Opening Comments of NWTRB Chairman John Garrick:
The NWTRB just completed a strategic planning exercise.  The key priorities of the board going forward will be the following issues:

1. Capability of the natural barriers in containing radioactive emissions.
2. The risks associated with post closure
3. DOE's approach to thermal management
4. Range of possible near filed environments that the engineered system might encounter
5. Comparison of pre- and post-closure radiation risk
6. Planes for the waste management system including transportation
7. Design of facilities and operations both surface and subsurface.

The board determined that it must work with DOE in a concerted manner on these issues.  So, eight fact finding meetings were held with DOE on these topics form April to September 2005. The board also held separate discussion with various transportation stakeholders. 

In the coming 12 months the board will meet 3-4 times here in Nevada.  They want DOE to get as much information as possible on the public record.  DOE is to be commended for updating models for flow in the unsaturated zone.  Concerns about the model regarding localized corrosion at high temperatures, along with the impact of dust on the containers remain. 

Several issues are unresolved including chemistry of groundwater and issues of radionuclide transport.  On facility design, there is a need for improved communication between DOE and the nuclear industry on analogous facilities.  Another issue is understanding the waste management system as a whole.  Performance of the waste management system and the repository system must be evaluated interdependently due to how changes in one may impact the other.  The total system model (TDM) developed by DOE should be helpful.

Thermal management is a priority issue.  It dictates design issues.  NWTRB needs a good technical justification from DOE to more fully understand.  The board understands the natural tendency to go slow in making scientific claims until all the evidence can be gathered.  But DOE should be more forthcoming.  Gaps in understanding are handled by "bounding assumptions."  DOE has adopted a conservative, science based approach that may impede public understanding of the repository.  More realistic performance assessments are needed.  Filling this critical gap would help define what are appropriate levels of conservatism.  Fundamental understanding is important.

Betsy Forinash, EPA , EPA's Yucca Mountain Standard
She gave an overview of the history and current status of EPA's work on the Yucca Mountain radiation standard. 

Questions:
Q-Did EPA talk to members of the NAS committee?  A-No, committee is dissolved.  EPA was bound by the wording in the written report.
Q-The court decision was narrow.  Did EPA go beyond the decision?  A-Yes.
Q-What metric is used to measure how Yucca can safely contain waste, slide 12?  A-the dose limit, but EPA does not demonstrate it.
Q-Why no schedule for the final rule?  A-Many variables.  In addition, DOE has not declared its schedule.
Q-Slide 13, why use the median, rather than the mean for calculating radiation doses?  A-The 50^th percentile is where you want to be.
Q-It appears that the FEP for the 10,000 and one million limits are the same.  A-Yes except for igneous, seismic, climate change and corrosion.
Q-Does the 10,000 year FEP cast a large enough net?  A-Yes except for climate change.  Climate change can be limited to greater precipitation and its impact on the repository.

Victor Gilinsky, on behalf of Nevada, former NRC commissioner
He discussed the EPA draft rule.  The new rule is really the old rule.

The post 10,000 year standard is more permissive than it looks.

EPA has exhibited a pattern of recalcitrance.  Court said it rejected the NAS report.  Peak dose measures the site's adequacy.  Redundancy protects human health from exposure--multiple barriers are necessary.  The 15mrem should have been extended beyond the 10,000 years where peak doses greater than 15 are likely.  Instead it goes to 350, which is background at Amargosa Valley.  Colorado is 700 mrem.  This is bizarre rationale.

350 is really 1,000 mrem.

Drip shield should not be counted because it is an entirely speculative and may not actually be employed.

EPA uses the median to ignore high doses.  The mean would include the extremes.  EPA does not need to reign in DOE's penchant for being conservative. 

Why worry if peak is in the remote future?  The times in years are DOE simulations, we don't really know the timing of the peak dose.  It may or may not be valid, EPA should be careful in relying on them.  If the peak comes early, protection in the pre-10,000 period could be compromised.  Uncertainty in the future is used to justify a looser standard.  "Reasonable expectations" is used as a way to define away issues.

EPA rule fails comparison with WIPP.  Same 15 mrem standard, but at WIPP there is no water and it doesn't rely on the package.  AT WIPP 10,000 years is essentially forever.  At Yucca, you have a radioactive "balloon payment" a big dose at the time of package failure. 

EPA rule fails IAEA safety principles.  Also, the YM safety regime is much weaker than that for reactors.  Much greater allowed dose.  With reactors you correct things along the way, at Yucca after closure, its irretrievable.

