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Journal of the American Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries

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INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

The editor of the *Journal of the American Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries* welcomes manuscripts which would be of interest to our members and legislative staff, including topics such as parliamentary procedures, precedent, management, and technology. Articles must be of a general interest to the overall membership.

Contributions will be accepted for consideration from members of the American Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries, members of other National Conference of State Legislatures staff sections, and professionals in related fields.

All articles submitted for consideration will undergo a review process. When the Editorial Board has reviewed a manuscript, the author(s) will be notified of acceptance, rejection or need for revision of work.

STYLE AND FORMAT

Articles should follow a format consistent with professional work, whether it is in the style of the Chicago Manual, the MLA, or APA. Articles should be submitted in MS Word, single spaced with normal margins.

All references should be numbered as footnotes in the order in which they are cited within the text. Accuracy of the content and correct citation is expected of the author. Specialized jargon should be avoided as readers will skip material they do not understand. Charts or graphics which may assist readers in better understanding the article’s content are encouraged for inclusion.

SUBMISSION OF ARTICLES

Articles for the 2018 Journal should be submitted electronically, not later than July 1, to the Chair:

Bernadette McNulty  
Bernadette.McNulty@sen.ca.gov

Inquiries from readers and potential authors are encouraged. You may contact the Chair by telephone at (916) 651-4171 or by email at Bernadette.McNulty@sen.ca.gov.

Letters to the editor are welcomed and may be published at the conclusion of the journal to provide a forum for discussion.

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From the Editors

The editors of the last volume of the *Professional Journal* identified an error. Volume 21, fall 2016 of the *Professional Journal* on page 1 inadvertently identified the incorrect committee members.

To correct this error and give proper recognition we have decided to list the correct committee membership on this page.

2015-2016 Committee

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Organizing the Wisconsin State Assembly: The Role of Memoranda of Understanding

By

Richard A. Champagne
Emma J. Gradian
Madeline R. Kasper

Legislative bodies throughout the United States establish parliamentary procedures that allow business to be conducted in a timely and predictable manner. These procedures are designed to ensure economy, efficiency, and fairness in the legislative process. At the most basic level, parliamentary procedures allow the majority to achieve its policy goals, while at the same time provide the minority the opportunity to be heard. Legislative procedures are determined by many sources: the rules of each house of the legislature, as well as the joint rules of the houses; statutes that prescribe or govern the internal operating procedures of the legislature; judicial decisions that affect legislative operations and procedures; the authoritative rulings of the presiding officers of the legislative bodies; and the customs, practices, and usages of each house.2

This article examines some of the customs, practices, and usages of the Wisconsin State Assembly that were established during its two most recent legislative sessions. We look at two Memoranda of Understanding entered into by the majority and minority party leadership to govern assembly floor proceedings. The MOUs, as they are called, were agreed on at the start of the 2013 session and the 2015 session.3 The provisions of the MOUs were not adopted as rules or formally enacted into law. Instead, they were informal agreements negotiated between the majority and minority party leadership about how legislative business should be conducted. The MOUs applied only to the Wisconsin assembly, not the senate. The MOUs shared three general goals: “to provide greater transparency of the legislative process”; to “establish the structure for a more productive

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1 This paper is being prepared for submission to the Journal of the American Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries, Volume 22, Fall 2017. Richard Champagne is Chief of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau. Emma Gradian and Madeline Kasper are Legislative Analysts at the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau. The authors benefitted greatly from the assistance and insights of Kay Inabinet and Julie Martyn of the Wisconsin Assembly Chief Clerk’s Office.


3 We refer to the MOU adopted for the 2013-14 legislative session as the 2013 MOU and the MOU adopted for the 2015-16 legislative session as the 2015 MOU. We also refer to the 2009-10 legislative session as the 2009 session; the 2011-12 legislative session as the 2011 session; the 2013-14 legislative session as the 2013 session; and the 2015-16 legislative session as the 2015 session.
debate”; and to “provide for greater public participation in the legislative process.” In this article, we examine the specific provisions of the MOUs, consider how the MOUs affected legislative behavior, and look at whether the MOUs achieved their goals.

**The MOUs**

The MOUs were agreements entered into by the Democratic and Republican Party leadership at the outset of the 2013 and 2015 legislative sessions. The MOUs sought to reduce legislative volatility, increase political participation in the legislative process, and restore a more civil and predictable way of doing legislative business. Prior to the 2013 legislative session, all-night floor sessions in the assembly were frequent, with legislative debate often beginning after 5:00 pm and continuing into the night; biennial budget acts were sometimes late, at times by months; special and extraordinary sessions were regularly convened; and the marathon floor sessions during the enactment of 2011 Act 10, the measure curtailing municipal and state collective bargaining, were the longest in Wisconsin history. The MOUs called for “a new bipartisan tone” and sought to “establish the structure for a more productive debate.” In short, the MOUs were a response to the unpredictable environment of the legislature.

The MOUs dealt mainly with floor proceedings. The 2013 MOU focused on establishing time limits for floor debate and enforcing the time limits. Party leaders agreed that their goal was “to finish debate at a reasonable time.” The Assembly Rules Committee, which establishes the floor calendar, was charged with setting time limits for debate, as well as allocating time between the majority and minority parties for debate on final passage. In the MOU, the leaders agreed to confer before the Rules Committee established time limits and agreed “to minimize the number of contentious bills on any session day.” The MOU contained a specific methodology for determining how to count time for debate for purposes of the limits and also set aside 30 minutes for debate on final passage of any bill, unless a different amount of time was agreed to by the majority and minority leaders.

The 2013 MOU further provided that the time limits would be strictly enforced and that session days would start at the time set by the Rules Committee. If time limits for debate on a bill expired, the MOU provided that the majority leader could move to dispense with remaining amendments. However, the MOU promised that “Every effort will be made to consider all amendments.” To accomplish this, the MOU provided that amendments submitted to the assembly chief clerk by 9:00 a.m. on a floor session day would “receive priority consideration” and be considered by each party caucus. One other important item in the 2013 MOU was that the leaders agreed to not recess for party caucus, “except under extenuating circumstances.” And any recess for party caucus would not extend the Rules Committee time limits for debate. The expectation was that the parties would hold their caucuses before the assembly convened to take up legislation.

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4 The 2013 and 2015 MOUs are reprinted in the Appendix.
5 In Wisconsin, amendments may be offered by any member on the floor while a proposal is at the amendable stage.
The 2015 MOU contained all of the 2013 provisions, with minor differences, as well as new provisions relating to committee processes and consideration of legislation. The leaders agreed to try to provide 4 days’ notice for committee hearings; require 48 hours between a committee hearing on a bill and an executive meeting on the bill; notice public hearings with actual bill numbers, and not with Legislative Reference Bureau bill draft numbers; make efforts to minimize the use of paper ballots in the Assembly Committee on Organization; and try to ensure that all who attend committee hearings wishing to testify be provided the opportunity to do so. There were other provisions in the MOU affecting floor sessions, but for the most part the 2015 MOU continued the 2013 agreements concerning the scheduling of floor sessions and floor debate on legislation.

There was one additional factor relating to the 2015 MOU, though it was not contained in the MOU: the assembly amended its rules to allow the presiding officer to enforce time limits on debate. The new assembly rules provided that a member could move that all pending amendments and substitute amendments on a bill be tabled en masse and the body would then proceed immediately to the main question pending without any further debate on amendments or substitute amendments. This procedure, however, could be used only if the time limits for debate established by the Rules Committee had expired.

Assessing the Impact of the MOUs

The MOUs aimed at making the assembly a more productive environment for debate, increasing transparency, and encouraging citizen participation in the legislative process. Floor sessions were to begin and end at set times and legislative business was to be conducted in such a manner as to allow for citizen involvement in the legislative process, especially in terms of providing individuals the opportunity to easily observe and follow assembly proceedings. Legislative business was to be conducted during regular business hours and time limits on debate were to ensure that members were not engaged in dilatory actions to prolong assembly consideration of legislative proposals. Recessing the floor day to go into partisan caucus was strongly discouraged and consideration of contentious bills was to be spread out across session days.

To determine whether the MOUs achieved their professed goals, we look at a number of variables across four successive legislative sessions. Generally, these variables attempt to gauge legislative output, the assembly work and floor environment, and the opportunities for citizens to observe and follow legislative proceedings. We look at the two legislative sessions, the 2009 and 2011 sessions, which occurred immediately preceding the adoption of the MOUs. We then focus on these several variables during the 2013 and 2015 sessions when the MOUs were in effect. During the 2009 session, the Democrats were the majority party in the assembly and senate; during the 2011, 2013, and 2015 sessions, the Republicans were the majority party in the assembly and

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6 Until a proposal is introduced, the proposal is usually referred to by a number assigned by the Legislative Reference Bureau that is used for drafting purposes.
7 Assembly Rule 71m. This new rule was included in 2015 Assembly Resolution 3.
senate. Thus, we are looking at the same variables across legislative sessions during which both houses of the legislature were controlled by the same majority party, thereby eliminating any effects that could result from split-party control of the two houses.

Table 1: Legislative Session Statistics 2009-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biennial Session</th>
<th>2009-10</th>
<th>2011-12</th>
<th>2013-14</th>
<th>2015-16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Floor Days</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual session time in hours (not including recess time)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total session time in hours (start to adjournment)</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of floor days with at least one request for a recess</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floor days adjourned after 9:00 pm</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bills passed by assembly</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of bills passed each floor day</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of assembly amendments offered to bills passed by assembly</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of amendments offered to bills passed by assembly</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Special and Extraordinary Session days were included in the tally unless they occurred simultaneously with Regular Session days. State of the Union and Budget Address Session Days were only included if other legislative business occurred on that day.

Table 1 contains the information we use to determine the effectiveness or impact of the MOUs. During the 2009 session, the assembly met on 36 floor days when legislation was taken up. The total number of session hours from start to finish during these 36 floor days was 293 hours, but with only about 129 hours actually spent on the floor in debate and not in recess. In other words, on a percentage basis, the assembly was actually engaged in legislative business on the floor for
only 44 percent of the time during a floor day in the 2009 session, with the other time spent in recess. In fact, on 31 of the 36 floor days in the 2009 session, there was a request from the floor to go into recess. Recess extends the floor day and if members of the public are attending the daily session, they must wait until the assembly returns to session from recess to follow assembly consideration and debate of legislation. There was no time limit on recesses, so they could last any amount of time. These recesses contributed to the fact that during the 2009 session the assembly adjourned after 9:00 p.m. on 9 different occasions, thereby conducting floor proceedings when there were few members of the public left in the galleries. In terms of legislative output, the assembly passed 551 bills during the 36 floor days, an average of about 15 bills a day, and offered 702 amendments to these bills, an average of about 1.27 amendments per bill.

During the 2011 session, the assembly met on 31 floor days during which legislation was considered. This number is a little deceptive however, since during consideration of what became 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, the assembly was in session for more than 60 straight hours although this was considered only one legislative day. The total number of hours from start to finish during the 31 floor days in the 2011 session was 419 hours, with about 219 hours actually spent on the floor in debate and not in recess. The assembly was therefore engaged in legislative business on the floor for about 52 percent of the time during a floor day. In fact, on 30 of the 31 floor days during the 2011 session, the assembly went into recess. The normal pattern of legislative proceedings on a given floor day was to gavel the start of the session, dispense with several of the opening orders of business, and then at the request of one or both of the party leaders recess for caucus until much later in the day. During the 2011 session, the assembly adjourned after 9:00 p.m. on 14 different occasions. This was close to half of the days the assembly was on the floor in the entire session. In terms of output, the assembly passed 319 bills during these 31 floor days, an average of about 10 bills a day, but offered 838 amendments to these bills, an average of about 2.62 amendments per bill. There were more amendments to bills during the 2011 session than the 2009 session, but far fewer bills passed the assembly. Generally speaking, the more amendments offered to a bill, the more likely it is that the bill is considered contentious and divides the parties.

During the 2013 session, the first session governed by an MOU, the assembly met on 31 floor days, the same number as in the 2011 session, but the total number of hours from start to finish during the 2013 session floor days was 207 hours, with about 167 hours actually spent on the floor in debate and not in recess. This was a major change. With an identical number of floor days as the 2011 session, the 2013 session had only half as many total hours from start to finish on a floor day. Floor days were shorter. Of the 207 total hours on a floor day during the 2013 session, about 167 were spent on the floor doing legislative business and not in recess. Whereas 52 percent of a floor day was spent on legislative business during the 2011 session, 80 percent of a floor day was spent on such business during the 2013 session. The assembly simply did not recess for that many hours. In fact, there were just 10 floor days when a recess was taken during the 2013 session, a number that compares to 31 in the 2009 session and 30 in the 2011 session. With fewer recesses, the assembly could complete its business in a timely manner and adjourn earlier. Consequently,
there were just 7 days when the assembly adjourned after 9:00 p.m. – half the number that occurred during the 2011 session. In terms of output, the assembly passed 435 bills during the 31 floor days, an average of about 14 bills a day, and offered 558 amendments to these bills, an average of about 1.28 amendments per bill.

The 2015 session continued the trends of the 2013 session. In the 2015 session, the assembly met for only 23 days and was in session a total of 194 hours, with 152 hours engaged in legislative business and not in recess. Significantly, the 2015 session had the fewest number of floor days during the entire 2009-16 period. Moreover, 78 percent of the time on floor days was spent on legislative business and not in recess, a percentage almost equal to that in the 2013 session. There were only 10 days when the assembly recessed as compared to 31 days in the 2009 session and 30 days in the 2011 session. In addition, the assembly was in session only on 5 days after 9:00 p.m., as compared to the high of 14 days in the 2011 session. The assembly passed 480 bills in its 23 days on the floor, an average of almost 21 bills a floor day. It also offered 616 amendments to these bills, averaging 1.28 amendments to each bill, an average less than half of that in 2011 when 2.62 amendments were offered to each bill.

If the 2009 and 2011 sessions before adoption of the MOUs are compared with the 2013 and 2015 sessions that were subject to the MOUs, all of the following conclusions can be made. First, the number of floor session days declined, but a larger number of bills were nonetheless considered and passed on each floor day. Second, the total number of assembly session hours from start to finish declined, but a far greater percentage of time was spent during those hours engaged in legislative business. Third, the assembly dramatically reduced the number of times that it was in recess and seldom adjourned after 9:00 p.m. Finally, especially compared to the 2011 session, the assembly passed many more bills, but with fewer offered amendments.

**Did the MOUs Change the Assembly?**

The two legislative sessions before the adoption of the MOUs are very different from the sessions governed by the MOUs. If the trend continues, there is predictability to the hours of the legislative day that was not there before the 2013 session and legislative sessions for the most part no longer run past 9:00 p.m. More bills are calendared, debated, and passed on a floor day. Also, bills are debated under the terms of time limits established by the Rules Committee and these time limits are enforced. But were there other factors at work that could have caused these changes?

One factor that could have contributed to the changed legislative environment was new legislative leadership, especially in the majority party. There was a new speaker for the 2013 and 2015 sessions, a new speaker pro tempore for the 2015 session, and a new majority leader for the 2015 session. None of these legislators had held the positions in the 2009 or 2011 sessions. According to newspaper accounts, all of the legislative leaders were determined to avoid the legislative upheaval and conflict of the 2011 session, as well as to end certain practices that had become normal for conducting legislative business, such as lengthy and unpredictable floor days,
late night and all night sessions, and frequent breaks for partisan caucuses.\(^8\) From this perspective, the MOUs were simply a means to achieve results that could have been achieved through other means, such as changes to the assembly rules, strict enforcement of existing assembly rules governing debate, or rulings from the chair regarding debate and procedure.

