Case Supreme Court Strikes Down Administrative Child Support Process
By Teresa A. Myers
On January 28, 1999 the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled that aspects of the
state's administrative process related to child support establishment and
enforcement violated the state constitutional clause requiring a separation of
powers between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government.
Minnesota's child support process was more administrative in nature than most
state programs, and the case challenged the process under the state, not the
federal, constitution. For these reasons and because the case was heard in a
state court rather than a federal court, it will likely have little bearing on
other state child support programs. It will, however, inform the child support
discussion and probably influence development of child support structures across
the country. Below is a discussion of the case based on questions most
frequently asked by legislators and legislative staff interested in the
case.
Q. What was the case about?
A. This case resulted from a consolidation of three cases brought against
the state by non-custodial parents who were dissatisfied with the administrative
child support process and subsequently challenged its constitutionality. The
non-custodial parents' main claim was that the statute authorizing the agency to
use the administrative process violated the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine, which prohibits any branch of the government (e.g. executive,
judicial, or legislative) from taking upon itself powers granted to one of the
other branches. The parents also argued that the statute permitted
administrative employees to engage in the practice of law by granting them
duties formally reserved to licensed attorneys.
Since 1984, federal law has required that state legislatures authorize their
state agencies to conduct certain child support duties through administrative
processes. These requirements were expanded in 1993, in 1994, and again in 1996.
State officials in Minnesota acknowledge that Minnesota's administrative program
surpassed the federal requirements. In 1988, Minnesota began an administrative
hearing pilot project in one county to test the use of increased administrative
process in child support cases. Initially, final orders of the chief
administrative law judge (ALJ) were treated like final agency decisions, rather
than final district court decisions. As such, the administrative decisions could
be appealed to the court of appeals for a fairly broad review of the facts and
legal findings. The pilot project also pioneered the use of child support
officers (CSOs), acting under the supervision of the county attorney, to handle
many child support matters. All cases in which the state or local agency was a
party were required to be processed administratively; child support parties
involved in such cases were not given the option to proceed in district
court.
In 1989 and 1990, the pilot project was expanded to additional counties, and
the powers of the CSOs were also expanded. CSOs were permitted to prepare final
orders, which were reviewed and signed by ALJs, and these administrative orders
were given the same weight as district court orders. ALJ orders were also
appealable to the court of appeals in the same manner as a district court order
and subject to a more narrow standard of review than under the previous
structure. A final change occurred in a 1996 law that permitted CSOs to perform
nearly all child support tasks, without the supervision of a county attorney. In
fact, the statute prohibited county attorneys from assuming an active role in
reviewing the information, preparing documents, and attending hearings, unless
requested to do so by the local child support office.
Minnesota's administrative child support process consisted of two "tracks" -
uncontested proceedings and contested proceedings. In uncontested proceedings,
the CSOs prepared a proposed order for the parties to sign and the ALJ to
ratify. In contested proceedings, the CSOs drew up documents and appeared at
administrative hearings. During the hearings, the ALJs had "all powers, duties,
and responsibilities conferred on judges of district court to obtain and enforce
child and medical support and parentage and maintenance obligations," including
the power to issue subpoenas, conduct proceedings in district court courtrooms,
and issue warrants for parties' failure to appear. The ALJs had several
additional powers, including authority to modify child support orders issued by
the district courts. Although several legal distinctions were retained to
separate the duties of the district judges from their ALJ counterparts, the
state supreme court ultimately held that these distinctions were not sufficient
to distinguish the district court jurisdiction as superior to the ALJ
jurisdiction.
Q. What did the lower court say?
A. The Minnesota Court of Appeals focused on the parents' separation of
powers claim in determining that the state's administrative process for
establishing and modifying child support orders was unconstitutional. Based on
the constitutional requirement that the executive branch not interfere with the
courts in the courts' exercise of judicial power, the court of appeals found
that the administrative process placed the ALJs "in the constitutionally
untenable position of reviewing and modifying judicial decisions." The lower
court stated that a state agency's exercise of quasi-judicial power was not
unconstitutional as long as the agency's decisions were not only subject to full
judicial review, but also not judicially final until a court issued a binding
judgment on the order. The court of appeals held that the state's administrative
process violated the separation of powers doctrine by allowing ALJs to make
final decisions not subject to district court review and by permitting limited
appeals rather than a full appeal.
Q. What did the state supreme court say?
A. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the lower court's decision
that a portion of the Minnesota administrative child support process violated
the state constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The court gave three
reasons for its decision: 1.) the administrative process infringed on the
district court's jurisdiction; 2.) ALJ jurisdiction was essentially equal to the
district court's jurisdiction; and 3.) the administrative process permitted
non-attorneys to practice law, which infringed on the judicial branch's
exclusive power to supervise those who practice law.
The supreme court began by comparing the administrative nature of the child
support process to the statutorily-created tax courts. Relying on a previous
supreme court case, the court distinguished the state tax courts from the child
support ALJ hearings by noting that "[t]axation is primarily a legislative
function," and argued that "the type of function delegated played a critical
role in determining whether an administrative action impinges on the district
court's...jurisdiction." The court found that because family dissolution
remedies were the jurisdiction of the district court, this function could not be
completely reassigned to the executive branch.