The 15 mrem standard should be extended beyond the 10,000 years for several reasons, including that 15 has a firm basis in NRC rulemaking.

The system won't be perfect, some failure is expected.  For this to work the feedback loop needs a reasonable time frame.  This is not the case here.  Measurements are over many generations.  Post closure failures will come to late to fix.  Pressure to get it right may be lessened because failure is so far in the future.  Calls for a tougher rather than a looser regulatory approach. 

Questions:
Q-Is he in dialogue with EPA, DOE and others?  A-Some, but primarily through  submitted comments.
Q-Expectations--is 15 mrem in a million years even plausible to demonstrate?  A-The site should contain radioactivity so it doesn't matter how long.  The peak is key and should meet the standard.
Q--But there is large uncertainty?  Failure of package is the main uncertainty, and then the peak dose will come. A-- Not important where the peak is, just that the standard will be met then.
Q--Paradox--the better the containment, the further in time the peak goes?  A-It must be done right in any case.
Q-Simulations--how effective.  A-there various limitations.  EPA overly relies on DOE here.
Q- Are you suggesting that WIPP be the site for HLW and spent fuel disposal?  A-No.

John Arthur, DOE-OCRWM
Topics:

Program priorities
Budget
Program status
Minimizing the handling of bare fuel
Licensing Support Network (LSN)
Falsifications back in March

Improvement in contract management and organizational performance.
Reducing complexity, improving safety.
Stepped up emphasis of trust, increased outside oversight by experts.

Budget--operating under CR to Nov. 18.  Conference met $450 million, 127 below current, 200 under request.  Still analyzing what this means.

Organization changes.  Joe Zeigler resigned, Mark Williams will replace in a month or so.  Ted --SAIC-Bechtel head

EPA-NRC standards.  DOE comments under development for both sets of regulations.  Will make adjustments to license application once regulations are finalized.

Bare fuel handling minimization.  Decision announced last week Oct 25 letter --clean facility, clean operations.  Standardized canisters will come to Yucca that can be immediately disposed after being placed in waste package.  Phased construction approach.  Both truck and rail acceptance.  Minimize impact on post closure.  Recommend other system optimizations.  Preliminary report by Nov. 25

Critical decision (CD) in June 2004--CD zero, CD-1, etc.  Looking at canister process.  Will build on work already done.

LSN--Should the draft license application (LA) placed in the LSN?  Under review.

Temporary hold on LA, due to EPA standard, Oct 25 change. And resolving the falsifications.  LA will be submitted when ready.

Alleged falsifications--technical and programmatic impacts are under review at DOE. Independent review started in October.

Canister approach is the right one. 

Questions:
Q-With MPC now specified, this changes the point at which the fuel is placed in canister, many implications. Is it feasible site by site?  A-Now is an important time, many meeting with utilities planned.  Kouts will address individual facility capabilities tomorrow.
Q--25% cut, how applied?  A-Not sure.  Under review, priorities will be recommended.  Reductions will be required from the base program.
Q-Assuming encapsulation at utilities.  Will this evaluation be done prior to the LA.  A- Want to minimize uncertainty and risk.  Do all the analysis that is needed.         
Q-Surface facility impact with the new approach.  What impact on thermal management?
A-Total system management (TSM) will drive this, changes are accounted for across the board.  
Q-CD-1 revisited.  Is this common?  A-Higher life cycle cost than other projects.  Need new baseline cost.  Earlier designs will be revisited.
Q-Thermal management strategy is key.  TSPA impact.  A-new TPSA runs. 
Q-Key issues for going ahead with LA.  A-Much of the LA is in good shape.  Modify for the canister approach.  Want to minimize licensing risk, relative to post closure.  Conservatism in many areas, defining vis a vis realistic values.
Q-Falsification issue taking longer than expected to resolve.  A-Several prongs, don't feel technical work was compromised.  But need to do all the necessary searches and ensure correctness.
Q-When will LA be submitted?  A-Don't know, no schedule.  At least 3-6 months.
Q-Reopening the concept of reprocessing?  A-Not is what he is involved with.  Boit it os out there, but no move to give up on the repository.
Q-Interim storage at Yucca?  A-Can't speculate on that.  There will be a place for cooling.
Q-Impact on PFS.  A-Can't speculate.
Q-MPC canisters would be licensed by NRC--how long would this take?  A-Part6 od CD-1 effort.  Commercialized approach, DOE will set requirements.  Whole process takes awhile.
Q-More documents loaded on LSN recently, but not publicly available.  A-will be made available after certification.  3.3 million documents in LSN.
Q-Readiness of LSN?  A- relates to CD-1 process.  6 months prior to LA submittal.
Q-Truck rail mix?  A-Still advancing the rail option.  The Nevada extension work is proceeding regarding environmental documentation.
Q-New technical issues from extension from 10,000 years to a million?  A-Tradeoffs, relying on the draft standard.
Q-Prototype canister testing time frame at Yucca.  A-There is a timeline.