Another factor was the changing composition of the assembly and the growing size of the majority party. In the 2013 session, there were 25 new members of the assembly and in the 2015 session there were another 25 new members. If the 30 new members from the 2011 session are also included in this count, then at the start of the 2015 session the overwhelming majority of the 99 assembly members had fewer than 4 years of legislative service. For these legislators, the volatile 2011 session was either their first experience of the legislature or was an event still talked about in the halls of the Capitol. New members from both political parties had not been “socialized” into expecting long floor days, frequent recesses, and unlimited debate. As a result, they may have been less inclined to continue parliamentary practices that led to late night sessions and lengthy floor debates. In addition, the Republican Party went from a minority party of 46 members in the 2009 session to 59 members in the 2013 session, its largest majority since 1957, and to 63 members in the 2015 session. With its largest majority in more than half a century and with mostly new members, the new majority party legislators may have been less willing to continue the old way of doing legislative business. This in itself could have led to procedural reforms or to stricter enforcement of existing debate rules without having to adopt the MOUs. Again, from this perspective, the MOUs were simply the means to achieving what the majority party members were going to try to make happen in some other way.

These two factors—committed leaders and a growing number of members who had no direct experience with the volatile legislative environment of the 2009 and 2011 sessions—are helpful in explaining the success of the MOUs, at least in terms of achieving the goals of the MOUs. The MOUs expressed a hope for “a new bipartisan tone” and set up a process for organizing a floor day and conducting debate on legislative proposals. But the MOUs were not self-enforcing. How each floor day was organized and how debate was conducted was subject to negotiation and required both active majority and minority leadership participation. In this regard, the involvement of minority party leadership in negotiating each day’s floor agreement was crucial to the MOU process. Without active minority party participation, the process might not have worked as smoothly as it did and the goals of shorter and more predictable floor days and time limits for debate would have had to be achieved in other ways, such as by stricter enforcement of rules ending debate and calling for the vote on the main question. These procedural tools might have led to more polarization, conflict, and disruption on the assembly floor.

Conclusion

The MOUs produced a consensus with less chaotic floor days, negotiated time limits for debate, and increased opportunities for citizens to observe and follow assembly proceedings. In this respect, the MOUs changed the customs, practices, and usages of the assembly. There is now less of an expectation that floor days will last long into the night and legislative debate is taking place under time limits. The changes wrought by the MOUs could have been attained formally through amendments to legislative rules, but changes to the rules might well have been debated and voted on entirely along party lines, thereby raising the question of the partisan nature of the rule changes. Instead, the MOUs put into place an informal, negotiated process with minority party participation. The negotiated terms of an MOU on any given floor day may not have been ideal from the perspective of the minority party, which typically wishes more time for debate, but the minority party had a say. This is important. To the extent that a basic tenet of parliamentary procedure is that the majority of a deliberative body must be able to achieve its goals, while the minority of that body must have the opportunity to be heard, the MOUs struck a balance between these two goals, which are often in tension. There were fewer floor days, shorter floor days, and legislative business on floor days was less disrupted by recesses and generally proceeded in a predictable manner.

The MOUs now govern assembly floor days and the conduct of legislative business on the floor, as well as some committee procedures. The terms of the MOUs were never specifically incorporated into legislative rules or enacted into law, although an enforcement mechanism was included in the 2015 assembly rules. It is unclear if future leaders or future majority and minority parties will continue to negotiate MOUs and abide by their terms in conducting legislative business. But the 2013 and 2015 MOUs have changed the way the assembly operates, at least on floor session days. There is now predictability to the legislative day in the assembly that was not there before the 2013 session. To the extent that these changes become ingrained in assembly proceedings and that members of the majority and minority parties come to accept time limits on debate, the MOUs will have played a major role in changing the customs and practices of the Wisconsin assembly. That may well be the most enduring significance of the MOUs.
APPENDIX

Memorandum of Understanding For The

2013-2014 Legislative Session

This Memorandum of Understanding has been set forth by the leaders of the 101st Wisconsin State Assembly in order to provide greater transparency of the legislative process to the citizens of the state of Wisconsin. This document has been arrived at through hours of civil discussions between the two party leaders and hopefully, will set a new bipartisan tone for the 2013-2014 session. We, the Assembly leaders, believe that this signed document will establish the structure for a more productive debate. The beneficiaries of this memorandum are the people of Wisconsin. These changes will allow representatives to better serve their constituents and will provide for greater public participation in the legislative process.

- Our goal this session is to finish debate at a reasonable time.

- The Rules Committee will meet to set goals for the structure and timing of debate, including the division of the time on final passage for both parties.

- The Majority Leader and Minority Leader will make an effort to minimize the number of contentious bills on any session day.

- The Majority Leader and Minority Leader will consult before the Rules notice is distributed regarding the time frame for debate on each bill.

- The time frame for debate on a bill will be defined by the point at which the Assembly Chief Clerk reads the bill to the point at which there is a vote on final passage.

- Amendments submitted to the Assembly Chief Clerk by 9 a.m. on a session day will receive priority consideration and shall be considered by each caucus.

- Bipartisan Leadership Meetings will be held on a regular basis.
The floor rules will be strictly enforced; including time limits. There will be objections to breaking for caucus, except under extenuating circumstances, and extending time limits for debate.

There will be a minimum of 30 minutes set aside for debate on final passage of each bill, unless agreed to by the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader.

The session start time published on the Rules notice will be strictly followed.

When the agreed upon time frame for debate has expired on a bill, the Majority Leader may make a motion to dispense of all remaining amendments. Every effort will be made to consider all amendments.

If a Rules Committee meeting needs to be convened, any such break for the meeting will not count against the agreed upon time for debate on the bill under consideration.

Memorandum of Understanding For The

2015-2016 Legislative Session

This Memorandum of Understanding has been set forth by the leaders of the 102nd Wisconsin State Assembly in order to provide greater transparency of the legislative process to the citizens of the state of Wisconsin. This document has been arrived at through hours of civil discussions between the two party leaders and, hopefully, will continue to set a bipartisan tone for the 2015-2016 legislative session. We, the Assembly leaders, believe that this signed document will establish the structure for a more productive debate. The beneficiaries of this memorandum are the people of Wisconsin. These changes will allow representatives to better serve their constituents and will provide for greater public participation in the legislative process.

1) Every effort will be made this session to finish debate at a reasonable time.
2) The Majority Leader and Minority Leader will make every effort to minimize the number of contentious bills on any session day and will make every effort to spread out the bills over the course of a session week.
3) Amendments submitted to the Assembly Chief Clerk by 10:30 a.m. on a session day will receive priority consideration and shall be considered by each caucus.

4) The floor rules will be strictly enforced, including time limits. There will be objections to breaking for caucus, except under extenuating circumstances, and extending time limits for debate.

5) The time frame for debate on a bill will be defined by the point at which the Assembly Chief Clerk reads the bill to the point at which there is a vote on final passage. At the discretion of the Speaker Pro Tempore, every effort will be made to count the time for debate on a bill in a fair and equitable manner.

6) There will be a minimum of 30 minutes set aside for debate for each caucus on final passage of each bill, including after any pending amendments have been tabled en masse, unless agreed to by the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader.

7) The session start time published on the Rules notice will be strictly followed.

8) If a Rules Committee meeting needs to be convened, any such break for the meeting will not count against the agreed upon time for debate on the bill under consideration.

9) Every effort will be made to give 4 days’ notice before a committee meets for a public hearing with the understanding that the last weeks of regular session commonly result in fewer than 4 days’ notice.

10) Every effort will be made to have 48 hours’ notice between a committee hearing and executive session with the understanding that the last weeks of regular session may result in fewer than 48 hours’ notice.

11) If the Majority Leader and Minority Leader do not have time to meet before the Rules committee meeting regarding a bill(s) arriving just before the meeting starts, then the Rules meeting will be delayed for renegotiation of the time limits on the bill(s) in question until the Minority Leader has time to review the executive action taken on the bill(s) in question.

12) When taking up Senate bills that have not received an executive session, every effort will be made to also schedule the Assembly companion bill that at least has had a public hearing.

13) Every effort will be made to minimize the use of paper ballots in the Assembly Organization committee.

14) Every effort will be made to notice public hearings with bill numbers.

15) Every effort will be made to ensure that all people who attend a public hearing and wish to testify will be given the opportunity to do so.

16) Joint leadership will negotiate to identify two weeks for potential extraordinary session periods in the event they are needed after March 2016.

17) The Majority Leader and Minority Leader will consult before the final Rules notice is distributed regarding the time frame for debate on each bill.
Senate Counsel, Research, and Fiscal Analysis

State of Minnesota

Legislative Immunity

Peter S. Wattson
Senate Counsel

Updated July 1, 2016

Eric S. Silvia
Senate Counsel
INTRODUCTION

This document is a compilation and explanation of federal and state cases on the doctrine of legislative immunity. It has been used in memoranda in support of a motion to quash a subpoena or to dismiss the complaint in a civil action, and can be useful as a quick source of points and authorities when trying to convince opposing counsel to think twice before trying to subpoena a client who does not wish to testify concerning legislative intent.


I. Origins of the Doctrine of Legislative Immunity

A. Common Law

The doctrine of legislative immunity has its origins in the struggles between the English Crown and Parliament that began more than 600 years ago. For some, it was a matter of life and death. In 1397, during the reign of Richard II, Thomas Haxey, a member of Parliament, was condemned to death as a traitor for having introduced a bill to reduce the expenditures of the royal household. Richard II was deposed by Parliament before the sentence was carried out and Henry IV annulled the judgment in 1399. See Leon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech -- Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 960, 962 (1951); G.M. Trevelyan, I HISTORY OF ENGLAND 335 (3rd ed. reissue 1952); Thomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 195-96 (F.T. Plucknett 10th ed. 1946). In 1512, during the reign of Henry VIII, a county court in tin mining country convicted a member of Parliament, Richard Strode, and imprisoned him for having proposed bills to regulate tin mining. Parliament passed an act annulling the judgment against him and declared void all suits and proceedings against Strode and every other member of Parliament. Yankwich, supra, at 963. Later kings granted the members of Parliament the right to speak with impunity, id., until Charles I, in 1632, prosecuted Sir John Eliot and his friends Valentine and William Strode and kept them in prison for what they had done in the House of Commons. Eliot died in the Tower. Valentine and Strode were not freed until 1643, after Parliament had raised an army and begun the Civil War. The struggle was not ended until the army of Parliament had won the war and Charles I was beheaded, January 30, 1649. See G.M. Trevelyan, II HISTORY OF ENGLAND 165, 179-203 (3rd ed. reissue 1952); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).

We usually think of the common law as judge-made law. Legislative immunity is one part of the common law that was developed directly by the participants under very trying circumstances. In 1689, following the “Glorious Revolution” that brought William and Mary to
the throne of England, the legislative immunity that the members of Parliament had fought so hard to achieve was codified in the English Bill of Rights as:

That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament. 1 W. & M. 2, § 9 (1689).

In the colonies, it was seen “as a fundamental privilege without which the right to deliberate would be of little value.” Mary Patterson Clarke, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 97 (1943), quoted in Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 221, 230-31 (2003).

It was “taken as a matter of course” by our Founding Fathers and included in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, article V as:

Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372.

It was included in the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6, as:

[F]or any speech or debate in either house [the members] shall not be questioned in any other place.

This language was meticulously crafted and not disputed either at the Constitutional Convention or during the ratification debates. See Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1135-40 (1973); Huefner, supra, at 232.

As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Tenney v. Brandhove:

The reason for the privilege is clear. It was well summarized by James Wilson, an influential member of the Committee of Detail which was responsible for the provision in the Federal Constitution. “In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” II WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (Andrews ed. 1896) 38. Quoted in 341 U.S. at 373.

Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon the conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury’s speculation as to motives. The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130, that it was not consonant with our scheme of government
for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned. 
_Id._ at 377.

As Justice Story described it:

The next great and vital privilege is the freedom of speech and debate, without which all other privileges would be comparatively unimportant, or ineffectual. This privilege also is derived from the practice of the British parliament, and was in full exercise in our colonial legislatures, and now belongs to the legislature of every state in the Union, as matter of constitutional right. II Joseph Story, _Commentaries on the Constitution_ § 863 (1833).

Due to its common law origins, legislative immunity under federal common law is afforded to state legislators even where not specifically provided for in a state’s constitution. _Tenney v. Brandhove_, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).

_Tenney_ involved a suit by a witness against the chairman and members of a committee of the California State Senate for misusing the subpoena power of the committee to “intimidate and silence Plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights of free speech and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances, and also to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, due process of law, and of the enjoyment of equal privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States under the law . . . .” 341 U.S. at 371. The central question in the case was whether Congress by the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had intended to “overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National governments here.” 341 U.S. at 376. The Court found that Congress, “itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom,” had not intended to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason” and that § 1983 did not subject legislators to civil liability for acts done within “the traditional legislative sphere” or “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” 341 U.S. at 376. The Court found Tenney and the other members of the committee immune from suit under § 1983 for their conduct of the committee hearings and compelling Brandhove to appear before the committee as a witness. It reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing the Complaint. 341 U.S. at 379.

State courts have likewise afforded common law legislative immunity to legislators or legislative staff, or both, even when not provided for in a state’s constitution. _See_ Huefner, _supra_, at 237 n.54.

redistricting plan to become law without legislative approval); In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001) (members of Legislative Redistricting Board developing redistricting plan to become law without legislative approval); Marylanders for Fair Representation v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292 (D. Md. 1992) (governor drawing redistricting plan for presentation to the legislature).

Common law legislative immunity has also been recognized for members of local legislative bodies. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (members of city council); Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (members of regional planning body created by interstate compact). See also, Carlos v. Santos, No. 97-7523, 123 F.3d 61, 66 (2nd Cir. 1997); Burtnick v. McLean, No. 95-1345, 76 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 1996); Fry v. Board of County Com’rs of County of Baca (10th Cir. 1993) (county board of commissioners); Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1992); Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1991) (parish police jury); Haskell v. Washington Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1276-78 (6th Cir. 1988) (town board of trustees); Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park, 831 F.2d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 1987) (town commissioners); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 98-100 (3rd Cir. 1983) (members of borough council); Reed v. Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir. 1983) (village board of trustees); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982) (county supervisors); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 274-80 (4th Cir. 1980) (county council members); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-14 (8th Cir. 1980) (city directors); Searingtown Corp. v. Vill. of North Hills, 575 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. N.Y. 1981) (village board of trustees); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 921-22 (N.D. Tex. 1979) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1392 (1981) (county commissioners); Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 854 P.2d 126 (1993) (town council); City of Louisville v. District Court, 190 Colo. 33, 37, 543 P.2d 67,70 (1975) (city council); In re Recall of Call, 109 Wash.2d 954, 958-59, 749 P.2d 674 (1988) (city council member not subject to recall because of statements made in a council meeting); Issa v. Benson (Tenn.Ct.App. 2013)(statement from one council member to another council member about alleged bribe was protected even though statements were not made during a regularly-scheduled, open meeting). Contra, Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362 (Ky. App. 2007) (“absolute legislative immunity cannot be extended to municipal legislators.”)

B. Constitutions

The constitutions of forty-three states have a speech or debate clause, and most are similar to the federal clause. Only California, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina and South Carolina do not have a speech or debate clause in their constitutions. As a result of the common law origins of legislative immunity, where state courts have been called upon to interpret a speech or debate clause in their own constitution, they have usually chosen to follow the guidance given them by the decisions of federal courts interpreting the United States Speech or Debate Clause.

Of the 43 states with a speech or debate clause in their own constitution, 13 have not yet reported a decision applying it to their own legislators or legislative staff.1

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1Ark. Const. art. V, § 15; Del. Const. art. II, § 13; Ill. Const. art. IV, § 12; Ind.Const. art. IV, § 8; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 8; Mo. Const. art. III, § 19; N.M. Const.art. IV, § 13; N.D. Const. art.
The Minnesota Constitution has a speech or debate clause, MN. CONST. art. IV, § 10, that is identical to the Speech or Debate Clause in the United States Constitution.

