Virginia where spending of unanticipated federal monies is allowed as long as there is no significant alteration of an existing program. Other states like Arkansas and Tennessee simply require the review of the spending in the next legislative session.

In nine states, the legislature is defined as having no general control over receipt of unanticipated federal funds. However, some legislatures do exercise control when matching state funds are required as in Mississippi. In Mississippi, an agency is required to have an "escalation authority clause" in its appropriations bill in order to spend any federal funds that require a state matching amount. Otherwise, the federal funds cannot be spent until the legislature meets again in session.

State Responses to Proposed Federal Block Granting

The survey also asked about state planning for possible new block grants. The survey found no evidence that legislatures are making any changes to the way they currently control federal funds. Fiscal officers contacted for the survey indicated that the federal policy changes are too unpredictable for states to be able to plan.

State policymakers are concerned however, that any significant drop in federal dollars for shared state-federal programs could result in budget cuts at the state level. While funding levels are an issue for legislatures, there is little that legislatures can do because of the uncertainty of federal decisions. One example of a state's concern about possible federal fund policy changes is contained in a policy brief by the California Legislative Analyst's office on the fiscal impact of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995. This bill, which passed the House of Representatives in March 1995, would, if enacted, repeal or amend the provisions of several major public assistance programs and replace them with several block grants.

In Arizona the discussion has not moved to the point of determining what choices the state has in dealing with the various federal programs but is instead fixed on what the state can do to get more involved in the process of allocating federal funds for programs. Arizona is relatively weak in the area of legislative control over federal funds.

According to policymakers in Oregon, some critical choices will have to be made regarding state support for programs that are funded through block grants to the states. The flexibility that states will be allowed in operating their programs and how much funding the federal government decides to cut from the programs will determine the state's action on changing the programs.

To address changes in federal funding from categorical to block grants, many states already have statutes in place. The language found in the Nevada statutes reads

"whenever federal funding in the form of a categorical grant of a specific program administered by a state agency, commission or department is terminated and incorporated into a block grant from the Federal Government to the State of Nevada, the state agency, commission or department must obtain the approval of the interim finance committee in order to allocate the money received from any block grant."

In Iowa, any change from categorical grants to block grants requires the governor to notify the chairs and ranking members of the senate and house standing committees on appropriations. In Vermont, statutes require that if there is a major change from categorical grants to block grants, the governor must get approval from the Joint Fiscal Committee whenever reallocation is required.

The possible devolution of responsibilities to the states is the primary catalyst behind the proposed for federal block grants. More control to the states means that governors and legislatures alike will have the opportunity to exercise much more policymaking authority over state-federal programs. This brief provides a comparative analysis on how well states are prepared to deal with the changing landscape of fiscal federalism.

Table 1
Legislative Authorization of Federal Funds & Federally Funded State Employee Positions

	Authorization of Use of Federal Funds
State	Makes Specific Authorizations	Makes Open-Ended Authorizations	Does not Authorize Use of Federal Funds	Limits Federally Funded FTEs
Alabama		X		No
Alaska	X*	X*		No
Arizona			X	No
Arkansas	X			Yes*
California	X*	X*		No
Colorado			X*	No
Connecticut			X	No
Delaware			X	Yes
Florida	X			Yes
Georgia	X			No
Hawaii	X			Yes
Idaho		X		Yes
Illinois	X*			No
Indiana		X		No
Iowa		X		No
Kansas	X*	X*		Yes*
Kentucky	X			Yes
Louisiana	X			No
Maine	X			Yes
Maryland	X			No
Massachusetts	X			No
Michigan	X			Yes
Minnesota	X*			No
Mississippi		X		Yes*
Missouri	X*	X*		Yes*
Montana	X			No
Nebraska	X*	X*		No*
Nevada	X			Yes*
New Hampshire	X			Yes
New Jersey	X			No
New Mexico			X*	Yes*
New York	X			No
North Carolina		X*		No
North Dakota	X			Yes
Ohio	X			No
Oklahoma			X	Yes
Oregon	X			Yes
Pennsylvania	X			No
Rhode Island	X			No
South Carolina	X			Yes
South Dakota	X			No
Tennessee	X			No
Texas	X			No
Utah	X			No
Vermont	X			Yes
Virginia	X			Yes
Washington	X			No
West Virginia		X		No
Wisconsin		X		Yes
Wyoming	X			Yes
Totals	36	13	6	Y=22 N=28

States appearing in bold face in Table 1 have a legislature that meets year round. Combined totals will exceed 50 because some states make both specific and open-ended authorizations. Definition of terms:

Specific Authorization-The legislature authorizes the expenditure of a specific amount for a declared purpose and may impose an upper limit on state expenditure of federal funds for the fiscal period. In some states this is called an appropriation. Others use the word "authorization" to refer to the process.

