~ Meeting Summary ~

New Developments at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Dale Klein, Chairman; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The NRC is currently focused on new reactor licensing, which involves hiring the correct workforce to review applications.  Twenty companies have shown interest in 28 new reactors, with six more in the planning stages.  The NRC expects three-five combined applications (construction and operation) later this year.

The standardization of reactor design allows for more timely review of applications.  There are currently 104 different reactors.  Because licensing the new fleet is expected to take considerable time and the NRC does not wish to be distracted from regulation of existing reactors, the NRC has created an Office of New Reactors.

The NRC is concerned with the available workforce, both degree/nuclear certificate positions, as well as construction and manufacturing.  There are only about three to five vendors building reactors at the current time - focused internationally.

Security:
Industry has invested about $1 billion into security at reactors.  The existing fleet is safe, based on two considerations: robust design and mitigating activities.  Looking at how to make the new reactors safe in regulation as well.

New systems ought to involve digital instrumentation and control, currently analog-based.

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP):
The NRC will be responsible for regulating activities under GNEP.  If the Department of Energy (DOE) decides to move toward new fuel cycles, the NRC will need to move in sync.  Must keep communication on the program open to allow time for the NRC to build an understanding and expertise of new systems in order to regulate effectively.

High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW) Disposal:
DOE plans to submit the Yucca Mountain repository license application (LA) to the NRC by June 2008.  The NRC will then have three years (with potentially one more for mitigating circumstances) to make a decision.  The NRC has prepared three times in the past for receipt of an LA which never came, so they are holding off hiring specialists to review the LA until it is closer to submission.

Q&A
How will a decision from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on radiation standards at Yucca Mountain affect the NRC review of the license application?

-  We expect the DOE application will fit the EPA standard.  The NRC will amend its rules to match the EPA requirements.

How long does it take the NRC to review new nuclear reactor applications?

-  The NRC receives two types of reactor requests: early site permits, and combined applications for construction and operation.  The combined application takes about 30 months for technical review and about 12 months for a National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) review - about 42 months total.  This process is much quicker than in the past because the designs for new reactors have already gone through certification.  The main differences among sites will be with environmental factors.

Will the NRC work with other federal agency experts to review the Yucca Mountain license application?

-  No.  The NRC has a research center of contractor experts for technical advice (housed in San Antonio).  DOE is already using the US Geological Survey and other agencies on the Yucca Mountain project, so the NRC does not wish to engage them in the review process (conflict of interests).  The NRC also has in-house expertise in such issues as geology and hydrology.

Is the NRC actively looking into the consequences of potential radioactive waste transportation accidents?

-  We are considering probability of risk, assessment.

What percentage of the energy mix should come from nuclear power?

-  DOE looks into the energy mix.  The NRC is the regulator.

Are there any special considerations for potential terrorist attacks on reactors?

-  The NRC is absolutely looking into potential terrorist threats.  Threats include design basis and non-design basis.  The Commission receives intelligence briefings and takes mitigating actions.  The NRC has open communication with counterpart countries and shares information internationally.

The NRC has been in the news recently for giving a license to a non-entity for nuclear materiel.

-  Two incidences:

o       Government Accountability Office (GAO) sting on radioactive sources coming into the US from Canada.  The NRC has corrected its computer systems to ensure low activity sources coming across the border are legitimate.

o       GAO fake license for low activity sources.  GAO applied for these sources through a dummy account in two states - Maryland and West Virginia.  Maryland, an agreement state with the NRC which allows it to regulate low-level waste itself, requires site visits and denied the application.  West Virginia, not an agreement state, requires NRC regulation of low-level waste, which did provide the license.  The NRC license was actually for a very low-level source and would not have likely resulted in weapons-grade material.  There is concern though that suppliers were willing to provide a large amount of the source.  The NRC is considering different approaches to licensing, such as requiring site visits or in-person applications/interviews.

Are there concerns about nuclear waste storage at decommissioned reactors?

-  No safety concerns for at least 50-100 years.  Klein personally prefers central interim storage because of cost and security efficiencies.  In the next few years, the NRC will be required to review its waste confidence decision.  By then the NRC should have received the license application for Yucca Mountain from DOE.