“For any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place.”

The Minnesota Supreme Court has never had occasion to construe this clause, but its recognition of the doctrine of legislative immunity can be inferred from its opinion in Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975), prospectively abolishing the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in the tort area but retaining sovereign immunity for legislative functions.

We wish to make clear, however, that we are only indicating our disfavor of the immunity rule in the tort area, and our decision should not be interpreted as imposing liability on any governmental body in the exercise of discretionary functions or legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial functions.

306 Minn. at 131.

In Florida, whose constitution of 1865 contained a Speech or Debate Clause substantially similar to that found in the U.S. Constitution, but whose constitutions of 1868, 1885, and 1968 omitted the clause, and whose statutes do not provide for a legislative privilege or immunity, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized a legislative privilege under the state’s constitutional separation of powers provision. Such legislative privilege, however, is not absolute, and may yield to a compelling, competing interest. League of Women Voters of Florida v. Florida House of Representatives (132 So.3d 135 (Fla. 2013)(legislative privilege not absolute when violations concern state constitution provision prohibiting partisan political gerrymandering and improper intent in redistricting).

A sampling of state court decisions interpreting their own constitutional speech or debate clause include:

**Alabama**

*Ex parte Marsh*, 145 So.3d 744,748 (Ala. 2013) (ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 56, “for any speech or debate in either house shall not be questioned in any other place.”)

**Alaska**

*Whalen v. Hanley*, 63 P.3d 254 (Alaska 2003) (ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 6, “Legislators may not be held to answer before any other tribunal for any statement made in the exercise of their legislative duties while the legislature is in session.”)
Arizona  
*Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields*, No. 1CA-SA 03-0085, 206 Ariz. 130, 137 n.4, 75 P.3d 1088, 1095 n.4 (2003) (ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2, § 7, “No member of the Legislature shall be liable in any civil or criminal prosecution for words spoken in debate.”)

Colorado  

Connecticut  

Hawaii  
*Abercrombie v. McClung*, 55 Haw. 595, 525 P.2d 594 (1974) (HI. CONST. art III, § 7, “No member of the legislature shall be held to answer before any other tribunal for any statement made or action taken in the exercise of his legislative function.”)

Kansas  
*State v. Neufeld*, 926 P.2d 1325, 1332 (Kan. 1996) (KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 22, “For any speech, written document or debate in either house, the members shall not be questioned elsewhere.”)

Kentucky  
*Wiggins v. Stuart*, 671 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Ky. App. 1984) (KY. CONST. § 43, “for any speech or debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any other place.”)

Louisiana  
*Copsey v. Baer*, 593 So.2d 685, 688 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991) (LA. CONST. art. III, § 8, “No member shall be questioned elsewhere for any speech in either house.”)

Maryland  
*Blondes v. Maryland*, 16 Md.App. 165, 294 A.2d 661 (1972) (MD. CONST. Dec. of Rights, art. 10, “That freedom of speech and debate, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any Court of Judicature.” MD. CONST. art. 3, § 18, “No Senator or Delegate shall be liable in any civil action, or criminal prosecution, whatever, for words spoken in debate.”)

Michigan  
*Cotton v. Banks*, 872 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. App. 2015) (MICH. CONST., art. 4, § 11, “They shall not be questioned in any other place for any speech in either house.”)

Montana  
*Cooper v. Glaser* 228 P.3d 443 (Mont. 2010) (MONT. CONST. art. V, § 8, “shall not be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate in the legislature.”)

New Hampshire  
foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecution, in any other court or place whatsoever.”

New Jersey

*New Jersey v. Gregorio*, 451 A.2d 980 (N.J. Super. L. 1982) (N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 9, “for any statement, speech or debate in either house or at any meeting of a legislative committee, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”)

New York


Ohio


Oklahoma


Oregon

*State v. Babson*, 355 Or. 383, 326 P.3d 559 (2014) (“Nor shall a member for words uttered in debate in either house, be questioned in any other place.”)

Pennsylvania


Rhode Island

*Holmes v. Farmer*, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1984) (R.I. Const. art. VI, § 5, “For any speech in debate in either house, no member shall be questioned in any other place.”)

Tennessee


Texas

*Bowles v. Clipp*, 920 S.W.2d 752, 757-59 (Tex. App. 1996) (TEX. Const. art. III, § 21) (“ No member shall be questioned in any other place for words spoken in debate in either House.”)

Utah


The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has interpreted its speech or debate clause in *Silva v. Hernandex Agosto*, 118 P.R. Offic. Trans. 55, 70 (1986) (P. R. Const. art. III, § 14, “The members
of the Legislative Assembly shall not be questioned in any other place for any speech, debate or vote in either house or in any committee.”).

The District of Columbia, in *Alliance for Global Justice v. District of Columbia*, 437 F.Supp.2d 32 (D.D.C. 2006), interpreted its speech or debate clause. (D.C. Code § 1-301.42, “For any speech or debate made in the course of their legislative duties, the members of the Council shall not be questioned in any other place.”).

Although most state courts that have interpreted their speech or debate clause have decided to follow the federal lead, see *Wisconsin v. Beno*, 341 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 1984) (“The people of other states made for themselves respectively, constitutions which are construed by their own appropriate functionaries. Let them construe theirs--let us construe, and stand by ours.” Quoting *Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow*, 4 Wis. 567, 785 [757, 758] (1855)). See WIS. CONST. art IV, § 16. Accord, *Wisconsin v. Chvala*, 2004 WI App. 53, ¶ 33, 678 N.W.2d 880, 893 (2004).

C. Statutes

In Minnesota and other states, legislative immunity has been provided for in statute. Some examples include:

Minnesota: No member, officer, or employee of either branch of the legislature shall be liable in a civil action on account of any act done by him in pursuance of his duty as such legislator. Minn. Stat. § 540.13 (2016);

North Carolina: The members shall have freedom of speech and debate in the General Assembly, and shall not be liable to impeachment or question, in any court or place out of the General Assembly, for words therein spoken. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120-9 (2016).

Iowa: A member of the general assembly shall not be held for slander or libel in any court for words used in any speech or debate in either house or at any session of a standing committee. Iowa Code § 2.17 (2016).

Michigan: A member of the legislature of this state shall not be liable in a civil action for any act done by him or her pursuant to his or her duty as a legislator. Mich. Comp. Laws §4.551 (2016)


II. Scope of Legislative Immunity
A. “Legislative Acts” Are Immune from Questioning


Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. Id at 625.

The test for determining whether an act is legislative “turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Bogan v. Scott Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998). A distinction must be made between a legislative act and an act merely performed by a legislator.

A promise of a member to perform an act in the future is not a “legislative act” for purpose of the speech or debate clause. Protection only extends to a legislative act that has been already performed. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490 (1979) (a promise by a member of Congress to deliver a speech, to vote, or to solicit other votes at some future date is not a “speech or debate” for purposes of speech or debate clause.)

1. Introducing and Voting for Legislation


Kilbourn v. Thompson was the first Speech or Debate Clause case decided by the United States Supreme Court. It was a civil suit by a private citizen who had been jailed by the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives after he had been voted in contempt of the House for failing to answer questions as a witness before a committee. The Court found that the Speaker of the House, who had signed the order for the witness’ imprisonment, and who had introduced a resolution to that effect and voted for it, were immune from having to defend themselves in court. The Court refused to limit the privilege only to words spoken in debate, but rather extended it to the written report presented to the House by the committee, the resolution offered by committee members finding the witness in contempt and the act of voting for the resolution, “In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.” 103 U.S. at 204. The court quoted approvingly from an 1808 decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, which said in regard to a similar clause in the Massachusetts Constitution (MASS. CONST. PT. FIRST, ART. XXI):

I would define the article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution for everything said or done by him as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular . . . or irregular . . . . I do not confine the member to his place in the House; and I am
satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled to the privilege when not within the walls of the representatives’ chamber.

103 U.S. at 203-04.

United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979) was a criminal prosecution of a former congressman who was alleged to have solicited and obtained bribes from resident aliens in return for introducing private bills on their behalf to suspend the application of the immigration laws so as to allow them to remain in the United States. The court held that evidence of Helstoski’s actions to introduce the bills could not be admitted at trial, since the legislative acts of a member were not a proper subject of judicial scrutiny.

On the other hand, where a state constitution prohibits members from voting in caucus to commit themselves to a position on a bill, a court may issue a declaratory judgment that their voting in caucus violated the prohibition. Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1991).

2. Failing or Refusing to Vote or Enact Legislation

Failing or refusing to vote or enact legislation is also conduct entitled to legislative immunity. Schlitz v. Virginia, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988) (not voting to reelect state circuit court judge); Gamboz v. Subcomm. on Claims, 423 F.2d 674 (3rd Cir. 1970) (voting to deny a claim); Suhre v. Board of Comm’rs, 894 F. Supp. 927 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (refusing to remove Ten Commandments from wall of courtroom); Marylanders for Fair Representation v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292 (D. Md. 1992) (failing to adopt alternative to redistricting plan presented by governor); Quillan v. U. S. Government, 589 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Iowa 1984) (failing to enact private claims bill); Irons v. Rhode Island Ethics Comm’n, 973 A.2d 1124 (R.I. 2009) (state senator voting against a bill in which he allegedly had a personal financial interest); Dorsey v. District of Columbia, 917 A.2d 639 (D.C. 2007) (district council member refusing to support repeal of an ordinance); Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 130 Idaho 609, 611-12, 944 P.2d 1372, 1374-75 (1997) (failure to support calling constitutional convention to consider term limits); New Jersey v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 650 A.2d 840 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1994) (approving a transfer of money by an executive agency by failing within a certain time to object to it); Marra v. O’Leary, 652 A.2d 974 (R.I. 1995) (preventing private claims bill from being passed out of committee).

3. Voting on the Seating of a Member


4. Voting on the Confirmation of an Executive Appointment

Voting on the confirmation of an executive appointment is a legislative act. Kraus v. Ky. State Senate, 872 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1994).

5. Voting on an Impeachment

State legislators participating in impeachment proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions. Larsen v. Senate of Pa., No. 97-7153, 152 F.3d 240 (3rd Cir. 1998).
Larsen was an action by a judge of the state supreme court against numerous state officials who had participated in various disciplinary proceedings against him, including 49 members of the Pennsylvania Senate who had voted on articles of impeachment presented by the House of Representatives. In addition to money damages against the senators, the judge sought declaratory and injunctive relief voiding the Senate verdict of guilty. The trial court dismissed the claim against the senators for money damages but not the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals observed that both the federal and state constitutions had placed the impeachment power in the legislative branch primarily as a function of the separation of powers. It therefore held that impeachment proceedings were a legislative activity and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss all the claims against the senators.

Members of a city council participating in impeachment proceedings have been held entitled to absolute judicial immunity, rather than absolute legislative immunity. Brown v. Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1992).

6. Determining Whether a Bill Requires Local Approval


7. Making Speeches

Under the Speech or Debate Clause, a member of Congress is immune from inquiry into his or her motives for giving a speech on the House floor, even when the speech is alleged to be part of a criminal conspiracy. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Representative Johnson was tried and convicted of conflict of interest and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Part of the conspiracy to defraud included a speech made by Representative Johnson on the House floor, favorable to savings and loan institutions. The Government claimed Johnson was paid a bribe to make the speech. The Supreme Court held that the Government was precluded by the Speech or Debate Clause from inquiring into Johnson’s motives for giving the speech, and thus could not use the speech as evidence of the conspiracy, even without questioning the representative directly.

A state legislator is immune from state bar disciplinary action for defamatory statements made on the senate floor. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Nix, 1956 OK 95, 295 P.2d 286. A defamatory speech made by a member on the floor of the body need not be pertinent to an issue before the body. Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Cooper v. Glaser, 355 Mont. 342, 228 P.3d 443 (2010) (statements made under a “point of personal privilege” were protected). Testimony by a witness at a committee hearing must be pertinent in order to be protected. Kelly v. Daro, 147 Cal. App.2d 418, 118 P.2d 37 (1941).

8. Enforcing Rules

“Legislative acts” include compelling attendance at a legislative session in order to secure a quorum, Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1985); Keeffe v. Roberts, 116 N.H. 195, 355 A.2d 824 (1976); excluding private lobbyists from the house floor while admitting governmental lobbyists, Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622 (1st Cir. 1995); allowing a witness before a congressional committee to demand that his testimony not be televised, Cable News Network v. Anderson, 723 F. Supp. 835 (D.D.C. 1989); prohibiting videotaping by other

9. Serving as a Member of a Committee

Serving as a member of a standing committee that considers legislation is a legislative act, and proof that a member served on two committees that considered a bill imposing criminal penalties for certain conduct may not be used to prove the member knew when he engaged in that type of conduct that it was illegal. *United States v. Swindall*, 971 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040 (1994).

10. Conducting Hearings and Developing Legislation

Before members may make policy decisions, they must master the relevant facts. An established method for doing so is to conduct committee hearings at which documents and testimony are presented by witnesses with superior knowledge and fundamentally differing views. Conflicting testimony is encouraged in order to highlight what is in dispute. Statements of doubtful truth are challenged by opposing witnesses and by members of the committee. This is part of the duty of each member to become informed, and to inform the electorate, about the operation of the government. As Woodrow Wilson said:

The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. The argument is not only that discussed and interrogated administration is the only pure and efficient administration, but more than that, that the only really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its administration.


Legislative immunity, both under a state Speech or Debate Clause and at common law, “prevents the courts from making the Legislature justify its decision to hold closed sessions” to adopt budget and revenue bills. Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 776 (Tenn. App. 2001) (No. M2000-01948-COA-R10-CV, slip op. at 14), appeal denied (Mar 19, 2001), rehearing of denial of appeal denied (Apr 30, 2001).

Where investigative hearings by a legislative committee have been duly authorized, the members of the committee are immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even when they are alleged to have illegally issued subpoenas, examined witnesses, and gathered evidence. Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, No. 95-1235, 75 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1996).

“Legislative acts” include developing a legislative redistricting plan, even when some meetings take place outside the State House and are not formal committee meetings. Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 984 (R.I. 1984). Cf. Rodriguez v. Pataki, 280 F. Supp.2d 89 (S.D. N.Y. 2003), aff’d 293 F. Supp.2d 302 (2003) (legislative privilege did not protect members of an advisory task force that included four legislators and two nonlegislators, who were assigned to assist in developing a redistricting plan, from having to produce documents arising from their deliberations, so long as the production did not include depositions of legislators or their staffs).

11. Providing Testimony to a Committee

A legislator who provides testimony to a legislative ethics committee concerning the legislator’s legislative activity may not be questioned by an executive branch prosecutor about that testimony. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 387 U.S.App.D.C. 117 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1978). On the other hand, testimony to an ethics committee about the legislator’s personal financial transactions is not protected by legislative immunity. United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

12. Investigating Conduct of Executive Agencies

“The power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process plainly falls within [the legitimate legislative sphere].” Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (quoted in United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 304 (3rd Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1487, slip op. at 49) (Scirica, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, No. 94-5171, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Pentagen Technologies Int’l, Ltd. v. Comm. on Appropriations of the U.S. House of Representatives, 20 F. Supp.2d 41 (D.D.C. 1998) (confidential reports prepared by investigative staff of House subcommittee were protected from compulsory disclosure). On the other hand, legislative immunity does not insulate a legislative committee from a good faith colorable claim by the governor’s office that its impeachment investigation is being conducted in violation of the separation of powers. Office of the Governor v. Select Comm. of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 858A.2d 709 (2004).

