Skip to Page Content
Home  |  Contact Us  |  Press Room  |  Site Overview  |  Help  |  Login  |  Register
Add to MyNCSL

Western Governors' Association
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Technical Advisory Group
April 18, 2007 - San Antonio, Texas


Department of Energy (DOE) – Carlsbad Field Office

Bill Mackie, Manager, Institutional Affairs
As of mid-March, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) had accepted over 5,500 shipments of contact-handled (CH) radioactive waste, and had begun to accept shipments of higher-radioactive remote-handled (RH) waste.  In July 2007, WIPP will begin accepting a slightly higher number of shipments of RH waste from the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Savannah River Site (SRS), and the Hanford site.

DOE uses a satellite tracking and communications system called TRANSCOM to track shipments of waste being delivered to WIPP.  DOE is currently working to provide greater access to TRANSCOM training and improve features that make the system even more detailed.

The TRUPACT-III shipping container is working its way through the certification process.  Testing and examination of the containers were completed at the end of 2006, and a final Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision is expected early in 2008.  If approved, the construction phase for the containers will begin.


Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Earl Easton, Senior Scientist for Transportation Issues; Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Approval process of TRUPACT III has been longer than expected because the package has gone through several generations. It’s also one of the few that have undergone large-scale testing.  Advantage of TRUPACT III is that it allows fewer shipments to be made, which decreases the risk involved.

The package is multi-layered and very complex, and is not easily analyzed by computer.  TRUPACT III is different from TRUPACT II in the way it responds to stress.  After initial analysis, the package was shortened (6 feet) and lowered in weight (1,200 lbs in payload). 

TRUPACT II has 5 O-ring seals, while TRUPACT III has 2.  TRUPACT III was submitted in March 2004 with analysis of the package based on computer modeling and half-scale tests.  There was not enough margin in the findings of these tests to rely on computer analysis, which led DOE to conduct full scale testing.  Full-scale drop tests were conducted in October 2006.

The NRC is concerned that the package did not pass the leak test after multiple trials, that some of the bolts on the package came loose, and that some lid bolts were (slightly) bent.

NRC approval based on computer analysis requires:

  • No yielding of bolts
  • No deformation of sealing surfaces

October 2006 drop tests showed O-ring contamination of debris from material inside the package.  When dropped, the bolts expand and quickly retract in addition to the O-rings, creating a small, temporary gap that debris can get through.  The addition of a debris shield has been proposed.  It must be proved that this addition will solve the previous problem; if it is not, additional full-scale testing will be required for the package to be approved.

After the last meeting, DOE said they were going to submit an analysis showing why the debris shield would work, and request that the package be approved based on this information.


DOE – Office of Environmental Management (EM)

Dennis Ashworth, Director of Transportation; DOE-EM
There has been extensive effort to clean up radioactive waste at federal EM sites (part of the former nuclear weapons complex) and transport the material to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico.  This cleanup effort includes 114 sites in 31 states, and covers two million acres.

Work on the EM project is ongoing, but shipments of radioactive waste have decreased in 2007 because of progress made at various sites.  Cleanup at three sites was completed in 2006, and several more major facilities are expected to be finished in 2007 and 2008. 

The EM Office of Transportation strives to be leaders in the transportation of radioactive waste, and offer customers "the highest value planning, compliance and operational expertise."  Following a low number of transportation incidents in FY 2005, there was a dramatic spike in FY 2006.  Half way through the current fiscal year, there have been just five incidents, compared to 27 the year before.  In 2005 and 2006, none of the incidents were serious enough to qualify as reportable under Department of Transportation (DOT) guidelines. 

DOE is currently taking steps to improve the safety of transporting radioactive materials, including improving technology in trucks that can alert a driver of potential dangers, and enhancing awareness of factors that may cause an accident.  DOE is also working with other levels of government to help first responders to a potential accident be as effective as possible.


Incident Reporting Criteria Panel

Dennis Ashworth, Director of Transportation; DOE-EM
Within DOE, there is an Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS), which tracks all transportation events.  Certain criteria determines whether an event is reported in ORPS; a few years ago, it was decided that the criteria should be aligned with the Department of Transportation's (DOT) reporting criteria for HAZMAT incidents.  Lowering the criteria below DOT standards is not likely given that other federal agencies use ORPS as well.

Dan Johnson; Western Governors' Association WIPP Technical Advisory Group
Group sent a letter commenting on DOE’s incident reporting criteria.  There are various sets of criteria, with different standards; would like to have terminology clarified ("accidents,” “incidents,” etc).  State Regional Groups do not want to burden DOE with semantics, but they do feel it is important to understand exactly what is going on.


Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)

Larry Stern, Program Director
The purpose of peer review is to identify best practices, identify issues of interest for the Level VI program (trucking inspection program for select radiological shipments), and make recommendations to prepare the Level VI program for Yucca Mountain.  The review covers state laws and programs; inspector training; types and locations of transport; and permitting practices.  The review is part of a cooperative agreement between CVSA and DOE. 

Between March 2005 and August 2006, peer review teams made visits to Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington to review state practices in transportation safety.  These teams included individuals from CVSA, Council of State Governments offices, the Southern States Energy Board, Western Governors' Association, DOE and Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) carriers. 

The review of state practices revealed variations in areas including state inspection laws, presence of escorts, inspection practices, categorization of violations, and compliance with Level VI recommendations.

States could improve inspections by:

  • Creating key responsibilities under program areas;
  • Improving communication between program administrators and inspectors; and
  • Coordinating communication with rail safety personnel in states affected by shipments to Yucca Mountain.

Government agencies could improve inspections by:

  • Revising regulations and standards;
  • Promoting the standardization policies among states;
  • Providing increased guidance on programs;
  • Improving communication; and
  • Increasing funding levels.


Key Findings and Recommendations from Program Evaluations

Ken Niles, Assistant Director; Oregon Department of Energy
The radioactive waste shipment program in the west is generally running well and problems have been resolved, but need to be better identified.

Areas where improvement could be made with transportation, include:

  • Providing the states with more information regarding performance in the Tri-state (northwest) area;
  • Closely monitoring weather and road conditions on all transportation routes;
  • Improving communication with states regarding the use of safe parking locations; and
  • Resolution of all routing issues for shipments from the Nevada Test Site and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Areas where there were no significant findings or recommendations include:

  • Medical preparedness;
  • Emergency response planning;
  • Emergency training and exercises; and
  • Public information

Back arrow, return to previous page Return to the NCSL High-Level Radioactive Waste Working Group Menu Page
Back arrow, return to previous page Return to the Nuclear Waste Cleanup Menu Page

Visitor counts for this page

Denver Office: Tel: 303-364-7700 | Fax: 303-364-7800 | 7700 East First Place | Denver, CO 80230 | Map
Washington Office: Tel: 202-624-5400 | Fax: 202-737-1069 | 444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 515 | Washington, D.C. 20001