 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Andrew Grant, Acting Director; Office of WMD Terrorism, U.S. Department of State
Goals of the Global Initiative are to strengthen global capacity to combat nuclear terrorism and create/maintain a community of willing partners (political commitments).  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Union act as an observers/participants.  DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration support the work of the initiative as well.  The initiative is seeking new nuclear industry design changes as well for greater security.

53 partner nations (gaining one-two per week; would like to sign on India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Singapore to name a few).  There is ongoing outreach to the private-sector - mostly related to safeguarding materials, emergency response, and information sharing.

The initiative is planning to conduct a probability/consequence management exercise next year to include information sharing and Global Initiative planning scenarios.

Within the US federal government, the initiative includes a broad scope of departments and agencies.

Q&A
Is there overlap with the efforts of the IAEA?

-  The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism's efforts extend beyond those of the IAEA in this area.  This initiative is meant to house a group focused on the issue of nuclear terrorism, build a more consistent message, and help with global organization.

What costs are associated with the initiative?

-  Hosting activities related to meetings are the major expense at the moment.  Plan of work activities will add to the costs.  The goal is for the work of the initiative to accelerate other agencies' work and share costs over time.

Is there much overlap among disparate activities, such as reactor design, detection of special nuclear material trafficking, etc.?

-  Discussions vary as to technical and science-based versus political.

Has there been much success recruiting Middle Eastern countries?

-  Not a lot of success yet, but the involvement of those countries is essential.  It will be important to gain Saudi Arabia for others to follow suit.

How does the initiative coordinate all US agencies involved?

-  Agencies sometimes act alone (question the need to join another new initiative), but the growing partnership can certainly be a resource.  The administration is not certain exactly where this initiative is headed in the future.

 

New Developments in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
Dan Stout, Director of Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel Separations; DOE-Office of Nuclear Energy
There are plans for 222 new nuclear reactors around the world - mostly in China, Russia, India, and the US.

GNEP funding:

• Established in FY2006 and funded at $80 million
• FY2007 funding is $167.5 million
• FY2008 proposed budget is $405 million
  • House markup at $120 million
  • Senate markup at $242 million

Key international components of GNEP:

• Fuel Suppliers: Operate reactors and have complete fuel cycles, including uranium enrichment and spent fuel separations capabilities.
• Fuel Users: Operate reactors, lease and return fuel.
• IAEA: Provides safeguards and fuel assurances, backed up with a reserve of nuclear fuel for states that do not pursue enrichment and reprocessing.

International engagement pathways:

• Policy - establish bilateral or multilateral partnerships based on GNEP principles.
• Fuel Assurance - reliable fuel leasing mechanisms, emergency fuel banks, spent fuel management.
• Technical Collaboration - advanced fuel cycle cooperation with fuel supplier countries, grid-appropriate reactors, infrastructure development.

France, Japan, China, and Russia - with UK and IAEA observers - held ministerial meetings with the US Secretary of Energy in May, 2007 in Washington, D.C.  The partnership issued a joint statement pledging to broaden participation to other nations.

Disclaimers:

• Realizing the benefits of GNEP on the geologic repository and management of high-level radioactive waste will require changes in law and policy.
• Materials in this presentation are options being considered.
• The Secretary of Energy is to make a decision in 2008 regarding the path forward for GNEP.

Domestic components of GNEP (with the Nuclear Power 2010 project):

• Expanding nuclear power
• Developing, demonstrating, and deploying advanced technologies for recycling spent fuel (without separating plutonium)
• Developing, demonstrating, and deploying fast reactors that consume transuranic elements and generate electricity.

Potential benefits of a closed fuel cycle - improved waste management:

• Uranium can be re-enriched
• Plutonium, americium, and curium can be recycled as fuel for fast reactors.  As can neptunium - transuranics (which carry a long term heat load).
• Cesium and strontium can be removed before geologic disposal (short term heat load).

DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy will work with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to technically integrate when the time comes.  Yucca Mountain will be needed regardless of fuel cycle scenarios.