Open-Ended Authorization-The legislature authorizes the state to spend federal funds received during the fiscal period without declaring a specific purpose or amount.

* Notes:

Alaska--Appropriations may need to conform to statutes, legislative intent, legislative review or program requirements.

Arkansas--The legislature enacts appropriation of specific amounts by line item and specific numbers of positions by title and grade. These can be increased during the interim through the unanticipated federal funds process.

California--All appropriations are both specific and open--ended because of the general control section in the budget. Any federal funds received above the set amount are subject to a notification requirement to the Joint Legislative Budget Committee.

Colorado--The general appropriations act reflects federal funds for information purposes only. Where state match is required, lawmakers get more say over how the executive will apply those dollars and such plans are reflected in the budget act.

Illinois--Federal funds are not appropriated separately but are included in the total appropriation for each program, by line item (e.g., personal services, retirement contributions, travel, etc.)

Kansas--Some appropriations have a specific dollar limit while others are appropriated as "no limit." The legislature treats federally funded FTEs the same as any other state FTE. They can be placed under an FTE limitation or they could be treated as "special project employees" and be outside the limitation.

Mississippi--Policy is to place employees paid from federal sources in "time limited" status so that if funds are eliminated, so are the positions.

Minnesota--If federal funds are not specifically appropriated in the budget, they may be expended under an "open and standing" authorization in the statutes.

Missouri--Authorizations to spend federal grants may be open--ended or specific; practice varies. Authorizations are noted as estimates in the budget act, where appropriate, giving agencies sufficient authorization to accept and spend federal grants. FTE limits are usually set for organizational or program entities, but they are not set by fund source.

Nebraska--Authorizations to spend federal grants may be open--ended or specific; practice varies. Authorizations normally are estimates and bill language clarifies when unanticipated receipts over budget estimates may be spent. A limit is placed on salary expenditures in the budget, but FTE are not specified. During the interim, salary limits may be exceeded by the amount of new federal grants.

Nevada--State statutes require legislative authorization before state agencies may accept any gift or grant, including those that involve new positions.

New Mexico--The general appropriations act reflects federal funds for information purposes only. Where state match is required, lawmakers get more say over how the executive will apply those dollars and such plans are reflected in the budget act. It is policy to place employees paid from federal sources in "term" status so that if funds are eliminated, so are the positions.

North Carolina--Agencies must expend federal fund sources before utilizing state fund sources.

Oklahoma--Appropriations bills limit the expenditure of federal funds. A recent constitutional amendment authorizes the appropriation of federal funds and statutory language to implement an appropriations process.

Oregon--Legislative authorization is required for an agency to apply for a grant. Expenditures are both authorized and limited.

South Carolina--South Carolina authorizes the expenditure of federal funds, but does not appropriate them, a distinction which in South Carolina means that the state is not obligated to make up any shortfall of receipts. The authorization is for total agency expenditure and does not itemize the federal sources of the revenue.

South Dakota--Authorization of expenditures up to a specified amount.

Tennessee--Line--item appropriations.

Texas-- Appropriations are specific, but the amounts are estimates and language is intended to be broad enough to allow the use of unanticipated funds.

Utah-- Appropriations are specific, but the language allows the use of unanticipated funds if no state matching funds are required.

Wyoming--The current budget act eliminates all federally--funded positions at the end of the current biennium so that agencies will have to seek reauthorization for them. This has not been done before.

Source: NCSL survey of the National Association of Legislative Fiscal Officers, May 1995.

Table 2
Interim Control Over Receipt of Unanticipated Federal Funds

	Controlling Authority		General Degree of legislative authority
State	Executive	Legislature	General Degree of legislative authority
Alabama	X		None
Alaska		X	Advisory
Arizona	X		Conditional*
Arkansas	X		Advisory*
California	X		Advisory
Colorado	X		Conditional*
Connecticut	X	X	Conditional*
Delaware	X		Joint*
Florida	X	X	Advisory*
Georgia	X		None
Hawaii	X		Binding
Idaho	X		Advisory*
Illinois	X		Conditional*
Indiana	X		Joint*
Iowa	X	X	Conditional*
Kansas	X	X	Joint*
Kentucky	X		Advisory*
Louisiana		X	Binding*
Maine	X	X	Conditional*
Maryland	X	X	Advisory*
Massachusetts	X		Advisory*
Michigan	X	X	Binding*
Minnesota	X	X	Advisory*
Mississippi	X		None*
Missouri		X	Binding*
Montana	X		None*
Nebraska		X	Binding*
Nevada	X	X	Binding*
New Hampshire	X		Conditional*
New Jersey	X	X	Conditional
New Mexico	X		None
New York		X	Binding*
North Carolina	X		None*
North Dakota	X	X	Joint*
Ohio	X	X	Joint*
Oklahoma	X	X	Joint*
Oregon		X	Binding*
Pennsylvania		X	Binding*
Rhode Island	X	X	Joint*
South Carolina		X	Binding*
South Dakota		X	Binding*
Tennessee	X		Advisory*
Texas		X	Binding*
Utah	X		Conditional*
Vermont		X	Binding*
Virginia	X		None
Washington	X		None
West Virginia	X		Conditional*
Wisconsin	X		Advisory
Wyoming	X		None
Totals	39	25