The state supreme court also discussed a similar Nebraska Supreme Court case,
Drennen v. Drennen, 426 N.W.2d 252 (Neb. 1988). In the Drennen
case, the state supreme court found the expedited child support system
unconstitutional because the administrative system usurped the district court's
jurisdiction by removing certain child support cases from the district court's
jurisdiction. The Minnesota Supreme Court drew analogies between the
Drennen case and the case at hand: 1.) Minnesota's administrative process
was mandatory for many parties, which removed a whole class of cases from the
jurisdiction of the district court; and 2.) ALJs were given powers inherently
belonging to the district court, and ALJ decisions are given the same weight and
authority as district court decisions.
Minnesota's highest court rejected the state's request to narrow the more
liberal separation of powers test contained in Breimhorst v. Beckman, 35
N.W.2d 719 (1949), a case challenging the constitutionality of the state's
administrative worker's compensation system. Acknowledging that
Breimhorst contained a flexible review standard, the court explained that
Minnesota Supreme Court cases since then have applied the standard and
considered many factors in addition to the public policy involved, including the
existence of adequate judicial checks on administrative workers, the nature of
the function delegated to the administrative workers, and ALJ decision
appealability. The court refused to apply a narrower reading of
Breimhorst, arguing that any limiting principle would result in allowing
"the legislature's sincere efforts to address public concerns" to determine the
outcome of the decision at hand.
In reaching its holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited several aspects of
the administrative child support process which gave the court considerable
discomfort. First, the court noted that ALJs "are given responsibilities and
powers comparable to a district court, [and] ALJs also have the power to modify
district court decisions." Second, the court argued that "the right to appellate
review does not provide sufficient judicial oversight of this
mandatory...process." Third, the court reached "the inescapable conclusion that
CSOs are engaging in the practice of law." For these reasons, the state supreme
court determined that the statute authorizing the administrative process
violated the state constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Q. Can the state appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling to a higher
court?
A. No. This state supreme court decision was based strictly on an
interpretation of the state constitution and involved no questions of federal
law or the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court would not have
jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the case.
Q. Does it matter that the federal government mandated that states pass laws
authorizing expedited administrative processes for child support cases like the
one challenged here?
A. The fact that the state legislature, in order to receive federal funding,
was required by federal law to enact statutes authorizing administrative
processes to handle child support cases was not material to the court's analysis
in this case. This case did not challenge nor address the legal or
constitutional validity of the federal law. Therefore, the federal mandates will
still be valid, and the state legislature will still be required to have
administrative process laws on the statute books.
Q. What happens next in Minnesota?
A. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the chaos that would ensue if
its decision was applied to nullify all of the administrative orders currently
in place. As a result, with the exception of the three consolidated cases before
it, the court did not give its ruling retroactive effect. Therefore, the
decision will only affect child support proceedings subsequent to the decision's
effective date. The court also postponed the effective date of its decision
until July 1, 1999, in order to allow the legislature time to fix the law in
accordance with the court's holdings. Minnesota legislators are already
considering how to best restructure their child support program to meet the
thresholds established in this case.
Q. What does this ruling mean for other states?
A. Minnesota's administrative process for child support has long been
regarded as a model for administrative efficiency and the state's child support
program is one of the best-performing in the country. The challenge facing
officials in Minnesota is how to restructure their program without sacrificing
their much-envied performance.
Because Minnesota's administrative process was broader and more encompassing
than most states, this case should have little effect on states that use an
administrative child support process on a more limited basis. Commentators
uniformly agree that, given the district court review present in most other
states, their programs likely would have passed muster under the Minnesota
Supreme Court analysis. Several key factors are identified as distinguishing the
Minnesota program from other states' programs. First, parties to a child support
proceeding involving the state had no choice of forum for that proceeding; under
law they were required to use the administrative process. Second, parties did
not have the right to a complete review of the administrative findings by a
district or circuit court. Finally, the CSOs were performing functions
considered to be the practice of law and were not under the supervision of the
judiciary. Basically, all three of these points can be condensed into one key
factor: the judicial branch did not have adequate jurisdiction or oversight over
child support matters; at best a party could only file a limited appeal after
having gone through the entire administrative process. Many other states with
state-supervised, county-administered programs like Minnesota's split their
child support duties between the judicial branch and the executive branch, with
judicial branch employees handling establishment issues related to child support
and paternity orders, and executive branch employees enforcing those orders.
This structure is favored in many states precisely because it is viewed as a
compromise between judicial and administrative involvement.
This is the first case to examine the use of administrative child support
processes for establishing and modifying child support orders to reach a
high-level court since enactment of the sweeping 1996 federal child support
reform mandates. Since this case was litigated in state court and not in federal
court, however, it is not controlling precedent outside of Minnesota. Even so,
any state or federal court looking at this type of case will read this Minnesota
decision and may be influenced by the court's reasoning.
Finally, future state court rulings in this area may depend considerably on
the policy-leanings of the court reviewing the case. Some state courts are
simply more protective of the judiciary's jurisdiction and more likely to view
administrative processes as usurping that jurisdiction.
Case Citation:
Holmberg v. Holmberg, Carlson v. Carlson, and Kalis-Fuller v. Fuller, Ct.
Nos. C7-97-926, C8-97-1132, C9-98-33, C7-97-1512, Slip Op. (Minn. S. Ct. Jan.
28, 1999).
Selected References:
Preliminary Survey Results: Basic Organization of State IV-D Programs,
Center for Law and Social Policy, Draft Version, January 1999.
Preliminary Survey Results: State and Local Agencies Involved in IV-D
Paternities, Support Orders, and Enforcement
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