13. Gathering Information

“Obtaining information pertinent to potential legislation or investigation” is a legitimate legislative activity. Miller, 709 F.2d at 530. See Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. of Am.,
Inc. v. Gates, 506 F.Supp.2d 30, 57 (D.D.C.2007) (communications with executive branch, constituents, interested organizations, and members of the public are protected by federal legislative privilege if these communications “constitute information gathering in connection with or in aid of...legislative acts”).

Gathering information about the expenditure of public money is within the legitimate legislative sphere, even when done by an individual legislator. Harristown Development Corp. v. Pa., 135 Pa. Commw. Ct. 177, 580 A.2d 1174 (1990) (chair of state Senate Appropriations Committee). Gathering information by an individual legislator as part of an investigation of the performance of an executive agency is a legislative act. Williams v. Johnson, 597 F. Supp.2d 107 (D.D.C. 2009); but see United States v. Renzi, 686 F. Supp.2d 956 (D. Ariz. 2010) (discussing with constituents which parcels of land to include in land exchange legislation is not a legislative act); Bastien v. Office of Campbell, 390 F.3d 1301, 1316 (10th Cir. 2004) (informally gathering information by member of U.S. senator’s district staff meeting with constituents is not a legislative act).

14. Publishing Reports

“Legislative acts” also include distributing published reports for legislative purposes to “Members of Congress, congressional committees, and institutional or individual legislative functionaries,” Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1975); publishing a transcript of witnesses’ testimony at a hearing, Colon Berrios v. Hernandez Agosto, 716 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1983); releasing the official report of committee hearings to news reporting and publishing agencies, Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1980); and inserting material into the Congressional Record, Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983), even when the material contains revisions and extensions of the remarks actually made on the Floor. Gregg v. Barrett, 594 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1984).

Authorizing live television coverage of open hearings is a legislative decision entitled to absolute legislative immunity, even against an allegation that the broadcast went beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function. Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, No. 95-1235, 75 F.3d 23, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1996).

15. Sending Letters


16. Drafting Memoranda and Documents

“Legislative acts” include drafting memoranda and other documents for discussion between a legislator and legislative staff, even when the documents discuss proposed actions outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. United Transp. Union v. Springfield Terminal Ry., 132 F.R.D. 4 (D. Me. 1990) (documents discussing efforts to influence an executive branch agency on behalf of a constituent). In Michigan, however, legislative immunity may not extend to discussion between a senator and his aide about an investigation being conducted by an executive

17. **Lobbying for Legislation**


18. **Making Recommendations on Executive Appointments**


19. **Making Budgetary Decisions**


20. **Denying Press Credentials**

“Legislative acts” include denying press credentials for admission to the Senate and House galleries, *Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n*, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975); *Reeder v. Madigan*, 780 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2015) (denying press credentials to a reporter who was related to a lobbying organization).

21. **Making Personnel Decisions**

In order to be immune under the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a personnel decision by or on behalf of a member of Congress must be a legislative act, “part of or integral to, the due functioning of the legislative process.” *Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson*, 459 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom. *Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson*, No. 06-618, 550 U.S. 511 (2007). The Court of Appeals in *Fields
rejected the test it had used in *Browning v. Clerk, U. S. House of Representatives*, 789 F.2d 923, 928-29 (D.C. Cir 1986), *cert. denied* 479 U.S. 966 (1986), which was whether the employee’s “duties were directly related to the due functioning of the legislative process.” 459 F.3d at 11, 17. Using the *Browning* test, the duties of a congressional chief of staff had been found to be directly related to the due functioning of the legislative process and the U.S. senator who allegedly sexually harassed her was immune from suit under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438. *Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus*, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 n.5 (D.D.C. 2001).


Where the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico refused to hire a journalist as a legislative press officer after the journalist published an article attacking him, the court found that a press officer had “enough opportunity for ‘meaningful input’ into the legislative process such that the employment decision should be immunized.” *Agromayor v. Colberg*, 738 F.2d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 1984); *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). Where the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico fired the superintendent of the state capitol building, who held office at their discretion, the court found that the employee was “a political creature” whose firing was protected by legislative immunity. *Lasa v. Colberg*, 622 F. Supp. 557, 560 (D. Puerto Rico 1985).

An order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reorganizing the administration of a judicial district, including elimination of the position of Executive Administrator, was a legislative act, and the members of the court were absolutely immune from suit by the Executive Director for his termination. *Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania*, 211 F.3d 760 (3rd Cir. 2000).

Where a county board decided to eliminate an executive position, rather than terminate the incumbent, its decision was entitled to legislative immunity. *Bryant v. Jones*, 575 F.3d 1281, 1303-07 (11th Cir. 2009).

Where a town board voted to hire a consultant to review the police force as part of an investigation of the police department, it was protected by legislative immunity. *Carlos v. Santos*, 123 F.3d 61, 66 (2nd Cir. 1997) (No. 97-7523). Where town police officers were discharged as a consequence of the town board having voted to contract with the county sheriff for police services, the court found the town board entitled to legislative immunity for both the vote and the discharge. *Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park* 831 F.2d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 1987). Where the town board voted to reduce the salaries of the town supervisor and his confidential secretary, and failed to reappoint the deputy town attorney, the members of the town board were protected by legislative immunity. *Dusanenko v. Maloney*, 560 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

For a discussion of personnel decisions that have been held not immune because they were “administrative” rather than “legislative,” see section III.C.1.

**B. Legislative Immunity is Absolute**

Once it is determined that the activities of a legislator fall within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause is absolute. *Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund*, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975); *Doe v. McMillan*, 412 U.S. at 311-312; *Gravel v. United States*, 408 U.S. at 623 n. 14; *Powell v. McCormack*, 395 U.S. 486, 502-503
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The immunity of a legislator is not destroyed by a mere allegation of bad faith or an unworthy purpose. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951); X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 1999) (allegation that legislators had threatened to introduce legislation); MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1988); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1976); Larsen v. Early, 842 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1994) (allegation that a Colorado state senator had fraudulently misrepresented the effect of a bill to fellow legislators and had conspired to fraudulently mislead other legislators not sufficient to overcome defense of legislative immunity); Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 217 (1968), vacated on other grounds, 393 U.S. 407 (1969); Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 984 (R.I. 1984).

“The issue . . . is not whether the information sought might reveal illegal acts, but whether it falls within the legislative sphere.” MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 860-61 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

C. Legislative Immunity is Personal

Legislative immunity is personal and belongs to each individual member. It may be asserted or waived as each individual legislator chooses. Marylanders for Fair Representation v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292, 299 (D. Md. 1992). One legislator may not waive immunity on behalf of any other legislator. United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1374-75 (2nd Cir. 1988). It cannot be asserted by the chair of a committee to strike submission of an affidavit by the ranking minority member of the committee concerning the operations of the committee. Office of Governor of State v. Winner, 858 N.W.2d 871 (2008). It does not belong to the body as a whole. Maron v. Silver, 14 N.Y.3d 230, 925 N.E.2d 899, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2010); Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly, 190 Misc.2d 716,729; 738 N.Y.S.2d 512, 523 (2002).

D. Legislative Immunity Continues for Former Legislators


E. Legislative Immunity Extends to Non-Legislators Participating in the Legislative Process

“Officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998). This includes a mayor presenting a budget to the city council, 523 U.S. 44; a governor recommending a bill to the General Assembly and approving its enactment, Lattaker v. Rendell, 2008 WL 723978 (3rd Cir. 2008), accord, Burnette v. Bredesen, 566 F. Supp.2d 738 (E.D. Tenn. 2008); a governor and state agency head proposing repeal of a law creating the position of state poet laureate, Baraka v.
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2007), cert. denied, U.S. 128 S.Ct. 612 (2007); a governor presenting a budget to the state legislature, Abbey v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp.2d 94 (D. Conn. 2005); an executive agency employee preparing a change in an education funding formula for consideration by the legislature, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. N.Y., 179 Misc.2d 907, 687 N.Y.S.2d 227, aff’d 265 A.D.2d 277, 697 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1999); a judge preparing a budget proposal for presentation to the town board, Gordon v. Katz, 934 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); a town planning commission drafting a zoning ordinance for presentation to the town council, Maynard v. Beck, 741 A.2d 866 (R.I. 1999); the members of the state supreme court adopting an order reorganizing the administration of a judicial district, Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760 (3rd Cir. 2000); a governor signing a bill that repeals the position of state poet laureate, Baraka v. McGreevey, supra; a governor signing a bill that reduces the number of members on an industrial commission, Torres-Rivera v. Calderon-Serra, 412 F.3d 205 (1st Cir. 2005); a governor signing a bill that creates a “Choose Life” specialty license plate program, Women’s Emergency Network, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003); a county executive signing a budget resolution, Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F. Supp. 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); and a mayor vetoing an ordinance passed by the city council. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982). “It is the nature of the work in question performed by a state employee—not the employee’s title—that determines whether the Speech or Debate Clause obtains.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. N.Y., 687 N.Y.S.2d at 231.

A witness at a legislative hearing who makes defamatory statements that are pertinent to the subject matter of the hearing has an absolute common law immunity from suit for making them. Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 40 P.3d 1128 (2002). As the court said:

We recognize there is a potential danger for abuse, but conclude that the greater good is served by ensuring that citizens who want to participate in the legislative process may do so without fear of liability for defamation.


An unsolicited statement made to a legislative investigative employee is not protected by legislative immunity unless the communicator shows that he would not have made the unsolicited statement but for his intention to inform the legislative body on a subject properly within its jurisdiction and the statement has some relation to the legitimate legislative business to which it is addressed. Webster v. Sun Company, Inc., 731 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Circulating an initiative petition is a legislative function and the citizens who promote it are entitled to legislative immunity for their circulation-related activities. Brock v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, ¶ 20, 948 P.2d 279, 290 (1997) (dicta; defendants in this case had not yet begun to circulate the petition).

Where a state constitution provides for publication of official arguments for and against initiated legislation or a constitutional amendment, the officials who prepare and publish those arguments are entitled to absolute common law legislative immunity for defamatory statements in the arguments, but a private citizen who acts in concert with the officials is not entitled to immunity. Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio. St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941).
F. Legislative Immunity Does Not Extend to a Member-Elect Ruled Ineligible before Her Term Begins

Legislative immunity does not extend to a member-elect ruled ineligible to serve as a member before her term begins. Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2005). At 4 p.m. on the day before the 2004 general election for the 37th Senate District in Kentucky, Woodward commenced an action alleging that her opponent, Stephenson, did not meet the requirement of KY. CONST. § 32 that she have resided in the state for six years next proceeding her election. The suit was not heard until after the election, at which Stephenson received the most votes. The Jefferson Circuit Court found Stephenson ineligible and ordered local officials not to count votes cast for her. An election certificate was issued to Woodward. The decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court was not appealed. When the Senate convened in January, the Senate found Stephenson did meet the residency requirement, voted to seat her, and swore her into office. Woodward then obtained from the Franklin Circuit Court an injunction prohibiting Stephenson from performing her duties as a senator. She complied with the injunction. Almost a year later, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Stephenson had never become a member of the Senate because she had been finally adjudicated to be ineligible before her term began. Id. at 167-68.

III. Some Activities of Legislators are Not Immune

A. Actions Without Lawful Authority Are Not Immune

1. Unconstitutional Procedures for Enacting Legislation

Legislative immunity does not prevent judicial review of the procedure used by a legislature to enact a bill. Pa. School Bds. Ass’n v. Commonwealth Ass’n of School Adm’rs, 805 A.2d 476 (Pa. 2002) (claim that amended version of bill had not been read on three different days); Pa. AFL-CIO v. Pa., 691 A.2d 1023 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (claim that House of Representatives committee had violated Sunshine Act by holding a hearing on a bill at a time other than the one announced was not barred by Speech and Debate Clause).

Legislative immunity does not prevent a court from issuing a declaratory judgment that procedures used by the legislature to enact legislation were unconstitutional. Romer v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 810 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1991). In Romer, the governor had used his item veto authority to veto certain headnotes and footnotes in the “long” appropriation bill. Rather than override the vetoes or bring a declaratory judgment action in district court to have them declared invalid, the General Assembly chose to publish a letter that said, in the Assembly’s opinion, the vetoes were invalid and should be ignored. The Colorado Supreme Court held that this was an improper procedure for overriding a veto and thus outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. It presumed the vetoes valid until properly challenged.

2. Illegal Investigative Procedures

Legislative immunity does not protect otherwise legislative acts that are taken without legislative authority, as when a special investigative committee of the Puerto Rican House of Representatives issued subpoenas after its authority to investigate had expired. Thompson v. Ramirez, 597 F. Supp. 730 (D. Puerto Rico 1984).

3. False Disclosures and Claims


Legislative immunity does not bar recovery of money paid for health insurance premiums for the benefit of local legislators under ordinances that were not authorized by state law. *Massongill v. County of Scott*, No. 98-807, 337 Ark. 281, 991 S.W.2d 105 (1999).

Legislative immunity does not bar inquiry into whether a legislator’s activities and conversations were, in fact, legislative in nature. *Virgin Islands v. Lee*, 775 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1985). In *Lee*, a Virgin Islands legislator had requested reimbursement for the portion of his travel expenses that related to his activities as a legislator engaged in a fact-finding trip. The government alleged that his request overstated that portion, and the Court of Appeals held that legislative immunity did not bar inquiring into whether the private conversations he engaged in were, in fact, legislative in nature. 775 F.2d. at 522.

B. “Political” Acts Are Not Immune

1. Solicitation of Bribes

The Speech or Debate Clause does not preclude inquiry into alleged criminal conduct of a congressman apart from his actions as a member of Congress. *United States v. Brewster*, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); *United States v. Myers*, 635 F.2d 932 (2nd Cir. 1980); *United States v. Dowdy*, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); *United States v. Garmatz*, 445 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1977). Nor does a state Speech or Debate Clause preclude a similar inquiry into the conduct of a state legislator. *Blondes v. Maryland*, 16 Md.App. 165, 294 A.2d 661 (1972). In *Brewster*, United States Senator Daniel Brewster of Maryland was accused of solicitation and acceptance of bribes in violation of law. The Supreme Court held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not protect him from prosecution, because the bribery could be proved without inquiry into his “legislative” acts or motivation. The Court said:

A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry only into those things generally said or done in the House or Senate in the performance of official duties and into the motivation for those acts.
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include a wide range of legitimate “errands” performed for constituents, the making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Government contracts, preparing so-called “news letters” to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress. The range of these activities has grown over the years. . . . Although these are entirely legitimate activities, they are political in nature rather than legislative, in the sense that term has been used by the Court in prior cases. But it has never been seriously contended that these political matters, however appropriate, have been afforded protection by the Speech or Debate Clause.

408 U.S. at 512.

The Court referred back to the early Massachusetts case of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808), to show that while the privilege may extend beyond the legislative chamber, that is only because not all legislative business is done in the chamber.

If a member . . . be out of the chamber, sitting in committee, executing the commission of the house, it appears to me that such member is within the reason of the article, and ought to be considered within the privilege. The body of which he is a member is in session, and he, as a member of that body, is in fact discharging the duties of his office. He ought therefore to be protected from civil or criminal prosecutions for everything said or done by him in the exercise of his functions, as a representative either in debating, in assenting to, or in draughting a report. 4 Mass. at 28.

Quoted in 408 U.S. at 515.

Legislative immunity “does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process.” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972). It does not extend to discussions that involve only the possible future performance of legislative functions, as when Senator Harrison Williams discussed with an ABSCAM undercover agent disguised as an Arab sheik the possibility that the Senator would introduce a private immigration bill on the sheik’s behalf. United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950 (2nd Cir. 1981). Accord, United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2nd Cir. 1980). Nor does it extend to a whispered solicitation on the House floor by one member to another member to accept a bribe. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 861 (2nd Cir. 1982).

Federal common law legislative immunity does not prevent the use in federal court of evidence of a state legislator’s actions in directing the course of a committee’s investigation of a contractor’s performance as a construction manager according to whether the contractor made timely payment of a series of bribes the contractor had agreed to pay to secure a favorable investigation. United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977).