Science Update
Mark Peters
Drip shield presentations--Very technical in nature.

Localized Corrosion of waste package

Very technical

In general, the Board complemented these presenters on providing more data, but still find the depth of analysis wanting.

Public Comment
Dr. Jacob D. Paz
He challenged the EPA regulation.  Yucca is a mixed waste site, so the regulation should be based on mixed waste.  The drinking water radiation standard should be used, not background.  EPA has ignored the NAS BEIR VII recommendation.  The x-ray analogy is misleading. 

Sally Devlin
She was originally supportive of Yucca Mountain, but now has serious questions about accountability and high cost.  Is concerned that the program is fraudulent.  Concern about health impact.  The railroad proposal is very costly and not realistic.  No railroads build since 1974.  Compared her relationship to a marriage and now seeks a separation.

Grant Hadlow
Good news and bad news.  The bad news is that 20 years of bad science arguments are not compelling.  The data does not add up to a viable project.  He is amazed at the lack of technical expertise.  For example, Alloy 22 is used in the chemical industry, but is replaced every year due to corrosion.  Why would DOE even consider for containers with this track record?  Obviously this is a problem when trying to meet the 10,000 year standard.  I have heard lots of nonsense today.

The good news is that transmutation is now viable as developed by Sandia.  Use Yucca Mountain as a warehouse.  Replace the canisters every 20 years as they corrode.  Set up a test facility to evaluate corrosion.  Using Alloy 22 would cost a billion dollars per year.  The really good news is that industry is putting all its waste in dry storage on-site.  Thus, there is n o need for Yucca.  He thinks John Garrick and John Arthur are experts and wonder how they can still function amid all this nonsense.  More people need to be asked about these issues to bring out new and better ideas.

Day Two November 9, 2005

Chairman Garrick opened with general comments.  He was concerned that OCRWM's recent change in terms of the canister approach did not represent a lack of focus.  He liked all the new data presented by the scientists and stated that groundwater movement is not a good surrogate for radionuclide transport.  Still he said more probing by the NWTRB will be necessary in all the various scientific endeavors underway.  The issue of corrosion is very much an open question.

Christopher Kouts,  Systems Integration and Total System Model (TSM), US DOE, Director, Office of Systems Analysis and Strategy Development
Essentially, TSM is a tool DOE is using to analyze the linkages, interactions, and synergies, between waste acceptance, transportation, and the repository.  It will lend a systematic approach to support OCRWM's major program and policy objectives.