GNEP Strategic Plan actions:

• Obtain input from industries and governments on how best to bring the needed GNEP facilities into being, what technology and policy issues must be resolved, and what business obstacles must be overcome.
• Develop a detailed GNEP technology roadmap for demonstrating solutions to the remaining technical issues.
• Pursue industry engagement in the development of conceptual designs and other engineering studies that support both a nuclear fuel recycling center and an advanced recycling reactor.
• Prepare a programmatic GNEP environmental impact statement.
• In 2008, prepare a decision package for the Secretary of Energy.

The domestic GNEP vision - converting spent reactor fuel into reusable products and more manageable wastes:

• Separate out reusable elements for electricity generation.
• Separate out relatively short-lived wastes to reduce heat load in a geologic repository, enabling increased loading.
• Significantly reduce amount of long-lived wastes requiring disposal which minimizes potential dose to public (10,000+ years).
• Reduce waste volume to reduce cost and increase effective repository capacity.
• Generate electricity by deploying advanced recycling reactors (sodium-cooled, fast spectrum, recycling reactors) fueled by recycled uranium and transuranic elements.
• Initial GNEP facilities will consist primarily of technologies that are operational at full-scale today, incorporating technology advances over time through modifications and expansions.

The domestic GNEP "reference" approach includes:

• Dual-path, industry-led separations process approaches, aqueous and electro-metallurgical.
• Advanced recycling reactor partially funded by industry and/or international sources.
• Consolidate spent reactor fuel for process storage at nuclear fuel recycling center site.
• Short-lived waste management - decay storage followed by appropriate disposal.
• Long-lived waste management - use existing process technologies (e.g. vitrification) to safely package wastes.  Match waste hazards with best disposal options.
• Technology development supports industry needs (e.g. iodine capture, sodium infrastructure, advanced safeguards).
• Industry determines commercial GNEP facility capabilities, degree of technology innovation, siting and expansion.
• Use MOX (mixed oxide) project to supply U/Pu fuel for advanced burner reactor start-up.
• Modeling and simulation used to optimize GNEP technologies and advanced fuel qualification.
• Follow-on GNEP facilities, to contain evolutionary changes to improve recycling, transmutation, proliferation resistance and economics.

Separation processes:
In operation today - separates out uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) individually
Achievable today - separates out U and a U/Pu mix
Ultimate goal - separation of several different elements depending on future use/disposal

R&D Plans - DOE conducts R&D to support industry built facilities and develops and demonstrates supporting technologies at DOE National Labs.
Near-term:

• Demonstration of U/Pu/Np (neptunium) separation.
• Fabrication and qualification of U/Pu/Np fuel.
• Iodine (and other radioactive gas) capture and waste form development.
• Americium and curium separations, waste/product form development.
• Fission product process and waste form development.
• Electro-metallurgical process waste/product purity development.
• Sodium infrastructure development.
• Development of enhanced safeguards and non-proliferation features.

Long-term:

• U/TRU (transuranic) fuel development
• More complete separations and waste form development.
• Advanced recycle reactor economic improvements.

A National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis is underway for GNEP.  The programmatic environmental impact statement will assess reasonable alternatives, analyze potential environmental impacts, and assist DOE decision-making.  GNEP siting studies will discover stakeholder interest in hosting facilities.  Eleven grant applications have been funded - both DOE and non-DOE sites have been proposed.

Industry engagement:

• Scoping studies were completed last year as part of an Expression of Interest process.
• Deployment studies will be funded through a Funding Opportunity Announcement to address:
  • Business plan
  • Technology development roadmap
  • Conceptual design studies
  • Communications plan
• Three to six awards are anticipated by September 2007
  • Integrated technical and business approaches
  • Initial reports to be completed by January 2008

Q&A
How will you adapt to a much smaller budget than the administration proposed?

-  The funding now being considered in the House and Senate is still more or increased from what it was last year.  Will focus on R&D and industry engagement (what policies would be needed to commercialize the closing of the back end of the fuel cycle?)

How much will GNEP increase the capacity of Yucca Mountain?

-  Not certain.

If cesium and strontium can be removed, where would it be stored?

-  Onsite for 300 years, then disposed of (not sure how yet, would look at options).

DOE analysis of risk of a hot or cold repository were the same, so why are you focusing on lowering the repository temperature?  This has a low impact on dose.