2. Communications to the Press

remarks made to reporter off the Senate floor amplifying charges made in a speech on the Senate floor was in the “exercise of his legislative functions”; *State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Nix*, 1956 OK 95, 295 P.2d 286 (press release republishing speech and distributed outside the chamber while state Senate was in session was privileged, but similar statements made on television broadcast in district after Senate had adjourned *sine die* were not privileged).


3. Communications to Constituents

Legislative immunity does not extend to the use of the franking privilege to mail materials to constituents and potential constituents. *Schiaffo v. Helstoski*, 492 F.2d 413 (3rd Cir. 1974); *Hoellen v. Annunzio*, 468 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1972); *Hamilton v. Hennessey*, 783 A.2d 852, 855 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). This, notwithstanding that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, writing jointly, argued that correspondence between a representative and a constituent should be absolutely privileged. 8 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 322-23 (1797), *reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION* 336 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987). The Minnesota Government Data Practices Act makes correspondence between any elected official and any individual private data. See Minn. Stat. § 13.601, subd. 2.

4. Communications to a Legislator’s Spouse

A legislator who uses his desk phone on the House floor to telephone another representative’s wife to urge her to call her husband and urge him to change his vote on a bill then pending before the House is not engaging in a legislative act within the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. *Kansas v. Neufeld*, 260 Kan. 930, 926 P.2d 1325 (1996).

5. Communications Concerning Enforcement of Law

A legislator who serves on a joint committee of the legislature and who participates in enforcement of a law against a particular individual may be questioned because enforcement of the law is not generally part of the legislative function and therefore not a legislative act within

6. **Pressure on the Executive Branch**


7. **Travel on Legislative Business**


8. **Calendars and Expense Records**

Calendars and expense records “are merely administrative records only incidentally related to legislative affairs” and thus are not exempt from discovery in a divorce action by a member’s spouse. *McNaughton v. McNaughton*, 205 WL 2834243 (Pa. Comm. Pl. 2005).

C. **Administrative Acts are Not Immune**

1. **Personnel Decisions**

Legislative immunity for personnel decisions depends on the nature of the function rather than on the title of the official making it. *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (state court judge not immune from suit for firing probation officer since the action was an administrative rather than a judicial function); *Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago*, 958 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) (city assembly members adopting ordinance to abolish specified civil service positions may not have been legislative act if ordinance was used to fire only employees who supported the opposition party).

If a personnel decision does not involve a legislative act or the motive for a legislative act, it is not entitled to legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom. Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson, No. 06-618, 550 U.S. 511 (2007). A personnel decision is “administrative in nature if it is directed at a particular employee or employees, and is not part of a broader legislative policy.” Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 108 (2nd Cir. 2007). Questions to consider when deciding if it’s necessary to inquire into a legislator’s legislative acts include what the legislator said, did it require a legislative debate, and was there any action taken in committee or on the floor.

If a decision on how much money to allocate to each member of the state Senate is made by a vote as part of a legislative budget process, it is legislative, but if the same decision is made unilaterally by the Senate Majority Leader, it is administrative. Manzi v. DiCarlo, 982 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

The “deliberative and communicative processes by which the Members participate in committee and House proceedings,” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972), “are only those within Congress itself,” Bastien v. Office of Campbell, 390 F.3d 1301, 1319 (10th Cir. 2004), so an employee in a senator’s district office who informally gathers information for the senator by meeting with his constituents is not performing “legislative acts” and the decision of his office to terminate her employment is not entitled to legislative immunity. Id.

Placing individuals on a congressman’s staff as a pretext for paying them out of congressional funds, where their duties did not have even a tangential relationship to the legislative process, does not entitle the member to immunity from prosecution for using public money for private services. United States v. Rostenkowski, No. 94-3158, 59 F.3d 1291, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Like members of Congress, state legislators are not immune from criminal prosecution for placing on the legislative payroll certain “no show” employees who performed no services of any kind. People v. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d 38, 53, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744, 565 N.E.2d 493 (1990). A state legislator is not immune from criminal prosecution for hiring legislative aides solely to manage political campaigns or for directing legislative aides as they worked on campaigns. Wisconsin v. Chvala, 2004 WI App. 53, 678 N.W.2d 880 (2004).

Michigan’s constitutional speech and debate clause did not apply to a Michigan representative in a suit by a former employee alleging wrongful termination because representative’s conduct was merely administrative and did not involve legislative concerns. The court held that there was no evidence that employee’s employment and dismissal would require inquiry into prohibited areas, and representative’s proffered legitimate reasons for terminating employee did not require inquiry into legislative concerns or acts. Cotton v. Banks, 872 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. App. 2015).

Terminating a librarian employed by the legislative library because she was a member of the opposition party after the opposition party lost control of the legislature was an administrative act and not entitled to legislative immunity from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Laying off employees is an administrative act, even if done after adoption by ordinance of a layoff plan. Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, No. 99-1137, 204 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). Demoting and then discharging a state Senate caucus information officer who refused to do illegal campaign activity on state time was an administrative act. Chateaubriand v. Gaspard, No. 95-36086, 97 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1996). Discharging a House employee whose duties were to answer phones, provide media services, and move audio-visual equipment was not a legislative act. Irvin v. McGee, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 201, 1993 WL 818806 (Mass. Super.). Eliminating a position’s salary, consolidating it with another position, and refusing to reappoint the incumbent to the new position was an administrative act. Alexander v. Holden, No. 94-1810, 66 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995). Voting to replace the white
clerk of a county board with an African American clerk was an administrative act. Smith v. Lomax, No. 93-8062, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995). A discussion on whether new positions for specific individuals could be funded was an administrative act. Vacca v. Barletta, 933 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1991).

Terminating a legislative researcher for a District of Columbia council member allegedly because she took time off to observe Jewish holidays was an administrative act. Gross v. Winter, 692 F. Supp. 1420 (D.D.C. 1988). Refusing to accept an employee’s resignation in order to prevent another person from being rehired to fill the vacancy the resignation would have created was an administrative act. Harhay v. Blanchette, 160 F. Supp. 2d 306 (D. Conn. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Harhay v. Bd. of Educ., 323 F.3d 206 (2nd Cir. 2003). Refusing to rehire the Democratic clerk of a city council after Republicans gained a majority on the council at the general election was an administrative act. Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). Failing to rehire a police chief who had resigned is an administrative act. Detz v. Hoover, 539 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Deciding not to hire an applicant for employment as a committee clerk of the Texas House of Representatives because the applicant was suing a member of the committee for defamation was an administrative act. Associated Press v. Cook, 17 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App. 2000). Voting to not pay an annuity to an individual is an administrative act. Lopez v. Trevino, 2 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. App. 1999).

A decision by a school board to terminate an assistant principal is an administrative act, even though made by vote of a legislative body. Canary v. Osborn, 211 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2000); accord, Roberson v. Mullins, 29 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1994) (decision by a county board to terminate the superintendent of public works); Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1984) (township director of roads and public property).

Where the chair of the county board threatened and harassed county employees who supported a candidate for elected county office whom the chair opposed, and after the election the chair ordered their supervisors to fire the employees, the subsequent vote by the county board to eliminate their positions did not cloak the chair with legislative immunity for his actions before the vote that were independent of the vote. Carver v. Foerster, No. 96-3008, 102 F.3d 96 (3rd Cir. 1996).


2. Other Administrative Acts by a Local Legislative Body

In order for an act by a local legislative body to be considered “legislative” for purposes of absolute common law legislative immunity, the act must be both “substantively” legislative and “procedurally” legislative. Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286 (3rd Cir. 1989).

a. Substantively Legislative

Some courts have used a two-part test to determine whether an act is “substantively” legislative. The first part focuses on the facts considered by the decision-maker.

If the underlying facts on which the decision is based are “legislative facts”, such as “generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs”, then the decision is
legislative. If the facts used in the decision making are more specific, such as those that relate to particular individuals or situations, then the decision is administrative. *Cutting v. Muzzey*, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984).

The second part focuses on the impact of the decision.

If the action involves establishment of a general policy, it is legislative; if the action “single[s] out specifiable individuals and affect[s] them differently from others”, it is administrative.

*Id. Accord, Bryan v. City of Madison*, No. 99-60305, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000); *Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania*, 211 F.3d 760 (3rd Cir. 2000); *Roberson v. Mullins*, 29 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1994); *Brown v. Griesenauer*, 970 F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1992); *Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago*, 958 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1992); *Hughes v. Tarrant County*, 948 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1991); *Crymes v. DeKalb County*, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991); *Haskell v. Washington Twp.*, 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cir. 1988); *Bartlett v. Cinemark USA, Inc.*, 908 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App. 1995).

Other cases have found similar actions by a local legislative body, even though taken by a vote of the legislative body, to be administrative in nature. See, e.g., *Kamplain v. Curry County Bd. of Com’rs*, 159 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 1998) (vote to ban contract bidder from all future commission meetings and prohibit him from participating in or speaking at commission meetings); *Acierno v. Cloutier*, No. 93-7456, 40 F.3d 597 (3rd Cir. 1994) (vote to void approved record development plan and related subdivision plans for one parcel); *Trevino ex rel. Cruz v. Gates*, 23 F.3d 1480, 1480-82 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Wachs v. Trevino, 513 U.S. 932 (1994) (vote to pay punitive damage award); *Hughes v. Tarrant County*, Tex., 948 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusal to pay attorney’s fees incurred by county employee); *Crymes v. DeKalb County*, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991) (decision to uphold denial of development permit); *Front Royal and Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal*, 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989) (failure to provide sewer service after being ordered by court to do so); *Bateson v. Geisse*, 857 F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1988) (decision to deny building permit); *Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank*, 745 F.2d 560, 580 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1054 (1985) (vote to deny rock groups access to city amphitheater); *Franklin Building Corp. v. City of Ocean City*, 946 F. Supp. 1161 (D. N.J. 1996); *Miles-Un-Ltd., Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham*, 917 F. Supp. 91 (D.N.H. 1996) (enforcement of local zoning ordinance); *Stone’s Auto Mart, Inc. v. City of St. Paul*, 721 F. Supp. 206 (D. Minn. 1989) (actions of a city planning commission imposing certain conditions upon the development of a particular subdivision); *Bartlett v. Cinemark USA, Inc.*, 908 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App. 1995) (vote to deny development permit was administrative act); contra, *Sable v. Myers*, 563 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2009) (vote by city council to acquire parcel by condemnation was legislative act); *Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale*, 774 S.W.2d 284, 298 (Tex. App. 1989) (vote to deny development permit was legislative act).

b. Procedurally Legislative

Even if an act is substantively legislative, it will not be entitled to absolute legislative immunity if it has not been taken in accordance with established legislative procedures to insure that it is “a legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the people which the governing body has been chosen to serve.” *Ryan v. Burlington County, New Jersey*, 889 F.2d 1286, 1291 (3rd Cir. 1989). Where the members of the county board administered the county jail “in an informal manner” where decisions were not always made by passage of a resolution or ordinance, they were not entitled to absolute legislative immunity from a claim that the jail’s poor administration...
contributed to an inmate becoming a quadriplegic. *Id.* A mere technical violation of a statutory procedure is not sufficient to convert an otherwise legislative action into an administrative one. *Acierno v. Cloutier*, 40 F.3d 597, 614-15 (3rd Cir. 1994) (No. 93-7456).

**D. Executive Branch Activities Are Not Immune**

1. **Sitting on an Audit Commission**

While the Minnesota Supreme Court has never been called upon to construe the Speech or Debate Clause in the Minnesota Constitution, Judge Otis H. Godfrey, Jr., of Ramsey County District Court has ruled that legislative immunity “does not extend to such duties as sitting as members of an audit commission.” *Layton v. Legislative Audit Comm’n*, No. 429436 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County, Aug. 29, 1978) (unpublished order). This decision was appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, but the issue was made moot when the Audit Commission released the working papers to the public.

2. **Sitting on an Executive Branch Committee**


**IV. Some Offers of Proof About Legislative Activity are Not Prohibited**

A. **Proof of Status as a Member is Not Prohibited**


B. **Proof of Legislative Acts Offered by Defendant in Criminal Action is Not “Questioning”**

A member who chooses to offer evidence of legislative acts in defense of a criminal prosecution is not being “questioned,” even though he thereby subjects himself to cross-examination. *United States v. Kolter*, 71 F.3d 425, 430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *United States v. Rostenkowski*, No. 94-3158, 59 F.3d 1291, 1302-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *United States v. McDade*, 28 F.3d 283, 294-95 (3rd Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1487, slip op. at 23-25). If a member offers evidence
of his own legislative acts at trial, rebuttal evidence narrowly confined to the same legislative act may be introduced and such rebuttal evidence does not constitute questioning in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause. United States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731,747 (9th Cir. 2014).

V. A Legislator and Aide Are “Treated as One” for Purposes of Legislative Immunity

A. Legislative Acts of an Aide Are Immune

Legislative immunity extends to an aide working on behalf of a legislator to prepare for a committee meeting. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); or conducting an investigation on behalf of the member, Wisconsin v. Beno, 341 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 1984). In Gravel, Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska had read extensively aloud from the hitherto secret Pentagon Papers at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee. Senator Gravel was the chairman and had called the meeting himself. A federal grand jury investigating possible criminal conduct with respect to release and publication of the Papers subpoenaed an assistant to Senator Gravel who had helped him prepare for the meeting. Senator Gravel intervened and moved to quash the subpoenas on the ground that requiring the assistant to testify would violate the Senator’s immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. The Government contended that the meeting was “special, unauthorized, and untimely,” and that the courts had power to limit the immunity to meetings that were related to a legitimate legislative purpose. The District Court rejected the contention:

Senator Gravel has suggested that the availability of funds for the construction and improvement of buildings and grounds has been affected by the necessary costs of the war in Vietnam and that therefore the development and conduct of the war is properly within the concern of his subcommittee. The court rejects the Government’s argument without detailed consideration of the merits of the Senator’s position, on the basis of the general rule restricting judicial inquiry into matters of legislative purpose and operations. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp., 930, 935 (D. Mass. 1972).

Quoted in 408 U.S. at 610, n. 6. The Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s decision and prohibited the grand jury from inquiring further into the conduct of the Senator or his aides at the subcommittee meeting and in preparation for it.

In discussing the legislative immunity of the Senator’s aide, the Court found that “for the purpose of construing the privilege a Member and his aide are to be ‘treated as one’ . . . [T]he ‘Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done . . . as the Senator’s agent or assistant which would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally.’” 408 U.S. at 616; Jones v. Palmer Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Tex. 1979).

[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; . . . the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Members’ performance that they must be treated as the latter’s alter egos; . . . if they are not so recognized, the central role of the
Speech or Debate Clause - to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a hostile judiciary, United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966) - will inevitably be diminished and frustrated. 408 U.S. at 617.

The protection afforded a legislator and a member of his or her personal staff is also accorded to the principal employee of a committee when working on committee business. Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, No. 95-1235, 75 F.3d 23, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1996); Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1980); Marra v. O’Leary, 652 A.2d 974 (R.I. 1995) (claims committee legal counsel and committee clerk).

In Eastland, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, pursuant to its authority under a Senate resolution to make a complete study of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950, began an inquiry into the various activities of the U.S. Servicemen’s Fund to determine whether they were potentially harmful to the morale of the U.S. armed forces. In connection with the inquiry, it issued a subpoena duces tecum to the bank where the organization had an account ordering the bank to produce all records involving the account. The organization and two of its members then brought an action against the chairman, senator members, chief counsel of the subcommittee, and the bank to enjoin implementation of the subpoena on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held that the activities of the Senate Subcommittee, the individual senators, and the chief counsel fell within the “legitimate legislative sphere” and, once this appeared, were protected by the absolute prohibition of the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution against being “questioned in any other Place” and hence were immune from judicial interference. The Court drew no distinction between the members and the chief counsel, saying that “Since the Members are immune because the issuance of the subpoena is ‘essential to legislating’ their aides share that immunity.” 421 U.S. at 504. Cf. Peroff v. Manuel, 421 F. Supp. 570 (D.D.C. 1976), where a subcommittee investigator was held immune from liability for damages due to emotional distress and other harm he allegedly caused to a witness in the process of preparing him for a subcommittee hearing.