Questions:
Q-Assumptions made may not be appropriate.  Good straight to the stakeholders for the data.  Example is thermal issues with spent fuel casks in pools.  A-This is contingent on the "when" question.
Q-Should be done now to validate the approach, consider impact on mode selction and logistics of the shipments. A-Are very much engaged with the utilities on this.
Q-Have you begun analyses of the new canister approach and can you share.  A-Yes, for example, the model will say the larger the package, the more efficient the system will be.  This is actually the cause of litigation by utilities, was in court two weeks ago.
Q-Shutdown studies?  Issue of bottlenecks. Dealing with emergencies?  A- Not yet.  In the future.
Q-Capabilities of the model-does it have means to do probabilistic scenario analysis and optimizing. A- Yes.
Q-Where does this stand, more development?  Or reacting to program decisions?  A- Both.  Capability to answer what ifs?  Can do sensitivity studies in the future, can help assess uncertainties, especially with new canister approach.
Q-How do you interact with non-DOE elements?  DO you go to RR, utilities, etc?  A- For transportation, this is Gary Lanthrum's program.  He goes to DOE program people who are doing the outside interacting.  Find best available source for information.
Q-Is this a tactical tool can be used on a day-to-day basis?  A-Yes it has this capability, but this is down the road, after getting the new canister approach integrated into the model.
Q-Communication with stakeholders is key and almost none have taken place to date.  This is a serious problem.  Apparently legal issues are hindering this.  Try to get this behind you and move forward to make this work.  A-They do surveys of utilities by fuel managers to know about fuel characteristics.  Lawsuits are a fact of life, 60 suits pending, only  settled.  Don't feel they are lacking any information, as of last February.  Comment is well taken, constraints of the environment we are in.
Q-This sounds like nerve central for the whole system.  What else needs to happen to make this tool reach its potential.  A-Ongoing work across the program to show value and how it meets program needs.  Doing internal missionary work.  Concerned about how budget cuts will affect the full roll out of the model.  But is optimistic.
Q- Has this been mandated from on high?  A-No, but don't feel it is necessary.  It gets down to whether people in the program want to use it.
Q-All need to sit at the table, otherwise the tool breaks down.  Any plans to hold workshop to elicit the pushes and pulls that go on?  A- Workshops have not been held, but it may be helpful. People are now coming to them as they now know that the model is useful.
Q-Develop a scenario evaluation plan?  Look at all design and operating assumptions?  A-Have done a lot of that.  For example on modal mix.  Has done this in a structured manner.
Q-Output metrics--how are they used?  Is there a cost element in the model?  A-Yes.
Q-Dose times probability equals risk.  Risk studies?  A- Not yet. 
Q-What is the key factor in reducing dose?  A-Fuel aging is an issue, minimize number of packages.  Seal welding of canister could increase dose at utility, model gives a sense of this.
Q-How current is data on fuel?  A-About two years. Done by the EIA.  Q-Do you simulate?  A-Keeps current with planned projections of industry trends.
Q-Any counter intuitive insights from the model?  A-Not to date. Ultimately it is an adding machine.  Gives total magnitude number.
Q-11.8 kw per package? A-Seeking the correct thermal recipe.

Abraham Van Luik, DOE, and Robert Andrews, Bechtel-SAIC, Conservatisms in DOE's Performance Assessments: Roles and Examples
See handout

Essentially, they are justifying the use of conservative estimates for the dose to the maximally exposed individual.  NUREG citations were used to show that this is acceptable to NRC, given the uncertainty is projecting post-closure performance of Yucca Mountain.  Conservative representations are designed to be cautious but reasonable.  DOE continues to evaluate the range of conservatisms to ensure that no unintended risk dilution has occurred.  Much of the presentation was very technical and likely not of interest to our constituents.

The board was skeptical of many parts of the presentation, asking specific technical questions and examining assumptions.  I choose not to capture them is my summary. 

Frank Kendorski, on behalf of the State of Nevada,
Review and Critique of Drip Shield Concept and Retrieval Concept Planned for the Yucca Mountain Project, Nevada
Essentially, he says that the needs for titanium build the number of drip shields that DOE needs will require 3 ½ years of U.S. production. (Drip shields will provide an additional engineered barrier over all waste packages.)  Largest suppliers of titanium ores are South Africa, Australia and Canada. From the table it appears that US production accounts for only 1/18 of world production of titanium ores.  Supply could be an issue.  Also achieving acceptable drip shield interlock could be an issue.

The amount of dust will also be a problem, perhaps 300 years of dust will accumulate over the years of operation.  Plans to deal with retrieval difficulties and corrosion and dust are a must for a credible operation, and so far such plans and designs are not included in any project documents.

The board complimented the focus on operations.  But there were no questions.

Public Comments
Dr. Jacob Paz
Need to examine the matrix effect of sulfate and its impact on corrosion.

Heavy metals--such as nickel, chromium and molybdenum-- need to be considered relative to radionuclides.

Charles Fairhurst, rock mechanics professor emeritus at U. of Minnesota
He addressed dust issues.  Dust problems need to be placed in context.

Another comments had to do with worldwide 50,000 tons per year of titanium production

Dr. Abel Toffey, Las Vegas tribe
We need the data and the equations.  I am not convinced.  Give us examples using your models. 

Steve Frishman, State of Nevada
TSM will be seriously modified by the proposed multi-purpose container.  The MPC went out of business back in 1995 because it was not compatible with thermal management, and some other reasons.  TSM is maybe a good tool, but only as good as the inputs.  With MPC, the new unit for TSM would be the MPC not a fuel assembly.  DOE will have to build and use the TSM tool backwards.  The MPC may not be compatible with thermal management.  The NWTRB needs to track this closely given the unmanageable nature of the MPC.

Questions:
Q-The idea is to manage thermal issues at the utility site, not at the repository. 

Frishman--Under the contract, DOE can't control what goes into the MPC, unless the owner of the fuel wants to cooperate.