-  We are not basing the program on temperature.

Where would you get the MOX fuel for the start-up recycling facilities?

-  The South Carolina plant could produce it.

Why rush into GNEP with the uncertainty of technology development at this point?

-  To have influence on the marketplace, particularly with designs, policies, and practices (separations, enrichment).

Your differentiation of fuel suppliers and fuel users seems to be based on nuclear weapons states.  Argentina and Australia would like to be supplier nations as well.

Are there any economic considerations with GNEP?

-  Perfectly proliferation-resistant recycling may not be economical.  Economics is certainly a factor in whether to reprocess at all.  Must factor in alternative costs though - such as additional Yucca Mountains.

What are your quantitative goals.  When will you decide what is worthwhile?

-  The programmatic environmental impact statement will obviously focus more on the environmental side, but the record of decision expected next year will get more into the economic side.

 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), Department of Homeland Security
Dr. Chuck Gallaway, Deputy Director; DHS-DNDO
DNDO is an interagency office within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The Office works with:

• Department of Energy
• Department of Defense
• Department of Justice/FBI
• Department of State
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• Other DHS components: Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Administration.

DNDO objectives include the development of a global nuclear detection and reporting architecture, establishment of situational awareness through information sharing, and establishment of operation protocols to ensure detection leads to effective response (state and local coordination).

Global efforts:
Multi-layered, international system allows for detection opportunities: materials protection, control & accountability; ports of departure screening; at-sea interdiction; Coast Guard inspection; border protection.

Domestic efforts:
Coast Guard interdiction; seaport monitoring; border patrol interdiction; land portal monitoring; airport inspection; interior-modal detection; perimeter protection; federal, state, and local law enforcement.

Layers of detection:
Geographic - exterior, border, interior
Threats - nuclear weapons, nuclear material, radiological material
Pathways - air, land, maritime
Detection approaches - fixed, mobile, re-locatable; continuous, periodic, event

Most DNDO work is focused on the borders - 98 percent of shipments at 22 major seaports are being screened (was only 2 percent pre 9/11).  Having some problems will naturally-occurring radiation triggering alarms (about 400-500 in Los Angeles every day); would like to ensure non-dangerous materials inspections do not impede the flow of commerce.  Conducting tests at various DOE sites and ports of entry to improve identification and false alarm rate.

Program goals include developing the next-generation passive detection systems for multiple applications.  The initial focus will be on fixed portals for points of entry, with a substantial investment in rail, mobile, and re-locatable assets for non-points of entry venues.

Securing the Cities (state and local participation):
The goal of preventing a radiological attack on New York City by enhancing regional capabilities to detect, identify, and interdict illicit materials includes the following objectives:

• Leverage current technologies and deploy them in a coordinated manner regionally.
• Develop next-generation radiological sensors with isotopic discrimination capabilities for use in a dense urban environment.
• Design, procure, and deploy an operationally-viable regional architecture for these and existing sensors.
• Develop and implement a common, multi-agency Concept of Operations for sharing sensor data and resolving "hits" within the sensor architecture.
• Train and exercise regional agencies to execute.

The Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot project was set up to test aspects of the concept of operations, such as the communication infrastructure and equipment needs.  Hope to improve cities' awareness of radiological threats.

Operations Support:
DNDO is developing the information sharing and analytical tools necessary to create a fully-integrated operating environment across federal, state, and local partners.  Programs include a joint analysis center, nuclear assessment program, technical reachback, and training/exercises.

The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center provides national-level stewardship, centralized planning, and integration - determines technical decisions just prior to or following a bomb detonation.

Q&A
Are medical products causing a lot of the false alarms at inspection sites?

-  Yes.  Also must consider medical uses by passengers triggering alarms; need to be sensitive to privacy issues.

DOE used to provide money to states for radiation monitoring and training.

-  That program is separate.  DNDO can not fund state and local efforts.

What types of products are triggering the alarms?

-  So far nothing illicit, mostly items such as uranium, tiles, bananas, tobacco.  The detectors are very sensitive.

DNDO would like the National Academies to assess whether the Office is doing an effective job and what could be improved.