This same protection is also afforded to committee staff in general. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1975); accord, Williams v. Johnson, 597 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2009) (deputy committee clerk and policy director); Rangel v. Boehner, 785 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (former chief counsel of ethics committee).

Doe v. McMillan was a civil suit involving publication and distribution of materials in a committee report that were damaging to private individuals. The individuals brought suit against the committee members, the committee employees, a committee investigator, and a consultant, among others, for their actions in introducing materials at committee hearings that identified particular individuals, for referring the report that included the material to the Speaker of the House, and for voting for publication of the report. All were granted legislative immunity for their actions.

Protection is also afforded to the Sergeant at Arms and other employees and agents who adopt and enforce rules on behalf of either or both Houses, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975); to the official reporters who prepare the Senate and House versions of the Congressional Record, Gregg v. Barrett, 594 F. Supp. 108, 112 n. 4 (D.D.C. 1984); and to a legislative corrections ombudsman who investigates actions of the department of corrections on behalf of the legislature and publishes an allegedly defamatory report. Prelesnik v. Esquina, 347 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. App. 1984).
An independent contractor retained by a redistricting commission is entitled to the same protection as members of the commission when performing tasks on their behalf. *Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields*, 206 Ariz. 130, 75 P.3d 1088 (2003). In contrast, where state statute does not authorize members to employ consultants, an independent contractor working as legal counsel and consultant for legislative redistricting efforts by a partisan political party is not the functional equivalent to a legislative aide and therefore is not protected by legislative privilege. *Page v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, 15 F.Supp.3d 657 (E.D.Va. 2014)

Congressional staff who supervise employees whose duties are directly related to the functioning of the legislative process, such as an official reporter of committee and subcommittee hearings, are immune from suit for alleged racial discrimination in firing. *Browning v. Clerk, U. S. House of Representatives*, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1986). *But cf. Alaska v. Haley*, 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984). In *Haley*, the Executive Director of the Legislative Affairs Agency and the Director of its Research Division were sued for damages and reinstatement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for discharging a researcher in violation of her right to free speech. These two defendants failed to assert legislative immunity but successfully asserted a qualified official immunity for their actions. The Legislative Affairs Agency and Legislative Council, on the other hand, were required to reinstate the researcher and pay her back pay and benefits, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. The court held that the act of firing the researcher, even though done by a vote of the Legislative Council, was “an administrative rather than a legislative act, and that it was therefore not within the scope of legislative immunity.” 687 P.2d at 319.


B. “Political” Acts of an Aide Are Not Immune

Just as when a member himself engages in “political” acts, the courts have also held the conduct of legislative staff subject to judicial scrutiny when it has gone beyond what is “essential to the deliberations” of a legislative body, *Hutchinson v. Proxmire*, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); *Gravel v. United States*, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); *United States v. Eilberg*, 465 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1979); or “beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function,” *Doe v. McMillan*, 412 U.S. at 315-16, such as when arranging for a republication, *Hutchinson v. Proxmire, supra*; *Gravel, supra*; *Doe v. McMillan, supra*; *Hentoff v. Ichord*, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970); or contacting an executive agency to arrange for the release of grant funds, *Eilberg, supra*; or conducting prayers before the opening of a legislative session. *Kurtz v. Baker*, 630 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C. 1986).

Activities of an aide employed by a congressman to investigate matters not related to any pending congressional inquiry or legislation are not entitled to legislative immunity. *Steiger v. Superior Court*,112 Ariz. 1, 536 P.2d 689 (1975).

Congressional staff who supervise employees whose duties are not directly related to the functioning of the legislative process, such as the general manager of the House of Representatives restaurant system, are not immune from suit for alleged sex discrimination in firing. *Walker v. Jones*, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
C. Unconstitutional or Illegal Conduct of an Aide is Not Immune

Although legislators are immune from liability or questioning even when their legislative acts go beyond the constitutional authority of the legislative body, their aides do not share the same absolute immunity for their conduct in executing invalid orders or policies of the legislature.

The purpose of the protection afforded legislators is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action but to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being called into court to defend their actions. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969).

When a legislative act is alleged to be unconstitutional, the proper subject of judicial power is not a legislative body or its members, but rather those officials who are charged with executing the legislative act. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (dismissal of action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Speaker of the House and four other members individually and as representatives of all House members for voting to exclude Adam Clayton Powell from membership and refusing to administer to him the oath of office was affirmed, while dismissal of same action against the Chief Clerk of the House for refusing services to excluded member, Sergeant at Arms for refusing to pay salary to excluded member, and Doorkeeper for refusing to admit excluded member was reversed and remanded for further proceedings); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (Sergeant at Arms liable for damages for arresting a person found in contempt of the House); Hughes v. Lipscher, 852 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.J. 1994) (New Jersey Supreme Court not liable for attorney fees in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action invalidating employment rule adopted by the Court, but Administrative Director who enforced rule was liable); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973) (action against President and President pro tem of South Carolina Senate, members of the Senate, and Clerk of the Senate for declaratory judgment that denying a female law student employment as a page solely on the ground of gender was unconstitutional and for an injunction against continuing that denial, dismissed as to senators on the basis of legislative immunity; injunction granted as to Clerk of the Senate); Baker v. Fletcher, 204 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2006) (dicta that complaint seeking declaratory judgment that suspension of statute providing for at least a five percent annual pay increase for state employees was unconstitutional could have named House or Senate Clerk as defendant); Bowles v. Clipp, 920 S.W.2d 752, 758-59 (Tex. App. 1996) (sheriff collecting fees illegally imposed by county not immune from action for damages; declining to follow Merrill v. Carpenter, 867 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App. 1993)); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 503-07, 375 A.2d 698, 703-04 (1977) (action by expelled member of Pennsylvania House of Representatives against House Comptroller for back pay not barred by state Speech or Debate Clause).

Likewise, where a legislative staff person is accused of participation in a crime, the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause is not absolute. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 622 (1972); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Md. 1980). In Dombrowski, the chairman and the chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee were both accused of conspiring with Louisiana officials to seize petitioners’ property and records in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The chief counsel was required to go to trial on the factual question of whether he participated in the conspiracy, even though the case against the chairman of the committee was dismissed on the basis of legislative immunity. The Court found that legislative staff was not entitled to the same absolute protection afforded members where criminal activity was alleged.
VI. Uses of Legislative Immunity

A. From Ultimate Relief

1. Criminal Prosecution


Legislative immunity does not apply, however, to shield the legislative acts of a state legislator from criminal prosecution in a federal court. *United States v. Gillock*, 445 U.S. 360 (1980); *United States v. Gonzalez de Modesti*, 145 F.Supp.2d 171 (D. Puerto Rico 2001). The federal Speech or Debate Clause does not apply to state legislators, and a state Speech or Debate Clause does not limit the federal government. The court in *Gillock* found that common law principles protecting the independence of legislators from their executive and judicial co-equals did not require state legislators to be free from prosecutions by federal officials. Likewise, legislative immunity does not shield a governor from criminal prosecution in a federal court for mail fraud in lobbying for the passage of legislation to benefit his co-defendants. *United States v. Mandel*, 415 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1976).

The courts will not assume that Congress intended to abrogate the common law legislative immunity of a state legislator unless Congress has made a clear statement to that effect. In passing RICO, Congress did not express that clear intent, so legislative immunity is available to a state legislator as a defense to a prosecution under RICO. *Chappell v. Robbins*, No. 93-17063, 73 F.3d 918, 922-25 (9th Cir. 1996).

2. Liability for Damages

3. Declaratory Judgments

Legislative immunity protects legislators from declaratory judgments. *Powell v. McCormack*, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); *Larsen v. Senate of Pa.*, No. 97-7153, 152 F.3d 240 (3rd Cir. 1998); *Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n*, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (action for declaratory judgment that rules of Senate and House of Representatives excluding certain correspondents from the press galleries were unconstitutional dismissed on basis of legislative immunity and non-justiciability of subject matter); *Newdow v. Congress of the United States*, 435 F. Supp.2d 1066, 1074-75 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (action for declaratory judgment that national motto “In God We Trust” is unconstitutional); *Sanders v. U.S. Congress*, 399 F. Supp.2d 1021 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (action by taxpayer challenging inclusion of “with liberty and justice for all” in Pledge of Allegiance); *Consumers Education & Protective Ass’n v. Nolan*, 368 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1977); *Baker v. Fletcher*, 204 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2006) (action for declaratory judgment that suspension of statute providing for at least a five percent annual pay increase for state employees was unconstitutional); *Wiggins v. Stuart*, 671 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. App. 1984) (action for declaratory judgment that various bills passed by the legislature relating to compensation and pensions for legislators were unconstitutional).

*Powell v. McCormack* was an action against the Speaker of the House and four other members individually and as representatives of all House members for a declaratory judgment that the vote whereby congressman Adam Clayton Powell was excluded from membership in the House was null and void and to enjoin the Speaker from refusing to administer to him the oath of office. The action also sought to enjoin the Chief Clerk of the House from refusing services to the excluded member, the Sergeant at Arms from refusing to pay a salary to the excluded member, and the Doorkeeper from refusing to admit the excluded member. The action was dismissed as to the Speaker and members of the House on the basis of legislative immunity.

*Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania* was an action by a judge of the state supreme court against numerous state officials who had participated in various disciplinary proceedings against him, including 49 members of the Pennsylvania Senate who had voted on articles of impeachment presented by the House of Representatives. In addition to money damages against the senators, the judge sought declaratory and injunctive relief voiding the Senate verdict of guilty on Article II. The trial court dismissed the claim against the senators for money damages but not the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals held that impeachment proceedings were a legislative activity and remanded with instructions to dismiss all the claims against the senators.

*Consumers Education and Protective Ass’n v. Nolan* was an action against the chairman of a committee of the Pennsylvania Senate for a declaratory judgment that the vote whereby the committee recommended confirmation of an appointment by the Governor was void as in violation of the “sunshine” law because of inadequate public notice of the meeting, to declare the senate vote on the confirmation likewise void, to enjoin the chairman from submitting any other name to the Senate for confirmation, and to enjoin the chairman to take minutes of all meetings of his committee. The action was dismissed on the basis of legislative immunity.

Legislative immunity also protects legislative staff from declaratory judgments. *Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n*, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975); *Newdow v. Congress of the United States, supra*, (Law Revision Counsel).
In one case, however, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma refused to dismiss a declaratory judgment action brought against the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to have a law declared unconstitutional, finding that the suit was really against the state itself and that the legislators were only nominal defendants. *Ethics Comm’n v. Cullison*, 850 P.2d 1069 (Okl. 1993).

In a petition for a declaratory judgment to invalidate a governor’s vetoes of several items in a general appropriations bill, an allegation that there were communications between the governor’s staff and legislative staff about the items before the vetoes does not implicate the Speech or Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, article II, § 15. *Jubelirer v. Rendell*, 904 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).

Where legislators have been named as defendants but legislative immunity has not been asserted as a defense, courts have issued declaratory judgments invalidating legislative actions. *Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.*, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (current common school system did not satisfy constitutional requirement that General Assembly provide efficient system of common schools throughout state); *Williams v. State Legislature of Idaho*, 111 Idaho 156, 722 P.2d 465 (1986) (failure of the Legislature to appropriate money to the State Auditor to conduct post-audit functions was “impermissible”); *State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Finance Comm.*, 168 Mont. 470, 543 P.2d 1317 (1975) (law granting Legislative Finance Committee power to amend enacted budget was unconstitutional); *Thompson v. Legislative Audit Comm’n*, 79 N.M. 693, 448 P.2d 799 (1968) (law removing duties implicit in office of state auditor was unconstitutional). In similar circumstances, courts have upheld legislative actions, again without mentioning legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. *Jones v. Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Retirement Sys.*, 910 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1995) (General Assembly’s amendments to statute governing state retirement system were constitutional); *Philpot v. Haviland*, 880 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1994) (senate rule on withdrawing bills from committee was constitutional); *Philpot v. Patton*, 837 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1992) (suit challenging senate rule as unconstitutional was moot where rule expired at end of session).

### 4. Injunctions


In *Eastland*, an action to enjoin a Senate subcommittee from implementation of a subpoena *duces tecum* was dismissed on the basis of legislative immunity. In *Stamler*, an action to enjoin the House Un-American Activities Committee from conducting a hearing and from enforcing its subpoenas was dismissed on the basis of legislative immunity.
However, if the members of a subcommittee are not named as defendants in an action to enjoin implementation of a subcommittee subpoena *duces tecum* directed against a private corporation, and the executive branch moves to quash the subpoena on the basis of a claim of executive privilege to protect national security, as with a subpoena of telephone records of warrantless wiretaps, the court may be willing to balance a claim of legislative immunity against a claim of executive privilege. *United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Legislative immunity from injunctive relief applies at common law to protect state legislators from a federal injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Star Distributors, Ltd. v. Marino*, 613 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1980). There a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the members of a New York state legislative committee from enforcing subpoenas *duces tecum* served upon printers, publishers, and distributors of sexually-oriented material as part of a legislative investigation of child pornography was denied.

Legislative immunity does not protect a state senator from an injunction prohibiting her from performing her duties when, before her term began, she was finally adjudicated by a state court not to be eligible to hold the office to which she was elected, notwithstanding that the Senate to which she was elected found she was eligible, voted to seat her, and swore her into office. *Stephenson v. Woodward*, 182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2005).

5. **Writs of Quo Warranto and Mandamus**

Legislative immunity protects a Senate and House of Representatives, as well as their members, from writs of quo warranto and mandamus seeking to determine the constitutionality of a law, *State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives*, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984) (law authorizing legislature to adopt, modify, or revoke administrative rules by concurrent resolutions passed by the legislature without presentment to the governor); or seeking to order Congress to carry out its obligations under a treaty, *Orta Rivera v. Congress of the United States*, 338 F. Supp.2d 272 (D. Puerto Rico 2004).

Where a state constitution does not include a Speech or Debate Clause, see NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 11, and common law legislative immunity is not asserted, a writ of mandamus may issue directing the Legislature to enact a tax increase to fund education, *Guinn v. Legislature*, 71 P.3d 1269, 1276 (Nev. 2003), while individual legislators are dismissed from the suit on the basis of the separation of powers, 76 P.3d 22, 30 (Nev. 2003).

6. **Claims for Repayment**

Legislative immunity protects state legislators from having to defend a claim for repayment of amounts paid to them under a law increasing legislative expense allowances when the law is challenged as unconstitutional. *Consumer Party of Pa. v. Pa.*, 510 Pa. 158, 507 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1986).

7. **Cancellation of Enrollment in Political Party**

Legislative acts, such as voting, participating in caucus activities, and choosing a seat in the Senate Chamber, may not be used as evidence of party affiliation that is used to cancel a member’s enrollment in a political party. *Rivera v. Espada*, 98 N.Y.2d 422, 777 N.E.2d 235, 748 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2002).
8. Recall from Office

Common law legislative immunity protects a local legislator from recall for allegedly false statements made during a city council debate on adoption of a resolution. In re Recall of Call, 109 Wash.2d 954, 749 P.2d 674 (1988).

B. From Having to Testify or Produce Documents

1. In Criminal Actions

The Speech or Debate Clause protects a legislator from having to respond to a subpoena, even one issued by a grand jury investigating possible criminal conduct, insofar as the subpoena would require him or her to testify concerning legislative activities.