States appearing in bold face in Table 2 have a legislature that meets year round. Totals may exceed 50 because some states have both the executive and legislature as controlling authorities. Definition of terms:

None--The executive has complete discretion over unanticipated federal funds received between legislative sessions.

Advisory--A legislative board may provide advice during the interim, but lawmakers have no control over unanticipated federal funds.

Conditional--Lawmakers defer to the executive for some spending decisions between legislative sessions. Practice may vary depending on the source, purpose or type of unanticipated federal funds received.

Joint--Executive and legislative branch sit together on a board and during the interim, share the decision on spending unanticipated federal funds.

Binding--The executive branch may receive but cannot spend unanticipated federal funds without prior authorization or subsequent legislative approval.

* Notes:

Arizona--None with the exception of monies received under Title XIX of the of the Social Security Act (Medicaid). The general appropriation act sets a cap on total expenditures for Title XIX programs.

Arkansas--The full legislature must ratify the governor's decision during the next session or state participation in the program is withdrawn.

Colorado--A legislative role exists only when a specific state match is required.

Connecticut--The legislature has control for all block grants while the governor has control of other federal funds.

Delaware--The state Clearing House Committee for Federal Aid must approve any application for federal grants by state agencies. Membership includes the chairs of the Joint Finance Committee, four other legislators, the Secretary of Finance, the State Budget Director, the Director of the Office of Development, and the Controller General.

Florida--Governor submits budget amendment and, by statute, fiscal committees have 14 days to respond if they disapprove of the spending plan.

Idaho--Appropriations for anticipated federal funds are provided, but the executive can authorize unanticipated federal fund spending.

Illinois--Nonappropriated spending is permissible if: (1) the purpose for which monies are to be spent are for purposes and/or resources that were not appropriated; (2) the spending does not commit the state to matching resources; (3) the General Assembly has not specifically denied the purpose; and (4) the agency has the statutory authority to carry on the activities of the program. Otherwise a state agency must seek a supplemental appropriation.

Indiana--The governor is empowered by statute to receive federal funds that are appropriated automatically upon review and comment by the State Budget Committee. The State Budget Committee consists of the state budget director and four state legislators.

Iowa--All block grant funds received by the state must be deposited in a special account subject to appropriation by the legislature. Block grant appropriations are contained in the block grant bill. The legislature has no interim authority over other kinds of federal funds.

Kansas--State Finance Council includes the Governor, Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, House and Senate majority and minority leaders, and Ways and Means and Appropriations Committee chairs.

Kentucky--Provision is made for expenditure of excess receipts with notification and review by the Appropriations and Revenue Committee. Legislative objections may be overridden by the state budget director with written notification.

Louisiana--By statute, the Joint Legislative Budget Committee is the controlling authority. The governor may accept but cannot spend unanticipated federal funds without legislative approval.

Maine--The executive is authorized to accept and allocate unanticipated federal funds, except for block grants. No expenditure of federal block grants can be made without prior legislative review and approval. If there is any change from federal categorical grants to federal block grants, Maine statutes prohibit state--level implementation until appropriation committees have the opportunity to recommend and the legislature approves a spending plan.

Maryland--While lawmakers have the power to question how the executive plans to spend unanticipated federal funds, in practice, fiscal committees rarely become involved between legislative sessions.

Massachusetts--By statute, agencies cannot spend federal grant funds without specific appropriations. However, if federal grant funds become available that could not reasonably have been anticipated and included in the budget, the governor may spend that money. In so doing, the governor must submit to the chairs of the legislative fiscal committees, a statement explaining how the federal funds will be spent and why their receipt could not have reasonably been anticipated in the budget. A joint legislative committee on federal financial assistance (11 members of the House and six members of the Senate) exists to review and certify federal grant applications.

Michigan--A supplemental appropriation is required from the full legislative body whenever unanticipated federal funds are received by a state agency.

Minnesota--For new programs, personnel level changes, or proposed increases in state match, an agency must secure the recommendation of the Legislative Advisory Commission. Members of the Legislative Advisory Commission include the finance commissioner, the speaker of the House and Senate majority leader (or their designees), chairs of the House ways and means and Senate finance committees and on a rotating basis, subcommittee chairs from divisions of the House and Senate fiscal committees responsible for oversight of items being considered. The Legislative Advisory Commission may review and comment on planned uses for unanticipated federal receipts between legislative sessions, but the executive is not obliged to follow its recommendations.