[T]he Speech or Debate Clause at the very least protects [a Senator] from criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing at which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the public record. To us this claim is incontrovertible.

. . . We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer - either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution - for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting.


The immunity of a legislator from having to respond to a subpoena relating to conduct “within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” is shared by the legislator’s aides.

[F]or the purpose of construing the privilege a Member and his aide are to be ‘treated as one,’ United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d, at 761 . . . [T]he ‘Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by [a Senator’s aide] as the Senator’s agent or assistant which would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally.’ United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. at 937-938.

Quoted in Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616.

Nor will the courts attempt to enforce a subpoena ducès tecum served on the chief counsel of a House subcommittee on behalf of a defendant in a criminal trial when the subpoena is directed to the official record of testimony received by the subcommittee in executive session. United States v. Ehrlichman, 389 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1974).

Legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause is both a use immunity to protect a legislator from liability and a testimonial immunity to protect a legislator from harassment, but it may not always protect legislative documents from subpoena by a grand jury when they are not in the possession of a legislator or the legislator’s personal or committee staff.

[T]o the extent that the Speech or Debate Clause creates a testimonial privilege as well as use immunity, it does so only for the purpose of protecting the legislator and those intimately associated with him in the legislative process from the harassment of hostile questioning. It is not designed to encourage confidences by maintaining secrecy, for the legislative process in a democracy has only a limited toleration for secrecy . . . . As we have said on two other occasions, the privilege when applied to records or third-party testimony is one of nonevidentiary use, not of non-disclosure.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3rd Cir. 1978); contra Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, No. 94-5171, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that records of telephone calls, both official and unofficial, to and from Representative Eilberg and in the possession of the Chief Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, rather than in the possession of Rep. Eilberg or his aide, were subject to subpoena by a grand jury, but that calls identified by Representative Eilberg as relating to official business could not be presented to the grand jury. The Third Circuit’s approach has been squarely rejected by the D.C. Circuit. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, No. 06-3105, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (search of office of Congressman William J. Jefferson); Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420 (“We do not share the Third Circuit's conviction that democracy's 'limited toleration for secrecy' is inconsistent with an interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause that would permit Congress to insist on the confidentiality of investigative files.”)

In the search of Congressman Jefferson’s office, a search warrant had been approved in advance by a judicial officer on probable cause. The warrant specified in detail paper documents and computer files that were not privileged legislative material. But the nonprivileged material was commingled with legislative material. The seized materials were to be first reviewed and sorted by a “Filter Team” of two Department of Justice attorneys who were not on the “Prosecution Team” and an FBI agent who had no role in the investigation or prosecution of the case, with any disputes over privilege to be determined by the Court before the materials were given to the Prosecution Team. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the search violated the Speech or Debate Clause because it had not afforded the Congressman an opportunity to identify legislative materials and exempt them from seizure by the executive branch. 497 F.3d 654. However, the Court also ruled that copying the Congressman’s computer hard drives and other electronic media was constitutionally permissible because the Remand Order afforded the Congressman an opportunity to assert the privilege before disclosure of privileged materials to the Executive. 497 F.3d at 663.

In a Wisconsin case, the court held that a subpoena duces tecum issued by a magistrate judge at the request of the Dane County District Attorney and served on the Legislative Technology Services Bureau to produce all the backup tapes made on December 15, 2001, for all of the electronically stored communications of the Wisconsin Legislature was overly broad and therefore unreasonable. In re John Doe Proceeding, No. 02-3063W, 2004 WI 65, 272 Wis.2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792 (June 9, 2004), modified 2004 WI 149 (Dec. 15, 2004). The court said the record before it was insufficient for it to determine how the Speech or Debate Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, art. IV, § 16, related to the data sought by the subpoena duces tecum, but that even when it did apply, it provided “only use immunity and not secrecy for communications of government officials and employees.” Id. at 35.

Even where the records of a congressman were subpoenaed by a grand jury from his administrative assistant, the congressman’s motion to quash the subpoena was denied, but he was granted the right to assert legislative immunity as to specific documents in camera and his request for a protective order prohibiting testimony by his administrative assistant relating to the congressman’s legislative activities was upheld. In re Possible Violations, 491 F. Supp. 211 (D.D.C. 1980).

Legislative immunity under federal common law does not protect state legislators and staff from having to testify and produce records regarding legislative actions in a federal criminal proceeding. In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir. 1987). A federal grand jury investigating
alleged improprieties in procurement of granite for expansion of the Pennsylvania state capitol issued a subpoena *duces tecum* to members of a state legislative committee that had already been investigating the same allegations. The federal district court quashed the subpoena as to all documents conveying impressions and thought processes of committee members, but enforced it as to information regarding identity of witnesses interviewed by the committee and as to documents or exhibits authored by a witness or third party that could not be obtained by any other means. *In re Grand Jury Subpoena*, 626 F. Supp. 1319 (M.D. Pa. 1986). The court noted that the committee members had voluntarily supplied the grand jury with substantial information from their own investigation and that “much of the information sought is readily available from other sources.” 626 F. Supp. at 1329 n. 9. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Speech or Debate Clause immunity does not protect state legislators from having to produce documents for a federal grand jury. 821 F.2d 946. Their proper remedy to protect from an unreasonable or oppressive subpoena is a motion under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 821 F.2d at 957.

Federal common law legislative immunity does not shield a state senator and chief clerk of the state Senate from producing legislative payroll and tax evidence before a federal grand jury that is investigating allegations of mail fraud, racketeering, and tax evasion, although records of legislative actions would be protected. *In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Cianfrani)*, 563 F.2d 577 (3rd Cir. 1977).

In Florida, the refusal of the chair of a House committee investigating prison conditions to testify and produce documents before a grand jury investigating the death of an inmate was ruled a contempt of court, on the ground that the generalized interest of a legislator in preserving confidentiality must yield to the demonstrated specific need for evidence of a crime alleged to have been committed in the state. *See Girardeau v. Florida*, 403 So.2d 513 (Fla. App. 1981).

2. **In Civil Actions**

a. **State Legislators**

Legislative immunity at federal common law protects a state legislator from having to testify in a civil action in federal court in which the legislator is not a party about the legislator’s motives for supporting the passage of a bill. *Greenberg v. Collier*, 482 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Va. 1979). Where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a law and subpoenaed for deposition the chairman of the subcommittee of the Virginia General Assembly that had recommended the bill to pass, the chairman’s motion to quash the subpoena was denied but a protective order prohibiting inquiry into “any legislative activity or his motives for same” was granted on the basis of federal common law legislative immunity. *Id.*

In an action against a state legislator in state court alleging a violation of federal law, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a court will apply federal common law, rather than a state’s own Speech or Debate Clause, in determining the scope of legislative immunity. *Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Roberts*, 777 A.2d 1225, 1232-34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). Common law legislative immunity protects a legislator from having to disclose records of telephone calls on legislative business. *Id.* Legislative immunity will not protect from disclosure by a state senator documents showing the allocation of money to pay the senator’s office expenses if the decision is made by the Senate Majority Leader as an administrative action, rather than by a vote in the budget process as a legislative action. *Manzi v. DiCarlo*, 982 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
The Speech or Debate Clause of the Louisiana constitution protects legislative staff from having to produce bill drafting files related to specific legislation authored by a member. *Copsey v. Baer*, 593 So.2d 685 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991).

Legislative immunity from having to testify in a civil action in which the legislator was not a party has been recognized by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. *McGaa v. Glumack*, No. C9-87-2398 (Minn. App., Dec. 31, 1987) (unpublished order). *McGaa* was a defamation action brought against the former chair of the Metropolitan Airports Commission. The plaintiff alleged that defamatory statements about him had been included in a document given to a legislative committee. Plaintiff sought to question Senator Donald M. Moe, who chaired the committee, and his aide, Michael Norton, about whether they had received the document and, if so, when and where. He also sought to question them about whether they knew of anyone else who had received the document and, if so, when and where. The senator and his aide moved to quash the subpoenas served on them. The trial court refused to grant the senator and his aide absolute immunity and instead weighed the benefit to the plaintiff in being able to ask the questions against the imposition on the deponents in having to answer them. The trial court ordered the senator and his aide to answer just four questions about their receipt of the document. The Court of Appeals, in a decision for a three-judge panel written by Chief Judge D.D. Wozniak, issued a writ of prohibition reversing the trial court’s order on the ground that it required the production of information that was clearly non-discoverable. The Court cited both *Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund* and *Doe v. McMillan* for the proposition that, “within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause is absolute.

Legislative immunity for a member from having to testify in a civil action in which a legislator was not a party has likewise been recognized in Minnesota at the district court level. Judge Edward S. Wilson of Ramsey County District Court upheld a claim of legislative immunity made by former senator Donald M. Moe, his former committee administrator Michael Norton, and former Senate Counsel Allison Wolf when C. Michael McLaren, former Executive Director of the Public Employees Retirement Association (“PERA”), sought to question them about information they had gathered as part of a senate committee’s investigation of PERA. Judge Wilson issued a protective order prohibiting McLaren from questioning them “about anything said, done, received, or learned by either of them within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, particularly the 1984 investigation of the management of the Public Employees Retirement Association.” *State ex rel. Humphrey v. McLaren*, No. C5-85-475478 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County, Nov. 23, 1992) (unpublished order).

Judge Lawrence L. Lenertz of the First Judicial District upheld a claim of legislative immunity made by Senator Clarence M. Purfeerst and Representative Robert E. Vanasek in the case of *Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm’n*, No. 421416 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County, Dec. 14, 1977) (unpublished order). The legislators had been subpoenaed to give depositions in a case challenging the constitutionality of the act creating the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission. They moved to quash the subpoenas or for protective orders prohibiting plaintiff from questioning them “about anything said or done by them as members of the . . . Legislature in the exercise of the functions of that office, particularly the passage of” the act in question. Judge Lenertz granted the protective orders.

Later that same month, Judge Ronald E. Hachey of Ramsey County District Court upheld a similar claim of legislative immunity asserted by Senator Nicholas D. Coleman and Representative Martin O. Sabo in the *Lifteau* case, and signed a similar protective order. (Dec. 27, 1977) (unpublished).
The Speech or Debate Clause of the New York constitution prevents the introduction of testimony by a legislator about the motives and deliberations of nontestifying legislators regarding the funding of New York City schools. *Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. N.Y.*, 271 A.D.2d 379, 707 N.Y.S.2d 94 (2000). Earlier decisions requiring legislators to testify where they were not parties and faced no civil or criminal liability, e.g., *Abrams v. Richmond County S.P.C.*, 125 Misc. 2d 530, 479 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1984); and *Lincoln Bldg. Assoc.s v Barr*, 1 Misc. 2d 511, 147 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1955), appear to have been overruled by *People v. Ohrenstein*, 77 N.Y.2d 38, 53, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744, 565 N.E.2d 493 (1990) (“[New York’s Speech or Debate Clause] was intended to provide at least as much protection as the immunity granted by the comparable provision of the Federal Constitution”).

The Speech or Debate Clause of the Ohio Constitution protects legislators from being questioned about their private, off-the-record meetings with corporate representatives concerning legislation, but it does not protect them from having to divulge the identity of those corporate representatives or protect the corporate representatives from being deposed about the meetings. *City of Dublin v. Ohio*, 138 Ohio App.3d 753, 742 N.E.2d 232 (2000).


A Pennsylvania legislator may not be deposed in a defamation action about private conversations concerning various candidates to fill a judicial vacancy. *Melvin v. Doe*, 2000 WL 33252882, 48 Pa. D. & C.4th 566 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2000). This is because, even if the questioning were not barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, it would violate a citizen’s right to petition the government in confidence. Id. at 574–76.

The Speech or Debate Clause of the Rhode Island constitution protects state legislators from having to testify in an action challenging the constitutionality of a legislative redistricting plan concerning their actions and motivations in developing the plan. *Holmes v. Farmer*, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1984).

b. Legislative Aides

The immunity of a legislator from having to respond to a subpoena in a civil action relating to conduct “within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” is shared by the legislator’s aides. *MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.*, 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (subpoenas *duces tecum* for oral depositions served on custodian of records and staff director of subcommittee of U.S. House of Representatives for production of documents relating to testimony presented to the subcommittee and information gathered by it; subcommittee’s motion to quash granted); *United States v. Peoples Temple of the Disciples of Christ*, 515 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1981) (committee clerk subpoenaed to testify and produce documents at deposition concerning committee’s investigation of Jonestown tragedy; chairman and clerk’s motion to quash granted); *Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields*, No. 1CA-SA 03-0085, 206 Ariz. 130, 75 P.3d 1088 (2003) (independent contractors hired by commissioners to develop redistricting plan not compelled to disclose documents provided to commission, unless commission chose to call them as expert witnesses at trial); *In re Perry*, 60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001) (notice of deposition of aides to Legislative Redistricting Board quashed); *Holmes v. Farmer*, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1984) (legislative aide to General Assembly’s Reapportionment Commission not required to testify at trial concerning formation of redistricting plan); *Wisconsin v. Beno*, 341 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 1984).
(administrative assistant to speaker of state assembly subpoenaed to testify at deposition about investigation into member’s misconduct; speaker and aide’s motion to quash granted). See, Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1983) (congressman served with subpoena  duces tecum for deposition regarding source of article he inserted in Congressional Record; dicta said that “If [his] aides are deposed, [the congressman] may have them assert his privilege. Because Congressmen must delegate responsibility, aides may invoke the privilege to the extent that the Congressman may and does claim it.”)

When the administrative assistant to the Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, who also served as staff to the Assembly Organization Committee and Joint Committee on Legislative Organization, was served with a subpoena relating to information he had provided to the Speaker and committee members as a result of his investigation into alleged misconduct and violation of law by legislators, the administrative assistant and the Speaker moved to quash the subpoena on the basis of legislative immunity. Granting the motion was upheld on appeal. Wisconsin v. Beno, 341 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 1984).

In State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County, Minn.), defendant tobacco companies served subpoenas  duces tecum on the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House demanding that they produce any nonpublic documents in the possession of the legislature since 1946 related to the dangers of cigarette smoking to your health, public health regulations imposed by the state to reduce those dangers, taxes imposed on tobacco products, and spending of tobacco tax receipts. Judge Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick quashed the subpoenas on the ground of legislative immunity, saying:

Such information is traditionally protected, and for good reason. Such documents fall squarely into the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. The sorts of documents sought directly relate to the process of developing and considering proposed legislation. The exchange of such information is recognized as vital to the legislative process. Disclosure of such matters would chill, if not cripple, free debate, discussion, and analysis of proposed legislation.


In Blume v. County of Ramsey, 1988 WL 114606 (Minn. Tax Ct. 1988), the court quashed a third-party subpoena served on several tax committee staff persons and the Chief Clerk of the House, holding that the Speech or Debate protection prevented discovery into dates, places, and circumstances of committee meetings. The Court held that:

[T]he proposed questions about the dates, places and circumstances of committee meetings fall within the sphere of protected legislative activity. Questions regarding resolutions to suspend or alter Senate or House Rules, and questions about the availability of computer data presented to committees of the legislature likewise relate to the deliberation of the legislative body. . . . We find the recording in the Journals in this case is part of the legislative process because it is required of the legislature as part of its official action. Minn. State. § 3.17. No further inquiry is therefore allowed.

Id. * 4.