Mississippi--The state supreme court ruled in 1985 that Mississippi's constitution prohibits legislative involvement in the execution of the budget after its adoption. However, the executive would need legislative approval when state matching funds are required.

Missouri--So long as prior legislative authorization exists for that federal source, the executive is free to accept and spend unanticipated federal revenue. When an agency expects but can only estimate the amount of federal revenue it will receive for the fiscal period, the budget bill reflects this fact. Estimates are sufficient authorization to spend actual receipts. Agencies must notify legislative fiscal staff when federal receipts exceed budget estimates.

Montana--The governor is the controlling authority for the executive branch, the chief justice for the judicial branch, the Board of Regents for the university system.

Nebraska--Typically, federal funds are shown in appropriations bills as an estimate, thus the amounts shown are generally not an absolute expenditure restriction. Allotment of federal funds received in excess of budget estimates are delegated to the executive branch via the appropriations bills, however this delegation is discretionary. Without language delegating such authority and providing an estimate, funds can be received by the executive branch but not spent.

Nevada--Between legislative sessions, the Interim Finance Committee must approve gifts over $10,000 and grants over $50,000 not included in the General Authorization Act. The Interim Finance Committee includes all members who served on the Assembly Ways & Means and Senate Finance Committee during the preceding session.

New Hampshire--Unanticipated federal funds may not be expended for personnel costs or consultants without prior approval of the Legislative Fiscal Committee.

New Jersey-- Prior authorization is required unless otherwise specified in the budget act. It has been the practice to extend to the governor the authority to accept and spend certain federal grants without limit as in the case of grants awarded to New Jersey universities on a competitive basis. Limits may be set in advance to accommodate unanticipated federal funds. For example, an agency may be authorized to spend unanticipated federal receipts up to 125 percent of current authorized levels. Or the governor may be given discretion over small grants under $300,000. Federal spending authority also can be transferred between programs upon request to the legislature.

New York--Payments from any funds, including federal monies, of the state or under state management are prohibited without legislative appropriation.

North Carolina--A 1982 North Carolina Supreme Court advisory opinion found unconstitutional the delegation of the authority to approve/disapprove interim federal receipts to North Carolina's Joint Legislative Committee to Review Federal Funds that had been provided for in a 1981 law.

North Dakota--An emergency commission (the Governor, Secretary of State, chair of the Legislative Council and chairs of the House and Senate appropriation committees) proposes how to spend unanticipated federal funds. That allocation plan must be approved by the budget section of the Legislative Council.

Ohio--The State Controlling Board (six legislators and the director of the Office of Budget and Management) can adjust appropriations authority for other than general fund line items in the interim.

Oklahoma--The Contingency Review Board (the two presiding officers of the Legislature plus the Governor) can permit the expenditure of federal funds that exceed expenditure limitations included in appropriations acts.

Oregon------The Emergency Board (the Joint Ways and Means Committee plus presiding officers) controls use of unanticipated federal funds in the interim.

Pennsylvania--The Legislature is in session throughout the year.

Rhode Island--An agency can spend federal funds received up to the amount specified in an appropriation. Receipts in excess of the amount cannot be spent without express consent by the governor and the two presiding officers.

South Carolina--Joint Appropriation Review Committee (12 members from the two chambers) must approve a governor's recommendation for the expenditure of unanticipated funds.

South Dakota--Interim Committee on Appropriations (the appropriations committee out of session) must approve the governor's recommendation for the expenditure of unanticipated funds.

Tennessee--The governor's use of funds received in the interim is reviewed in the appropriations process in the following session.

Texas--Efforts are made to use language broad enough to allow unanticipated funds to be used; the Legislative Budget Board (presiding officers, four fiscal committee chairs, four other legislators) may authorize the expenditure of unanticipated funds in the interim.

Utah--Executive may accept federal funds if no matching state funds are required. In the latter case, the legislature will review the issue in the following session.

Vermont--The Joint Fiscal Committee (the four fiscal chairs plus three other legislators from each chamber) must approve expenditure of unanticipated funds or reallocation of existing funds in the interim.

West Virginia--Under a bill passed during the 1982 session, the governor must submit a statement to the legislative auditor explaining why the unanticipated funds could not be reasonably have been anticipated in the budget process and describing how the funds will be spent. If the legislature is in session, unanticipated federal funds must be appropriated. Unanticipated funds received during the interim may not be spent for the creation of a new program or for a significant alteration of an existing program.

Source: NCSL survey of the National Association of Legislative Fiscal Officers, May 1995.

Posted September 1999, reviewed December 2003.
Email statebudget-info@ncsl.org for more information.
Visitor counts for this page.