Where subpoenas to testify in a civil action to which they were not a party have been served on both Minnesota legislators and legislative staff, the subpoenas have been quashed or protective orders issued for the benefit of legislative staff along with the legislators. McGaa v. Glumack, No. C9-87-2398 (Minn. App., Dec. 31, 1987) (unpublished order); State ex rel. Humphrey v. McLaren, No. C5-85-475478 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County, Nov. 23, 1992) (unpublished order).
In *Minnesota-Dakota Retail Hardware Ass’n v. State*, No. 406422 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County, Sep. 14, 1976) (unpublished order), the hardware dealers challenged the validity of certain regulations promulgated by the Director of Consumer Services. In discovery, they served subpoenas *duces tecum* upon various legislative staff members seeking information concerning the Legislature’s intent in enacting the law pursuant to which the Director of Consumer Services had promulgated the regulations. Judge Otis H. Godfrey, Jr., applied to the Minnesota Constitution the same construction given the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution by the federal courts, and in his order of September 14, 1976, quashed the subpoenas served upon legislative staff “as to any matters pertaining to memoranda, documents or actions by said offices which are or were in connection with the Legislative process.” Other matters, those related to the preparation, drafting, and issuance of the *regulations*, he found to be not related to the due functioning of the legislative process and thus subject to discovery. Matters relating to the regulations may not have been within the legitimate legislative sphere because the duty of promulgating them was, by statute, placed upon the Director of Consumer Services in the executive branch.

Federal common law legislative immunity may not protect a *state* legislative staff member from having to produce documents in a civil suit in federal court in which he is not a party, even though the staff member would be immune from being deposed regarding the documents. *Corporation Insular de Seguros v. Garcia*, 709 F. Supp. 288 (D. Puerto Rico 1989).


In Minnesota, a statute makes bill drafting requests, documents, and communications kept by the Revisor of Statutes not public and not subject to judicial process:

[Employees of the Revisor of Statutes] may not reveal to any person not employed by the revisor's office the content or nature of a request for drafting services. The content of the request and documents and communications relating to the drafting service supplied is not public and is not subject to subpoena, search warrant, deposition, writ of mandamus, interrogatory, or other disclosure.

Minn. Stat. § 3C.05, subd. 1(a).

**VII. Appropriate Relief**

**A. From Criminal Indictment**

When a legislator has been improperly questioned before a grand jury concerning legislative acts, the counts in an indictment that are based on that testimony must be dismissed. *United States v. Swindall*, 971 F.2d 1531, 1546-50 (11th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 510 U.S. 1040 (1994).
If written evidence of any legislative acts is presented to a grand jury, a grand jury’s indictment that may have been based on that evidence must be dismissed. *United States v. Durenberger*, Crim. No. 3-93-65, 1993 WL 738477 at *3-4 (D. Minn. 1993).

B. From Civil Complaint

The usual relief granted when a legislator has been found to be immune from a civil complaint is to have the complaint dismissed. See, e.g., *Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund*, 421 U.S. 512 (1975).

In one case, the state supreme court issued a writ of prohibition to stop further proceedings in the district court. *Brock v. Thompson*, 1997 OK 127, 948 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1997).

C. From Subpoena

In *Gravel v. United States*, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the Court of Appeals to fashion a protective order that forbade questioning the Senator’s aide:

1. concerning the Senator’s conduct, or the conduct of his aides, at the June 29, 1971, meeting of the subcommittee;
2. concerning the motives and purposes behind the Senator’s conduct, or that of his aides, at that meeting;
3. concerning communications between the Senator and his aides during the term of their employment and related to said meeting or any other legislative act of the Senate;
4. except as it proves relevant to investigating possible third-party crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the course of their employment, in preparing for the subcommittee hearing.

408 U.S. at 628-29.


In *Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. N.Y.*, 179 Misc.2d 907, 687 N.Y.S.2d 227, aff’d 265 A.D.2d 277, 697 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1999), the court granted a protective order barring plaintiffs from “seeking disclosure concerning contacts between [an executive branch employee] and legislative and executive officials and staff concerning the creation, consideration and enactment of legislation.” 687 N.Y.S.2d at 232.

In *Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington*, 138 F. Supp.2d 136 (D. Mass. 2001), the plaintiffs sought to depose five members of the town’s board of selectmen about their motives for enacting regulations governing the use of the Battle Green at Lexington Common that prevented them from displaying a creche on the Battle Green. The court issued a protective order prohibiting plaintiffs from questioning the selectmen about their motives for passing the regulations and from deposing them at any time before demonstrating to the court that the selectmen had evidence of objective facts not available from any other source.

In *Minnesota-Dakota Retail Hardware Ass’n v. State*, No. 406422 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County, Sep. 14, 1976) (unpublished order), the district court quashed the subpoenas served on legislative staff “as to any matters pertaining to memoranda, documents or actions by said offices which are or were in connection with the Legislative process.” And in *Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm’n*, No. 421416 (2nd Dist. Ramsey County), the Minnesota district court granted protective orders (Dec. 14, 1977, unpublished), (Dec. 27, 1977, unpublished) prohibiting plaintiffs from questioning senators “about anything said or done by them as members of the . . .
Legislature in the exercise of the functions of that office, particularly the passage of [the act whose constitutionality was in question].”

VIII. Right to Interlocutory Appeal

Denial of a claim of legislative immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the Speech or Debate Clause is designed to protect Members of Congress “not only from the consequences of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending themselves.” Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979) (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967); United States v. Jefferson, 546 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, No. 06-3105, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1, 4 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom. Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson, No. 06-618, 550 U.S. 511 (2007); United States v. Rostenkowski, No. 94-358, 59 F.3d 1291, 1297-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Smith v. Lomax, No. 93-8062, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 288-89 (3rd Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1487, slip op. at 8-10); United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Browning v. Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923, 926 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Federal common law grants the same right of interlocutory appeal to state legislators, Youngblood v. DeWeese, No. 03-1722, 352 F.3d 836 (3rd Cir. Dec. 18, 2003), or to county commissioners, Woods v. Gamel, No. 96-7171, 132 F.3d 1417 (11th Cir. 1998), whose motion to dismiss a claim in federal court based on legislative immunity was denied.

The proper method of appeal is by direct interlocutory appeal; because a direct appeal is possible, a writ of mandamus will not lie in federal court. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 505-08 (1979). The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, has issued a writ of prohibition. McGaa v. Glumack, No. C9-87-2398 (Minn. App., Dec. 31, 1987) (unpublished order). The Arizona Court of Appeals has used special action jurisdiction to provide immediate review of an order to compel discovery, Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, No. 1CA-SA 03-0085, 206 Ariz. 130, 75 P.3d 1088 (2003); and of an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint, Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 854 P.2d 126 (1993). The Texas Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus when the trial court denied a motion to quash a notice of deposition of members of the Legislative Redistricting Board and their aides. In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001).

There is no right to interlocutory appeal of an order compelling discovery against legislators who had intervened in a suit and intended to press their claims, but who refused to respond to discovery requests against them. Powell v. Ridge, 247 F.3d 520 (3rd Cir. 2001).

Interlocutory appeal is not available where plaintiffs have alleged conduct by a state legislator that, if proven, would clearly be outside the legislative sphere, and defendant has offered no facts that would bring his conduct within the legislative sphere. Sylvan Heights Realty Partners, L.L.C. v. LaGrotta, 940 A.2d 585 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 2008).

IX. Waiver of Immunity

The legislative immunity afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause may be waived, if that is possible, “only after explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the protection.” United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979). Helstoski held that voluntary testimony to grand juries on ten occasions was not a waiver. Other cases have likewise held that a legislator may cooperate with an investigation in various ways and still be permitted to assert legislative immunity. See, e.g., 2BD Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. County Comm’rs, 896 F. Supp. 528, 535 (D. Md. 1995) (county
commissioners answering certain discovery questions about their legislative activities not a waiver of objections to further discovery); Greenberg v. Collier, 482 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Va. 1979) (submission of affidavit not a waiver); New Jersey v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 278 N.J. Super. 192, 650 A.2d 840 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1994) (participating in criminal investigation, submitting affidavits, and explicitly waiving immunity of legislative staff was not a waiver of immunity of members); Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 985 (R.I. 1984) (testimony at depositions in a related case not a waiver; voluntary testimony at trial not a waiver, testimony held improperly admitted into evidence at trial).


To receive the protection of legislative immunity, a member must assert it. In United States v. Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the chairman of a House committee was subpoenaed to testify at a third-party criminal trial while Congress was in session. The chairman moved to quash the subpoena on the ground compliance would be unreasonable and oppressive but did not advance a claim of legislative immunity. The court denied the motion to quash the subpoena, mentioning in a footnote that failure to claim legislative immunity was a waiver of it. In Hughes v. Speaker of the N.H. House of Representatives, 876 A.2d 736 (N.H. 2005), the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and others were sued by a member of the House for conducting conference committee meetings in private, in violation of the New Hampshire constitution’s open meeting requirement. The court noted that, because the defendants had not sought immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the state constitution, the court did not need to decide whether the Clause made the claim nonjusticiable, but dismissed it on the merits.

Testifying voluntarily is a waiver of legislative immunity. Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 520 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1985) (Virgin Islands legislator voluntarily submitted to deposition by Assistant United States Attorney); United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 1979) (Illinois legislator testified to grand jury); Alexander v. Holden, No. 94-1810, 66 F.3d 62, 68 n.4 (4th Cir. 1995). Choosing to call one’s legislative aide as an expert witness at trial is a waiver of the aide’s legislative immunity with regard to that testimony. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, No. 1CA-SA 03-0085, slip op. at 32-33, 206 Ariz. 130, 144, ¶ 48, 75 P.3d 1088, 1102 (App. 2003). However, if the aide is redesignated as a fact witness, legislative immunity may be reasserted, so long as the aide does not testify as an expert. Ariz. Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 1 CA-CV 04-0061, slip op. at 50-57, ¶¶ 76-89, 211 Ariz. 337, 358-60, 121 P.3d 843, 864-66 (Ariz. App. 1 Div. 2005).
Intervening in an action to defend the constitutionality of a law is a waiver of legislative immunity; legislators who so intervene may be assessed attorney’s fees when the law is declared unconstitutional. *May v. Cooperman*, 578 F. Supp. 1308 (D. N.J. 1984). In *May*, the New Jersey Legislature enacted, over the governor’s veto, a law directing principals and teachers to “permit students of each school to observe a 1 minute period of silence.” 578 F. Supp. at 1309. The attorney general and executive branch officials refused to defend the statute when its constitutionality was challenged in court. The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives moved, on behalf of their respective bodies, to intervene to defend the statute. The motion was granted, and they served throughout the litigation as the only defenders of the statute. The statute was found to be unconstitutional. The court found that the legislators had waived their legislative immunity and moved outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity by undertaking the executive’s responsibility to defend the statute, and assessed attorney’s fees against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

In Alabama, the Constitution of 1901, article IV, § 106, as amended by Amendment 341, and § 110, as amended by Amendments 375 and 397, requires that, before a local law may be introduced in the Legislature, four-weeks notice of its substance must be published in the affected counties. The Alabama Supreme Court, in *Bassett v. Newton*, 658 So.2d 398, 402 (Ala. 1995), held that “a legislator waives any confidentiality regarding proposed legislation once public notice is published.”


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### ASLCS

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### Case Studies

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**Historic Preservation**

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**International**

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<td>MacMinn, E. George</td>
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Spring 2006    Phelps, John B.    A Consultancy in Iraq
Fall 2000    Pretorius, Pieter    The Role of the Secretary of a South African Provincial Legislature
Spring 2002    Schneider, Donald J.    Emerging Democracies

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Summer 1999    Arinder, Max K.    Planning and Designing Legislatures of the Future
Fall 2000    Arinder, Max K.    Back to the Future: Final Report on Planning and Designing Legislatures of the Future
Fall 2013    Crumbliss, D. Adam    The Gergen Proposition: Initiating a Review of State Legislatures to Determine Their Readiness to Lead America in the 21st Century
Winter 2000    Drage, Jennifer    Initiative, Referendum, and Recall: The Process
Fall 2005    Hodson, Tim    Judging Legislatures
Fall 2010    Maddrea, Scott    Tragedy in Richmond
Fall 2006    Miller, Steve    Where is the Avant-Garde in Parliamentary Procedure?
Spring 1996    O'Donnell, Patrick J.    A Unicameral Legislature
Spring 1998    Pound, William T.    The Evolution of Legislative Institutions: An Examination of Recent Developments in State Legislatures and NCSL
Fall 2009    Robert, Charles    Book Review of Democracy's Privileged Few: Legislative Privilege and Democratic Norms in the British and American Constitutions
Fall 2000    Rosenthal, Alan    A New Perspective on Representative Democracy: What Legislatures Have to Do
Fall 1995    Snow, Willis P.    Democracy as a Decision-Making Process: A Historical Perspective
Fall 2014    Ward, Bob    Lessons from Abroad

**Process**

Spring 2010    Austin, Robert J.    Too Much Work, Not Enough Time: A Virginia Case Study in Improving the Legislative Process
Fall 1996    Burdick, Edward A.    Committee of the Whole: What Role Does It Play in Today's State Legislatures?
Fall 2017    Champagne, Richard    Organizing the Wisconsin State Assembly: The Role of Memoranda of Understanding
Spring 2003    Clapper, Thomas    How State Legislatures Communicate with the Federal Government
Spring 2008    Clemens, Laura    Ohio’s Constitutional Showdown
Fall 2006    Clift, Claire J.    Reflections on the Impeachment of a State Officer
Fall 2008    Clift, Claire J.    Three Minutes
Spring 2004    Dunlap, Matthew    My Roommate Has a Mohawk and a Spike Collar: Legislative Procedure in the Age of Term Limits
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Fall 2001 Whelan, John T.  A New Majority Takes Its Turn At Improving the Process

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Spring 2001 Barish, Larry  LSMI: A Unique Resource for State Legislatures
Fall 2001 Best, Judi  Legislative Internships: A Partnership with Higher Education
Spring 1996 Brown, Douglas G.  The Attorney-Client Relationship and Legislative Lawyers: The State Legislature as Organizational Client
Fall 2002 Gallagher and Aro  Avoiding Employment-Related Liabilities: Ten Tips from the Front Lines

Spring  2011 Galvin, Nicholas  Life Through the Eyes of a Senate Intern
Spring  2003 Geiger, Andrew  Performance Evaluations for Legislative Staff
Spring  1997 Gumm, Jay Paul  Tap Dancing in a Minefield: Legislative Staff and the Press
Fall  1997 Miller, Stephen R.  Lexicon of Reporting Objectives for Legislative Oversight
Fall  2014 Norelli, Terie  Building Relationships through NCSL
Winter  2000 Phelps, John B.  Legislative Staff: Toward a New Professional Role
Spring  2004 Phelps, John B.  Notes on the Early History of the Office of Legislative Clerk
Winter  2000 Swords, Susan  NCSL's Newest Staff Section: "LINCS" Communications Professionals
Fall  1996 Turcotte, John  Effective Legislative Presentations
Fall  2005 VanLandingham, Gary R.  When the Equilibrium Breaks, the Staffing Will Fall – Effects of Changes in Party Control of State Legislatures and Imposition of Term Limits on Legislative Staffing

Technology
Spring 1996 Behnk, William E.  California Assembly Installs Laptops for Floor Sessions
Spring 1997 Brown and Ziems  Chamber Automation in the Nebraska Legislature
Fall 2008 Coggins, Timothy L.  Virginia Law: It’s Online, But Should You Use It?
Spring 2002 Crouch, Sharon  NCSL Technology Projects Working to Help States Share Resources
Spring 1997 Finch, Jeff  Planning for Chamber Automation
Summer 1999 Galligan, Mary  Computer Technology in the Redistricting Process
Summer 1999 Hanson, Linda  Automating the Wisconsin State Assembly
Fall 1995 Larson, David  Emerging Technology
Fall 1996 Pearson, Herman (et al)  Reengineering for Legislative Document Management
Fall 1995 Schneider, Donald J.  Full Automation of the Legislative Process: The Printing Issue
Spring 2006 Steidel, Sharon Crouch  E-Democracy – How Are Legislatures Doing?
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